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This doctoral dissertation consists of three studies that discuss several aspects of the international 
development of the private equity industry. We start this dissertation with an introductory chapter that 
introduces our research topic. Chapter 2, 3 and 4 present each of the three studies. The final chapter 
discusses the main findings and contributions of the studies. 
Chapter 1: Introduction 
Private equity (PE) emerged in the 1970s and 1980s in the United States and became an important 
financing source for unquoted companies. Although the gradual internationalization is a major 
development within the private equity industry, this topic has only recently been addressed in academic 
literature (Wright, Pruthi & Lockett, 2005). The goal of this dissertation is to increase our understanding 
of international PE transactions. We hereby focus on the one hand on the drivers of PE investors’ cross-
border activities and on the other hand on the exits of international transactions. In this introductory 
chapter, we will first describe the PE market in addition to the development of cross-border PE. A 
particular emphasis will be given to international PE transactions as an interesting research setting for 
academics and the state of the current literature in terms of its contributions and gaps. Thereafter, we will 
outline the main theoretical contributions of this dissertation. This is followed by a detailed explanation of 
the research setting. A summary of the dissertation studies concludes this introduction. 
1.1 Setting the scene: Private equity investing 
 
Private equity investors are financial intermediaries that acquire unquoted firms for a limited time period, 
generally for about five to seven years. They have broadly two different business models. The first 
investment strategy is to finance young, entrepreneurial ventures with a high risk and a high growth 
potential. These are often excluded from most external sources of capital such as bank loans or stock 
markets. This investment strategy is typically called venture capital or early stage investing. A PE investor 
takes an equity stake in these firms. A second investment strategy is to acquire and restructure established 
firms in close cooperation with its management. This is the buyout investment market. Buyouts are, in 
contrast to early stage investments, often highly leveraged during their PE ownership (Landström, 2007)1. 
What characterizes both business models are the strict selection of these investments and a detailed 
assessment of information asymmetries2 between the private equity investor and the managers of the 
                                                          
1
 The first category is often defined as the venture capital investment market and the second as the buyout, later stage 
or private equity market. Venture capital and private equity are however often substituted and can generally be 
considered as synonyms (Wright & Robbie, 1998).  
2
 Information asymmetry entails that one party has more or superior information that another party. This happens 
often in private equity investments where managers have more information about a firm than the owners (i.e. the 
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company (Cressy, Munari & Malipiero, 2007; Metrick & Yasuda, 2011). PE investors are furthermore 
highly involved in the management of these companies through close monitoring and guidance. Finally, 
the returns of the investment are gained at the end of the investment when the company is sold, either on 
through an IPO, or - in most cases- through an acquisition (Wright & Robbie, 1998). 
The development of the PE industry started in the 1970s in the United States. It is driven by an increase in 
investment opportunities, tax incentives and by the increasing commitment of pension funds and financial 
institutions (Landström, 2007). The UK has become the second most important PE region since the 
beginning of the 1980s. Over the past 20 years, PE investing spread out towards Continental Europe and it 
is currently developing in emerging regions such as Eastern Europe, Asia and Latin America (Wright et 
al., 2005). 
To further highlight the importance of PE transactions, consider the following figures. In 2010, €203 
billion was invested globally in the PE industry despite difficult economic conditions. In 2008, global 
investing even amounted for € 364 bn. The total investment volume of PE transactions (both early and 
later stage investments) worldwide between 2000 and 2010 is estimated at € 2,046 billion and more than 
130,000 transactions. Later stage investments account for almost 70% of the total investment volume 
compared to 30% for early stage investments over those years. As investment amounts in the early stage 
market are generally much smaller than later stage ones, the venture capital market accounts with more 
than 94,000 investments for 71% of all investments, compared to 38,000 investments in the buyout market 
(29% of the total number). US has the largest investment volume of all countries and corresponds to more 
than half of the total number of private equity investments between 2000 and 2010. The development of 
the European market between 2000 and 2010 is also considerable with more than 38,000 PE investments 
(29% of the total number) and a total investment volume of € 1030 billion, which corresponds to 50% of 
the global investment value. Within Europe, UK is the largest PE market and accounts for 25% of all 
European investments (Thomson One, 2012). 
1.2. International private equity transactions 
 
The emphasis of PE investors on a reduction of information asymmetries explains the advantage of 
proximity (Mason, 2007). More specifically, in order select the most promising investment opportunities, 
obtaining high quality information is essential. This information is however mostly locally available 
through direct or indirect contacts with intermediaries, investors and consultants (Sörenson & Stuart, 
2001). Local presence remains highly important during the investment as well. PE investors devote 
                                                                                                                                                                                            
private equity investors). Potentially, the lack of information could be harmful because one party can take advantage 
of the lack of information of the other party. 
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substantial time in monitoring and value adding activities which requires close guidance, board 
representativeness and frequent contacts with the firm and its management (Wright et al., 2005). 
Familiarity with the firm and with local practices and regulations are important in this respect, 
notwithstanding the need for a specialized knowledge of local stakeholders such as suppliers, managers 
and local regulations (Mäkelä & Maula, 2005; Mason, 2007). Finally, the sale of PE backed companies 
benefits from proximity, because acquirers face substantially lower acquisition costs when they are 
located closely to the PE investment or the selling PE investor (Hursti & Maula, 2007; Jääskelaïnen & 
Maula, 2008).  
Because of the benefits of local presence, non- domestic investments were only a small fraction of the 
total investment activity before the early 1990s (Manigart, De Prijcker & Bose, 2010). This has changed 
substantially since then. In order to highlight the importance of cross-border private equity transactions, a 
brief overview of the international development of the private equity industry between 2000 and 2010 is 
provided in Table 1. This table details the number of investments as well as the total investment value. 
Panel A of Table 1 shows the annual trend in international private equity. Panel B presents the 
international development of the venture capital and buyout investment market and Panel C shows the 
regional spread of international private equity investments. This overview is based on Thomson One 
database on worldwide venture capital and buyout investments (Thomson One, 2012).  
Insert Table 1.1. around here 
Panel A of Table 1 shows that both the number of international as well as domestic investments has 
increased substantially since 2000. As a result, there is a relatively stable trend in the proportion of 
international private equity investments of about 24%. However, the total international investment volume 
has risen substantially from about 70% in 2000 to more than 80% of the global private equity value. This 
stresses the highly international orientation of private equity market. It also indicates that cross-border 
investments are on average much larger than domestic investments. 
Panel B of Table 1 shows that internationalization is highly important in both segments of the private 
equity industry: the relative number of international investments in the venture capital market is equal to 
the buyout market. However, in terms of the total investment value, the buyout market is more 
internationally oriented: 78% of the total investment volume in the buyout market is related to cross-
border deals compared to 70% in the venture capital market. Interestingly, the distribution of cross-border 
investing varies substantially across different target country regions. This is presented in Panel C. While 
only 14% of the North American PE investments are made by cross-border investors, this is almost 35% 
in Europe. Asia and the Middle East are even more internationally oriented. The latter is mainly due to an 
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attractive Israelian VC market. Most international investments occur in Continental Europe (42%), 
followed by North America (34%) and Asia (16%). North America, Europe and Asia also account for the 
highest international investment value: 51% of the total cross-border investment volume occurs in Europe, 
17% of all international investments occur in Asia and 14% of the cross-border deals are invested in North 
American firms. In these regions, cross-border PE finance accounts for more than ⅔ of the total 
investment volume. In sum, our findings show that cross-border private equity has become a crucial part 
of the global private equity market.  
Given the benefits of proximity, the importance of the cross-border private equity industry is paradoxical. 
This raises the interesting question how cross-border PE investors cope with the complexity of non-
domestic investing (Mason, 2007). As a result, cross-border investing receives increasing attention from 
business scholars. While this research field was almost non-existing 10 years ago, there are currently a 
growing number of publications in the area of cross-border PE. These studies are not solely relevant for 
PE scholars but apply to a broader audience in the area of international business: both private equity and 
international business scholars focus on the effects of information asymmetries. The information 
asymmetries in PE investing and internationalization originate from different sources however. Whereas 
the PE literature focuses on the information asymmetries between the managers of a firm and the private 
equity owners, internationalization theory stresses information asymmetries between local and 
international actors as a result of distant and unfamiliar markets. More specifically, cross-border actors are 
not as privileged as domestic ones in their access towards local information. This derives from the 
geographical distance but also from a different culture, language and institutional context. For cross-
border actors, this complicates the incorporation of local market conditions. Hence, the information 
disadvantages between the managers of a firm and the PE owners are particularly pronounced in a cross-
border context. This makes international PE transactions a highly interesting research setting. 
Academic studies in the area of cross-border PE focus generally on three types of phenomena. One 
research stream examines the motives of international PE transactions and the preferred investment 
regions. These studies show that PE investors gradually internationalize towards regions with an 
increasing geographical, cultural and regulatory distance (Alhorr, Moore & Payne, 2008; Manigart et al., 
2010). Moreover, PE investors favor internationalization towards more institutionally developed countries 
as this creates a more investor-friendly climate with more transparency and less information asymmetries 
between PE owners and its management (Guler & Guillén, 2010). When cross-border PE investors enter 
distant or less institutionally developed regions, they alleviate information asymmetries through 
international experience, a focus in later stage investments and close cooperation with local PE investors. 
A close cooperation with local PE investors mainly occurs under the form of a combined equity 
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investment by local and international PE investors which is known under the term local syndication (Dai, 
Hoje & Kassicieh, 2011; Chemmanur, Hull & Krishnan, 2012; Meuleman & Wright, 2011; Tykvová & 
Schertler, 2006). A second research stream explains how cross-border PE investors need to adapt their 
investment strategy to compensate for the lack of knowledge of local market conditions such as the 
different levels of ownership protection. Both local syndication and staffing with local managers is 
important herein (Tykvová & Schertler, 2006; Pruthi, Wright & Meyer, 2009). Cross-border PE investors 
furthermore focus on different aspects of monitoring and value adding than domestic investors. They 
prefer strategic monitoring and advice which is easier to guarantee across distance than monitoring of the 
operational activities (Pruthi, Wright & Lockett, 2003). The third research stream focuses on the outcomes 
of international private equity. While cross-border PE investors may help their investments to implement 
an internationalization strategy, the remoteness of an international investor and his limited local 
experience could potentially be harmful (Hursti & Maula, 2007; Mäkelä & Maula, 2005, 2006). Recent 
findings therefore stress the benefits of a local syndication for the growth and success of the investment, 
particularly for early stage investments and for investments in emerging markets (Dai et al. 2011; 
Chemmanur et al., 2012; Devigne, Vanacker, Manigart & Paeleman, 2011). 
In sum, there is notable research on institutional factors and local syndication in this research field. This 
contrasts to a lack of understanding on the effects of firm-specific heterogeneity for cross-border PE 
investing. More specifically, we know very little about the influence of PE investors’ resource base on the 
international investment strategy or on the outcomes of internationalization. The three doctoral 
dissertation studies aim to address this research gap. In each of these, we examine whether the PE 
investor’s resources alleviate the information asymmetries within different aspects of cross-border PE 
investing.  
1.3. Integrating the international business literature with the resource-based view of the firm 
 
The focus on PE investors’ resources explains why this dissertation lies at the intersection between the 
international business literature and the resource-based view of the firm (RBV). The RBV argues that a 
sustained competitive advantage derives from resources that are valuable, rare, inimitable and not 
substitutable (Barney, 1991). Clearly, within the context of the resource-based view, an important research 
question is: under which conditions do the resources of the firm influence the performance of corporations 
in cross-border activities? In particular, the resource-based view is considered as the main theoretical 
ground to explain how corporations can reduce the complexity of internationalization (Peng, 2001).  
Initially, the RBV was a context-free theory; the potential influence of environmental conditions on the 
value of resources was not taken into account. However, recent findings do show that the characteristics of 
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the business environment are an important moderator of the relationship between resources and 
performance (Holcomb, Holms & Connelly, 2009). Information asymmetries are a very important aspect 
herein. Resources (and strategies) that are valuable under low information asymmetries may become value 
destructive under high information asymmetries and vice versa (Brush & Artz, 1999). In order to address 
these issues, management scholars increasingly adopt a contingent resource-based view perspective. This 
theory combines insights from RBV and the contingency theory. The latter posits that a firm’s competitive 
advantage originates from a proper alignment with the context in which it operates (Aragón-Correa & 
Sharma, 2003).  
In this dissertation, we will apply the same approach and examine the effectiveness of resources for 
international PE investments, an activity characterized by severe information asymmetries. A central 
research question within this dissertation is whether resources that are developed within a particular, 
international context create a competitive advantage. This is an interesting question as there are currently 
contradicting expectations on the benefits of context-specific resources under high information 
asymmetries. One the one hand, large information asymmetries create severe issues for managers to make 
decisions and to assess the consequences of the decisions they make. Under these conditions, managers 
become more risk averse and rely primarily on resources that have proven to be valuable in a particular 
context (Aragón-Correa & Sharma, 2003). Moreover, as context-specific resources are ready to exploit 
and relatively easy to apply, they help firm to create a competitive advantage under large information 
asymmetries (Carpenter & Frederickson, 2001, Aragón-Correa & Sharma, 2003). On the other hand, 
context-specific resources are less generally applicable and they might create a rather narrow mindset. 
This bounds the firm from potentially relevant information. It may also limit the search towards novel, 
potentially more effective mechanisms how to deal effectively with the information disadvantages in 
international activities (Chetty, Eriksson & Lindberg, 2006; Miller & Shamsie, 1996). 
Through a focus on internationalization of PE investors, the studies within this dissertation aim to get a 
better view on the effectiveness of context-specific resources in a context of high information 
asymmetries. More specifically, in the first study we focus on the relationship between PE investors’ 
context-specific resources and the decision to opt for internationalization as a value creating strategy. In 
the second and third study, we examine whether context-specific resources influence the outcomes of a 
cross-border investment strategy, and the exit of their investments in particular. As such, we disentangle 
the effect of context-resources on performance into two steps. First, we focus on the relationship between 
context-specific resources and internationalization. Second, we study the influence of context-specific 
resources on the success of private equity investors’ cross-border investment strategy. This provides us 
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with a richer understanding of the influence of PE investors’ context-specific resources and the 
mechanisms through which these resources create or destruct value.  
1.4. Overview of the research questions and objectives 
 
Table 2 gives a schematic overview of the three dissertation studies. It indicates the aspects of cross-
border investing, the levels of information asymmetries and the resources that are examined. The first 
study focuses on the international investment strategy. The second and third study look at acquisition exits 
after cross-border PE ownership. While the second study examines the effect of cross-border ownership 
on the type of acquisition exit, the third study focuses on the effect of cross-border ownership on the 
likelihood of a domestic versus an international acquisition exit. Hereunder, the contributions of the three 
dissertation studies to the international business literature and to the resource-based view are explained.  
Insert Table 1.2. around here 
1.4.1. Study 1: The influence of experiential, inherited and external knowledge on the internationalization 
of private equity investors 
 
In this study, we examine whether PE investors invest across borders in addition to the extent of 
international investments. It aims to advance the contingent resource-based view through its focus on 
context-specific, foreign knowledge as a driver of internationalization. Building on insights from the 
resource-based view and international business literature; it examines which sources of foreign knowledge 
matter most for cross-border investing. Currently, there is no consensus herein. While international 
business scholars embedded in the process-based view of internationalization highlight the importance of 
internally developed knowledge for internationalization (Johanson & Vahlne, 1977), insights from the 
new venture internationalization studies suggest that relevant foreign market knowledge may originate 
from outside the firm as well (e.g. Oviatt & McDougall, 1994). We therefore focus on both internal as 
well as external sources of foreign knowledge: firm level experiential knowledge acquired through 
previous foreign investments, inherited knowledge through the prior working experience of its 
management and external knowledge through foreign network partners. The research question in this 
study is therefore: What is the effect of experiential, inherited and external knowledge accumulation on 
the likelihood and extent of cross-border acquisitions of private equity investors? 
1.4.2. Study 2: Acquisition exits of cross-border buyouts: Differentiating between financial and strategic 
acquisitions 
 
The second study differentiates between strategic and financial acquisition exits of cross-border buyouts. 
After the first part that examines the influence of cross-border buyout growth and efficiency on the 
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acquisition type, this study focuses on the role of PE investor reputation in the exit process. More 
specifically, it examines how the reputation of the selling international private equity investor can reduce 
the information asymmetries in the sale of cross-border buyouts. These information asymmetries originate 
from the uncertainty of strategic and financial acquirers in the reliability of the target’s financial 
information. This uncertainty is due to the private and international ownership of the cross-border private 
equity investor prior to the acquisition exit (Beuselinck, Deloof & Manigart, 2009, Fang, 2005).  
The contingencies on the reduction of information asymmetries through reputation are not are not fully 
understood however (Rhee & Valdez, 2009). Scholars increasingly highlight the segmentation of 
reputation towards different industries (e.g. Hsu, 2004), but it is unknown whether context-specific 
reputation can reduce the information problems of foreign owned businesses. For this reason, we examine 
the effectiveness of general as well as context-specific types reputation. With respect to context-specific 
reputation, both country-specific reputation (i.e. reputation within the investment country) and industry-
specific reputation (i.e. reputation within the investment industry) are studied. The research question of the 
second dissertation study is therefore: Can the overall, country-specific and industry-specific reputation of 
the private equity investor reduce the information asymmetries in acquisition exits of cross-border 
buyouts? 
1.4.3. Study 3: Cross-border financial intermediation and domestic acquisitions: The role of host country 
experience 
 
The focus of the third study is the information cost of domestic acquirers in the acquisition process of 
internationally owned firms. While cross-border financial intermediaries, such as PE investors, may be 
particularly advantageous for cross-border acquirers, they are less able than local intermediaries to reduce 
the information problems of domestic acquirers. This is the result of a lower integration of cross-border 
financial intermediaries in local information networks. This creates a liability of foreignness (Hymer, 
1976).  
International business scholars have stressed the benefits of context-specific resources and in particularly 
host country experience (i.e. experience in the country of the acquisition target) as a critical resource to 
overcome the liability of foreignness of financial service providers (Zaheer & Mosakowski, 1997). As 
such, we expect this to be important for financial intermediaries to reduce the information costs of 
domestic acquirers. However, within this literature stream, there is an increasing debate on the 
effectiveness of host country experience across different business contexts (Nachum, 2003). As a result, 
we study domestic acquirers’ connectivity towards local information channels as a contingency effect on 
the influence of intermediaries’ host country experience. In a first step, we examine the social aspect of 
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connectivity. We thereby focus on the access to local information through informal business networks 
(Davidsson & Honig, 2003). A second part focuses on the institutional aspect of connectivity. This 
investigates the impact of connectivity with alternative financial intermediaries across different levels of 
financial market development (Johnson, 2004). The research question in this study is therefore: What is 
the effect of host country experience of cross-border financial intermediaries on the information costs of 
domestic acquirers? Is the effect of host country experience contingent on the connectivity of domestic 
acquirers towards local sources of information?  
1.5. Empirical setting: The European private equity market 
 
This dissertation focuses on international PE transactions in Europe, particularly in Western Europe. 
While the first study examines the international investment strategy of European PE investors, the second 
and third study focus on deals located in Europe with a cross-border owner. Europe is second largest PE 
market after the United States (Lerner et al., 2009) but it tends to mirror the US with an increasing number 
of large and experienced investors and a mature fund raising market (Alhorr et al., 2008; Manigart et al., 
2010).  
The European PE market is a preferable research setting to study cross-border PE transactions due to 
better data availability in addition to its international orientation. The figures on cross-border investing 
illustrate the internationalization of the European PE industry. Over the period 2000-2010, 35% of all 
European private equity transactions were supported by foreign investors. In terms of deal value, the 
international orientation is even more notable as 77% of the total transaction volume originates from 
cross-border investments (see Table 1 supra).  
Although data on European private equity investments and other private companies is much more 
available in Europe compared to the United States, one of the main constraints of PE researchers remains 
the access to relevant information. Moreover, information on the investment strategy and international 
orientation of these investors is difficult to obtain. Data are therefore drawn from multiple data sources. 
Each study combines a hand collected dataset with information from other, more widely available 
databases.  
The first study uses survey information on PE investors originating from 5 European countries: Belgium, 
Germany, the Netherlands, Sweden and the UK These countries were chosen because they cover a 
substantial and diverse part of the European PE market. Moreover, these countries are considered 
increasingly mature PE investor markets, covering a large proportion of the cross-border investors in this 
region (Manigart et al. 2010; Schertler & Tykvová, 2011). Our sample combines the early and later stage 
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investment market. Information is collected through surveys by a lack of publicly available information on 
many variables of interest such as investor fund size or the number and international experience of the 
investment managers. This is added with information from the Zephyr (Bureau van Dijk) database which 
contains detailed information on PE transactions as from 1997. 
The second and third study focus on international transactions within the later stage, buyout investment 
market. They use the database from the Centre for Management Buy-out Research as the primary data 
source (CMBOR). This is a unique, hand-collected dataset on European buyout transactions. It covers the 
entire population of UK PE transactions as from the beginning of the 1980s in addition to the entire 
population on Continental European deals as from the beginning of the 1990s. From this database, we 
collected individual deal characteristics on cross-border buyout transactions during the period 1997-2004 
within 6 different countries: Belgium, France, Italy, the Netherlands, Spain and Sweden that have exited 
through an acquisition. Unquoted companies located in these countries are interesting data sources as they 
provide detailed annual account information. The CMBOR data are then combined with other data 
sources. Annual account information is obtained from the Amadeus database (Bureau van Dijk), the 
Datastream database provides information on business cycle effects and the World Bank data covers data 
on the institutional development. By combining these different sources, we were able to construct a unique 
and rich dataset for the three dissertation studies. 
1.6. A summary of the three dissertation studies 
 
1.6.1. Study 1: The influence of experiential, inherited and external knowledge on the internationalization 
of private equity investors 
 
Principal topic  
The increasing globalization is one of the most important developments in the professional service 
industry. International activities are however associated with a steep increase of information asymmetries 
(Filatotchev & Wright, 2011). These are particularly pronounced in professional services, due to the 
inherent difficulties for outsiders to verify the quality of the service ex-ante and to monitor them ex-post 
(Sanchez-Peinado & Pla-Barber, 2006; von Nordenflycht, 2010). Despite these adverse circumstances, our 
knowledge of how professional service firms deal with information asymmetries in cross-border activities 
is still limited. PE investors’ cross-border activities are an interesting example of professional service 
firms’ recent global development. Their value creating activities reside to a large extent in their ability to 
address information asymmetries and agency issues. The latter are heavily influenced by local market 
conditions and practices (Filatotchev & Wright, 2011). 
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A central theme in international business research is the importance of foreign knowledge accumulation 
that helps firms to deal with internationalization uncertainties (Yli-Renko, et al., 2002). The goal of this 
study is to understand how foreign knowledge accumulation influences cross-border activities under 
conditions of large information asymmetries that characterize the internationalization of professional 
service firms and PE investors in particular. Early internationalization theorists recognized the importance 
of internal knowledge development (Johanson & Vahlne, 1977). Subsequent findings from new venture 
internationalization studies (e.g. Oviatt & McDougall, 1994) showed that relevant foreign market 
knowledge may originate from outside the focal firm as well (e.g. Autio, 2005; Johanson & Vahlne, 
2009). We therefore focus on both internal and external sources of foreign knowledge accumulation in this 
study: firm-level experiential knowledge acquired through previous foreign investments, inherited 
knowledge through the prior foreign work experience of its management and external knowledge through 
its foreign network partners. We empirically test whether they increase the likelihood and the number of 
international investments of cross-border venture capital firms.  
Method 
The hypotheses are tested using a representative sample of PE investors in five European countries: 
Belgium, Germany, the Netherlands, Sweden and the United Kingdom. Our unique hand-collected dataset 
combines information from questionnaires and archival data sources. Information concerning inherited 
knowledge was, together with the control variables, collected through postal or e-mail surveys with senior 
managers or managing partners as key respondents. The sample was identified through national and 
European PE associations. Non-member firms that act as PE investors were added. Information on 
international investment partners and international investments required to compute the network variables 
and the dependent variables was obtained from the Zephyr-Bureau Van Dijk commercial database. This 
resulted in a final sample of 110 usable responses (=18.83% of the original sample): 17 Belgian, 28 
German, 6 Dutch, 15 Swedish and 44 UK PE investors. We adopted a Heckman two-stage model to 
analyze the cross-border investment activities of PE investors, estimating first the probability of investing 
cross-border in a selection equation and, conditional on investing cross-border, estimating the number of 
cross-border investments (Estrin, Meyer, Wright & Foliano, 2008; Heckman, 1979). 
 
Findings 
Our findings stress the positive effect of foreign knowledge accumulation on PE investors’ international 
investment behavior. Experiential knowledge has a large effect on international investment activity both in 
terms of the likelihood and the extent of international investments. Inherited knowledge through previous 
international activities of its managers is important as well, particularly for the likelihood of being 
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international. Our results on external knowledge accumulation point at the importance of the foreign 
network structure and particularly at the differences between the number of international partners 
(network range) and the intensity of the cooperation with these partners. While the range of the 
international network does not have a significant effect on the likelihood of being international, the 
intensity of cooperation negatively affects it. International PE investors with intense foreign network 
relationships are more likely to become domestic. Finally, external knowledge accumulation does not 
affect the extent of international activities. Together, these results highlight the importance of experiential 
and inherited knowledge to overcome the information asymmetries inherent in the international 
investment behavior of professional services and of PE investors in particular.  
 
1.6.2. Study 2: Acquisition exits of cross-border buyouts: Differentiating between financial and strategic 
acquisitions  
 
Principal topic 
Continental Europe has become an attractive investment region for cross-border private equity investors, 
despite the lack of a flourishing stock market (Meuleman & Wright, 2009). In order to understand their 
preference for Continental Europe, it is crucial to increase our knowledge of acquisition exits of cross-
border buyouts that provide an alternative to IPO exits. This paper aims to address this knowledge gap and 
differentiates between strategic acquisitions (also called trade sales) and financial acquisitions (also called 
secondary buyouts). In a first step, we examine whether the value creating mechanisms of the cross-border 
PE investor prior to divestment explain the differences between financial and strategic acquisitions. More 
specifically, we study the effect of growth and efficiency during the cross-border buyout as driver of the 
acquisition type. In a second step, we focus on the reduction of information problems inherent in the sale 
of cross-border buyouts. We examine whether the reputation of the cross-border PE investor can alleviate 
these information problems. We also differentiate between different types of reputation in this study. The 
effectiveness of overall as well as country-specific and industry-specific reputation is examined. As such, 
we test whether the effect of reputation in the reduction of information costs is segmented across countries 
and industries.  
 
Method 
We focus on acquisition exits of cross-border buyouts located in Continental Europe. As a result of its 
bank oriented financial system, acquisitions are the dominant exit mechanism for buyouts in this region. 
They correspond to more than 90% of all successful divestments by PE investors (Black & Gilson, 1998; 
CMBOR, 2008). The acquisitions in our sample are identified through the database of the Centre for 
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Management Buyout Research (CMBOR) which is regarded as a comprehensive source of information on 
acquisition exits in Europe. Our dataset covers cross-border buyout exits located in six countries: 
Belgium, France, Italy, the Netherlands, Spain and Sweden. The database covers the sale of investments 
that were made between 1997 and 2004. In order to be included in our sample, an acquisition needs to 
occur before the end of 2008. Our final samples consist of 180 acquisition exits: 83 strategic acquisition 
exits and 97 financial acquisition exits. A combination of logit analysis and seemingly unrelated 
estimations is used to obtain our results. 
 
Findings  
The results indicate substantial distinctions between strategic compared to financial acquisitions. First, we 
show that cross-border buyout growth increases the probability of a strategic compared to a financial 
acquisition. The opposite effect is found for efficiency, which decreases the probability of a strategic 
compared to a financial acquisition. Moreover, our findings stress the role of the selling PE investor’s 
reputation in the reduction of information problems. As a result, both overall as well as country-specific 
and industry-specific reputation strengthen the relationship between efficiency and the type of acquisition 
exit of cross-border buyouts. Country-specific reputation also increases the effect of growth on the 
acquisition type. Finally, our findings indicate that country-specific reputation has the strongest impact of 
the three reputation measures in our study. 
 
1.6.3. Study 3: Cross-border financial intermediation and domestic acquisitions: The role of host country 
experience 
 
Principal topic 
Financial intermediaries, such as financial investors, help to spread information thereby substantially 
reducing the information costs of acquirers (Chemmanur & Fulghieri, 1994). A substantial number of 
financial intermediaries originate from cross-border regions. Their large and geographically dispersed 
network increases the spread of information towards foreign acquirers (Jääskelaïnen & Maula, 2008; 
Ragozzino & Reuer, 2011). This contrasts to domestic acquirers who favor domestic intermediaries which 
are more embedded in the host country information networks (Granovetter, 1985; Zaheer & Mosakowski, 
1997). This creates an important liability of foreignness for cross-border financial intermediaries. 
In this study, we focus on the transfer of information between cross-border financial intermediaries and 
domestic acquirers. We examine how cross-border financial intermediaries can alleviate their liability of 
foreignness towards domestic acquirers through higher levels of host country experience. The latter is 
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defined as the experience acquired by the financial intermediary through prior business deals in the 
country of the target company (Chetty, Eriksson & Lindbergh, 2006). First, we investigate whether host 
country experience increases the likelihood of a domestic over an international acquisition through a 
reduction of domestic acquirers’ information costs. In a second step, we study domestic acquirers’ 
connectivity towards local information channels as a contingency effect on the influence of 
intermediaries’ host country experience. On the one hand, we examine the moderating effect of 
connectivity through informal business contacts between the domestic acquirer and the cross-border 
financial intermediary. We therefore investigate whether the influence of host country experience differs 
between financial acquirers - that operate within the same informal business network as financial 
intermediaries - and strategic buyers – with less established network connections to financial 
intermediaries. On the other hand, we study the moderating effect of the domestic acquirers’ connectivity 
towards alternative financial intermediaries under higher levels of financial market development.  
Method  
Our hypotheses are tested on a unique and hand-collected sample of 296 acquisitions that were guided by 
cross-border financial intermediaries. More specifically, the acquisition targets were financed by a non-
domestic private equity investor prior to the acquisition. Given the substantial equity stake by these 
investors, they are highly involved in the acquisition process of the firms they guide. Acquirers therefore 
attach a particularly high importance to the information spread by these intermediaries (Fitza & Dean, 
2009). We furthermore concentrate on the Continental European market, as this market is increasingly 
internationally oriented with a high number of both domestic and international acquisitions, a large and 
diverse set of cross-border private equity investors in addition to a substantial variation of institutional 
characteristics (Meuleman & Wright, 2011).  
 
Findings 
Our findings support the positive effect of host country experience of cross-border financial intermediaries 
on the likelihood of a domestic acquisition. The reduced liability of foreignness originates from a higher 
embeddedness of financial intermediaries within the local market and an increased transfer of information 
towards domestic acquirers (Coval & Moskowitz, 1999; Zaheer & Mosakowski, 1997). In addition, we 
stress the moderating effect of domestic acquirers’ connectivity towards local sources of information. We 
thereby show the effect of domestic acquirers’ connectivity to the financial intermediary through 
information business networks as well as the connectivity towards alternative financial intermediaries 
through higher levels of host country financial market development.  
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1.8. Tables 
 
TABLE 1.1.: OVERVIEW OF THE INTERNATIONAL PRIVATE EQUITY MARKET  
Panel A: Yearly trend in the number and value of international private equity investments between 
2000 and 2010 (Source: Thomson One) 
A1: Number of international investments 
 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 Total
# International 
investments 6,032 1,165 690 950 1,033 3,381 3,848 4,369 4,137 2,530 3,155 31,290
# Domestic 
investments 17,546 4,873 2,954 4,121 4,458 11,601 11,910 12,601 12,168 8,574 10,552 101,358
Total 
investments 23,578 6,038 3,644 5,071 5,491 14,982 15,758 16,970 16,305 11,104 13,707 132,648
% Inter-
national 
investments 
25.58% 19.29% 18.94% 18.73% 18.81% 22.57% 24.42% 25.75% 25.37% 22.78% 23.02% 23.59%
A2: Value of international investments 
 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 Total
International 
investment 
value  
89,248 58,410 43,875 59,774 64,794 129,793 199,544 284,801 291,837 161,864 164,111 1,548,051
Domestic 
investment 
value 
38,554 24,413 24,650 34,936 41,147 48,255 47,382 71,385 72,928 54,487 39,387 497,524
Total 
investment 
value 
127,802 82,823 68,525 94,710 105,941 178,048 246,926 356,186 364,765 216,351 203,498 2,045,575
% Inter-
national 
investments 
69.83% 70.52% 64.03% 63.11% 61.16% 72.90% 80.81% 79.96% 80.01% 74.82% 80.65% 75.68%
The amounts are expressed in million €. 
Panel B: International private equity investments per investment type (Source: Thomson One) 
B1: Number of international investments 
 
Venture capital investments Buyout investments 
# International investments 22,229 9,061 
# Domestic investments 72,213 29,145 
Total investmentss 94,442 38,206 
% International investments 23.54% 23.72% 
B2: Value of international investments  
 
Venture capital investments Buyout investments 
International investment value  437,717 1,110,334 
Domestic investment value 191,642 305,882 
Total investment value 629,359 1,416,216 
% International investments 69.55% 78.40% 
The amounts are expressed in million €.  
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Panel C: International private equity investments per target country region (Source: Thomson One) 
C1: Number of international investments 
# Inter-
national 
investments 
# Domestic 
investments 
Total 
investments 
% International 
investments in 
target region 
% of total 
international 
investments 
Total North America 10,541 64,148 74,689 14.11% 33.69% 
    US  9,007 55,601 64,608 13.94% 28.79% 
    North America excl. US 1,534 8,547 10,081 15.22% 4.90% 
Total Europe 13,180 24,871 38,051 34.64% 42.12% 
    UK 2,880 6,599 9,479 30.38% 9.20% 
    Western & Northern Europe (excl. UK) 8,092 14,934 23,026 35.14% 25.86% 
    Southern Europe 1,111 2,535 3,646 30.47% 3.55% 
    Eastern Europe & former USSR    1,097 803 1,900 57.74% 3.51% 
Middle East 1,059 947 2,006 52.79% 3.38% 
Total Asia 4,948 8,423 13,371 37.01% 15.81% 
    China 2,056 2,953 5,009 41.05% 6.57% 
    Asia (excl. China) 2,892 5,470 8,362 34.59% 9.24% 
Oceania 526 2,074 2,600 20.23% 1.68% 
Rest of the world  1,036 895 1,931 53.65% 3.31% 
Total 31,290 101,358 132,648 23.59% 100.00% 
C2: Value of international investments 
Value of 
international 
investments 
Value of 
domestic 
investments 
Total 
investment 
value 
% International 
investment value 
in target region 
% of total 
international 
investment 
value 
Total North America 222,033 41,821 263,854 84.15% 14.34% 
    US  177,006 20,611 197,617 89.57% 11.43% 
    North America excl. US 45,027 21,210 66,237 67.98% 2.91% 
Total Europe 791,358 238,865 1,030,223 76.81% 51.12% 
    UK 118,621 21,368 139,989 84.74% 7.66% 
    Western & Northern Europe (excl. UK) 457,326 148,363 605,689 75.51% 29.54% 
    Southern Europe 118,364 42,679 161,043 73.50% 7.65% 
    Eastern Europe & former USSR  97,047 26,455 123,502 78.58% 6.27% 
Middle East 47,589 33,697 81,286 58.55% 3.07% 
Total Asia 269,061 123,658 392,719 68.51% 17.38% 
    China 65,817 45,926 111,743 58.90% 4.25% 
    Asia (excl. China) 203,244 77,732 280,976 72.34% 13.13% 
Oceania 74,131 27,541 101,672 72.91% 4.79% 
Rest of the world  143,879 31,942 175,821 81.83% 9.29% 
Total 1,548,051 497,524 2,045,575 75.68% 100.00% 
The amounts are expressed in million €.   
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TABLE 1.2.: OVERVIEW OF THE THREE DISSERTATION STUDIES 
Title study The influence of 
experiential, inherited and 
external knowledge on the 
internationalization of 
private equity investors 
Acquisition exits of cross-
border buyouts: 
Differentiating between 
financial and strategic 
acquisitions 
Cross-border financial 
intermediation and 
domestic acquisitions: 
The role of host country 
experience 
Main concern The information 
asymmetries of private 
equity investors in 
international compared to 
domestic investments 
The information 
asymmetries in acquisition 
exits of cross-border 
investments: The 
uncertainty about 
governance quality and 
financial statement 
information of 
internationally owned 
portfolio companies 
The information 
asymmetries in the 
acquisition exits of cross-
border investments: The 
role of cross-border 
private equity investors 
on the reduction of 
information costs towards 
domestic acquirers 
Unit of 
analysis 
Acquirer: private equity 
investor 
Portfolio firm: acquisition 
target 
Portfolio firm: 
acquisition target 
Role private 
equity investor 
Acquirer Seller/ financial 
intermediary 
Seller/ financial 
intermediary 
Resource: 
Main variable 
of the study 
Foreign knowledge 
accumulation through 
experiential, inherited and 
external knowledge 
Reputation: overall, 
country-specific and 
industry-specific reputation 
Host country experience 
Research 
question 
What is the effect of 
experiential, inherited and 
external knowledge 
accumulation on the 
likelihood and extent of 
cross-border private equity  
investments? 
Can the overall, country-
specific and industry-
specific reputation of the 
private equity investor 
reduce the information 
asymmetries in acquisition 
exits of cross-border 
buyouts?? 
What is the effect of host 
country experience of 
cross-border financial 
intermediaries on the 
information costs of 
domestic acquirers? Is 
the effect of host country 
experience contingent on 
the connectivity of 
domestic acquirers 
towards local sources of 
information? 
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2.1. Abstract 
 
This paper examines the effect of different types of international knowledge accumulation on the 
internationalization of private equity investors, as a particular type of professional service firms. We 
distinguish between experiential knowledge acquired through previous activities, inherited knowledge 
through the management team and external knowledge through network partners. Hypotheses are 
developed for both the likelihood and the number of cross-border investments. The hand collected dataset 
comprises a combination of survey and archival data on a unique sample of 110 private equity investors 
from five different European countries. Analyses indicate a positive effect of experiential and inherited 
knowledge on internationalization, but external knowledge has limited impact. Intense international 
contacts even decrease international activities. Together, these results highlight the importance of 
experiential and inherited knowledge to overcome information asymmetries inherent in the 
internationalization of professional service firms, and of private equity investors in particular.  
2.2. Introduction 
 
Increasing globalization is one of the most important developments in the professional service industry. 
Over the last thirty years, professional service firms have benefited from the possibilities of foreign 
activities for growth and diversification (Contractor, Kundu & Hsu, 2003; Hitt, Uhlenbruck & Shimizu, 
2006). International activities are however associated with a steep increase of information asymmetries 
(Filatotchev & Wright, 2011). These are particularly pronounced in professional services, due to the 
knowledge-intensity of these activities and the inherent difficulties for customers to verify the quality of 
the services ex-ante and to monitor them ex-post (Sanchez-Peinado & Pla-Barber, 2006; von 
Nordenflycht, 2010). Despite these adverse circumstances, our knowledge of how professional service 
firms deal with information asymmetries in cross-border activities is still limited. Private equity (PE) 
firms’ cross-border investment activities are an interesting example of professional service firms’ recent 
global development. PE investors’ value creating activities reside to a large extent in their ability to 
address information asymmetries and agency issues. The latter are heavily influenced by local market 
conditions and practices (Filatotchev & Wright, 2011). 
A central theme in international business research is the importance of foreign knowledge accumulation 
that helps firms to deal with internationalization uncertainties (Yli-Renko, Autio & Tontti, 2002). The 
goal of this paper is to understand how foreign knowledge accumulation influences cross-border activities 
under conditions of large information asymmetries that characterize the internationalization of 
professional service firms and PE investors in particular. Early internationalization theorists recognized 
the importance of internal knowledge development (Johanson & Vahlne, 1977). Subsequent findings 
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from new venture internationalization studies (e.g. Oviatt & McDougall, 1994) showed that relevant 
foreign market knowledge may originate from outside the focal firm as well (e.g. Autio, 2005; Johanson 
& Vahlne, 2009). We therefore focus on both internal and external sources of foreign knowledge 
accumulation in this study: firm-level experiential knowledge acquired through previous foreign 
investments, inherited knowledge through the prior foreign work experience of its management and 
external knowledge through its foreign network partners.  
A unique hand-collected international dataset combining survey and archival data from 110 PE investors 
in five European countries is used as empirical setting. A broad definition of PE is used, including seed, 
start-up capital and later stage deals such as buy-outs (Wright & Robbie, 1998). Our results stress the 
positive effect of foreign knowledge accumulation on the international investment behavior of PE 
investors. Experiential knowledge has a large effect on international investment activity both in terms of 
the likelihood and the extent of international investments. Inherited knowledge through previous 
international activities of its managers is important as well, particularly for the likelihood of being 
international. Our results on external knowledge accumulation point to the importance of the foreign 
network structure and particularly to the differences between the number of international partners 
(network range) and the intensity of the cooperation with these partners. While the range of the 
international network does not have a significant effect on the likelihood of being international, the 
intensity of cooperation negatively affects it. International PE investors with intense foreign network 
relationships are more likely to become domestic. Finally, external knowledge accumulation does not 
affect the extent of international activities. 
Our study makes several contributions. This paper advances our understanding of international 
professional services. As internationalization is associated with a steep increase of information 
asymmetries and agency problems, it is interesting to study the effects of foreign knowledge 
accumulation in a setting where these issues are particularly pronounced (Shertler & Tykvová, 2011). In 
addition, our results increase our knowledge on the international development of PE investors. While 
previous research has mainly focused on the effects of information asymmetries on the behaviour and 
outcome of PE investors outside their home country (e.g. Chemmanur, Hull & Krishnan, 2010; Devigne, 
Vanacker, Manigart & Paeleman, forthcoming), this paper focuses on the effects of information 
asymmetries and agency risks on the internationalization pattern of PE investors.  
The paper is organized as follows. We first develop our theoretical framework including hypotheses, 
followed by a description of the research method and the presentation of our results. Thereafter, findings 
are discussed and the paper concludes with implications. 
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2.3. Theory development and hypotheses 
 
Cross-border activities increase information asymmetries and agency risks (Filatotchev & Wright, 2011), 
making a firm’s knowledge base especially important for overcoming these risks. Knowledge on 
operating in foreign markets may be accumulated through three different sources: (i) firm level 
experiential knowledge, developed through previous international activities, (ii) inherited knowledge, 
acquired by individual managers through their previous managerial experience in an international context 
and (iii) external international knowledge accessed through a firm’s network of foreign co-investment 
partners. 
Information asymmetries and agency risks are especially important for private equity investors, as they 
typically specialize in managing these risks through careful screening and due diligence before investing 
and through actively monitoring the venture after the investment (Manigart et al., 2006). PE investors 
pursue different strategies to mitigate higher levels of information asymmetries and agency risks in cross-
border investments. For example, they may invest in more information-transparent firms (Dai, Hoje & 
Kassicieh, forthcoming), use more staged financing (Chemmanur et al., 2010) or seek cooperation with a 
domestic co-investment partner (Meuleman & Wright, 2011; Devigne et al., forthcoming). We expand 
below how the three different sources of knowledge may also help to overcome problems of information 
asymmetries and agency risks in cross-border PE investment activities. 
 
2.3.1. Experiential knowledge 
 
Experiential knowledge is acquired and developed within an organization through its previous experience. 
International experience has traditionally been proposed as one of the primary sources of knowledge 
accumulation for international development (Johanson & Vahlne, 1977): internationalization is regarded 
as a learning process where firms create procedural knowledge about how to handle higher agency risks 
and monitoring costs that accompany the higher uncertainties of international activities (Chetty, Eriksson 
& Lindbergh, 2006). Experiential knowledge can be beneficial in a PE context to assess opportunities and 
to mitigate information asymmetries. This gradually results in a smoother incorporation of general 
internationalization knowledge within the firm, positively affecting the perception about its ability to 
further engage in cross-border activities (Cohen & Levinthal, 1990). As a result of this learning process, 
firms that develop general internationalization knowledge through past international experiences are 
expected to further increase their commitment to pursue even more international activities (Johanson & 
Vahlne, 1977). 
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The importance of experiential knowledge for reducing information asymmetries in cross-border 
investments has been recognized in the PE industry. For example, PE investors are less likely to syndicate 
with domestic partners when they have more international experience (Meuleman & Wright, 2011). This 
suggests that international experience alleviates information asymmetries and monitoring costs. 
Moreover, investments in international knowledge development through previous international activities 
are not recoverable. This is expected to strengthen the positive relationship between past international 
experience and future international investment activities. Hence we propose: 
 
H1: Experiential knowledge increases the cross-border investment activities of PE investors.  
2.3.2. Inherited knowledge 
 
In addition to internal knowledge development, we expect the international operations of professional 
service firms to be positively related with their inherited knowledge (Huber, 1991). Inherited knowledge 
refers to the previous international work experience of their managers (Sambharya, 1996) and contributes 
to a stronger understanding of foreign markets. This increases domain familiarity (Cohen & Levinthal, 
1990) and enables the development of schemata for dealing with increasing information asymmetries in 
foreign markets (Takeuchi, Tesluk & Yun, 2005). As such, investors with more inherited knowledge are 
expected to be more capable of managing international operations and to have a better risk perception 
concerning foreign market activities (Bruneel, Yli-Renko & Clarysse, 2010). This is particularly 
important for professional service firms where the professionalization of a firm’s workforce largely 
determines the quality of the services provided (von Nordenflycht, 2010). Its human capital base is 
therefore important for the implementation of local market conditions in different investment regions 
(Hitt et al., 2006). In addition, managers with international experience will have better risk perceptions 
and a more positive attitude towards cross-border activities (Herrmann & Datta, 2006). This will 
encourage firms to collect and integrate information about international opportunities (Erramilli, 1991) 
and make them more aggressive in committing relevant resources to international operations (Novicevic 
& Harvey, 2001).  
Inherited knowledge has proven to reduce information asymmetries in the PE industry. For example, PE 
investors with more experienced managers, hence with more inherited knowledge, provide more value-
adding activities thereby improving the success rate of their portfolio firms (Botazzi, Da Rin & Hellman, 
2008). In the context of international investing, foreign market knowledge gained through the experience 
of PE investors’ managers increases their attention towards agency issues and market risks which they 
perceive as more manageable and controllable (Patzelt, Knyphausen-Aufsess & Fischer, 2009). In 
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addition, PE investors with a stronger human capital base learn how to compete with more established 
investors in foreign regions (Meuleman & Wright, 2011), enhancing their willingness and ability to invest 
internationally. Therefore, we hypothesize:  
 
H2: Inherited knowledge increases the cross-border investment activities of PE investors.  
2.3.3. External knowledge 
 
An increasing stream of international business literature stresses the importance of networks for foreign 
knowledge accumulation (Yli-Renko et al., 2002). According to Johanson & Vahlne (2009), knowledge 
accumulation through foreign partners does not solely provide an opportunity to use or copy the extant 
knowledge from others, it may result in the development of new knowledge as well. It can hence provide 
an incentive to internationalize, with or without the aid from the external network partner (Koza & Lewin, 
1999). 
For PE investors, relevant network relationships originate mainly from syndicated deals with investment 
partners. Syndication entails a combined equity investment which requires substantial commitments and 
frequent interactions of investors (Wright & Lockett, 2003). We expect that network partners are also 
important as a source of external knowledge about international markets. There are two mechanisms 
through which external network relations may expand a PE investor’s knowledge base. First, PE investors 
depend on the knowledge base of their international co-investors during shared activities. Second, shared 
investments, whether they are local or international, may create ability to access and incorporate relevant 
knowledge about non-domestic environments from their international partners (Bruneel et al., 2010).  
 
A foreign network structure is characterized by both the number of partners (or the network range) and 
the strength of the ties with the partners (or the network intensity) (Uzzi, 1997). We explain below how 
the range and the intensity of the foreign network may contribute to external knowledge accumulation 
(De Clercq & Dimov, 2008; Watson, 2007).  
Foreign network range is defined as the number of different non-domestic co-investment partners (Zhao 
& Aram, 1995). We expect that it influences ex-ante information asymmetries and ex-post monitoring 
issues through several mechanisms. First, having a large international network increases the potential of 
deal reciprocity thereby reducing information asymmetries in deal sourcing across distance (Sorenson & 
Stuart, 2001). Second, it diminishes post-investment information asymmetries, particularly if the partner 
in the target country is willing to take the lead (Devigne et al., forthcoming; Meuleman & Wright, 2011). 
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Third, more foreign partners offer more opportunities to acquire knowledge on how to deal with different 
market conditions, skills and approaches in foreign investments (Lavie & Miller, 2008). This may 
incentivize PE investors to internationalize, either as a sole investor or with the aid of other partners.  
The intensity of the relationship with international partners is also expected to impact knowledge 
accumulation (Uzzi, 1997) and ultimately international investment activity. Professional service firms 
often repeat interactions with the same partners to reduce transaction costs and behavioral uncertainty 
inherent in the intangible nature of the services rendered (Hitt et al., 2006; Meuleman, Lockett, Manigart 
and Wright, 2010; Wright & Lockett, 2003). Intense networks signal a higher trust and restrain 
opportunistic behavior (Wright & Lockett, 2003), further reducing information asymmetries and 
monitoring costs (De Clercq & Dimov, 2008; Meuleman et al., 2010). A more intense network of 
relationships hence leads to a higher willingness to invest across distance (Sorenson & Stuart, 2001). 
Moreover, repeated exchanges facilitate the flow of knowledge and in particular the acquisition of tacit 
information (Lane & Lubatkin, 1998; Uzzi, 1997). As a result, the firm may be dislodged from its 
competency traps, stimulating new solutions (Hitt et al., 2006; Lavie & Miller, 2008). Hence, we 
hypothesize:  
 
H3: External knowledge through foreign network range and foreign network intensity increases the 
cross-border investment activities of PE investors.  
2.4 Research method 
 
2.4.1. Sample 
 
The hypotheses are tested using a representative sample of PE investors in five European countries: 
Belgium, Germany, the Netherlands, Sweden and the United Kingdom. These countries are chosen 
because they are major PE markets that cover a substantial and diverse part of Europe (Manigart, De 
Waele, Wright, Robbie, Desbrières, Sapienza & Beeckman, 2002). More specifically, according to the 
EPEA statistics for 2000-2005, these countries managed between 59.5% and 71.6% of all funds that were 
invested by European private equity investors (EPEA, 2006). In addition, these five countries are 
considered as attractive or very attractive PE investment regions in Europe (Groh, von Liechtenstein, & 
Lieser, 2010). In particular, UK is listed as the most attractive European investment country, followed by 
Sweden on the fourth, the Netherlands on the seventh, Germany on the ninth and Belgium on the twelfth 
place (Groh et al., 2010). Finally, the countries in our sample reflect levels of R&D intensity that either 
equaled (Belgium, Netherlands, UK) or largely exceeded (Germany and Sweden) European averages 
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during the time frame of our research (Eurostat, 2008). This indicates the substantial innovation capacity 
of the countries in our sample. 
Our unique hand-collected dataset combines information from questionnaires and archival data sources. 
Information concerning inherited knowledge was, together with the control variables, collected through 
postal or e-mail surveys (in the other countries) with senior managers or managing partners as key 
respondents. The sample was identified through national and European PE associations. Non-member 
firms that act as PE investors were added. This process resulted in 189 responses (response rate of 
34.30%) which compares favorably with rates reported in other recent questionnaires (Cycyota & 
Harrison, 2006). 
Information on international investment partners and international investments required to compute the 
network variables and the dependent variables was obtained from the Zephyr-Bureau Van Dijk 
commercial database. This database has a strong pan-European focus and is thus well suited to develop 
the variables of interest. We omitted 53 cases due to missing data in the Zephyr database, 20 cases due to 
incomplete survey data and six cases due to unreliable data1. This resulted in a final sample of 110 usable 
responses (=18.83% of the original sample): 17 Belgian, 28 German, 6 Dutch, 15 Swedish and 44 UK PE 
investors.  
The questionnaires were administered in 2002 in the UK and in 2003 in the other countries (Belgium, 
Germany, The Netherlands and Sweden). To avoid potential biases from cross-sectional research, the 
dependent variables are measured in a later time period than the independent variables. Hence, only cross-
border investments between 2002-2004 (for the UK) and 2003-2005 (for the other countries) are taken 
into account.  
Overall, our sample is broadly representative of the population with some explicable differences. The 
sample contains proportionally more British firms (40.00% versus 27.40%), while the proportion of 
Dutch PE companies in our sample is somewhat low (5.45% versus 11.43%). The overrepresentation of 
UK PE investors is not surprising as these firms are on average larger and more international than 
Continental European firms, which increases their tendency to respond to the survey and to have 
information recorded in Zephyr. Compared to the European PE population, the sample contains more 
(semi-)captive (33.64% versus 26.30%) and less independent firms (56.36% versus 66.90%) (EVCA, 
2004). Table 2.1. describes all variables, both for the total sample and for the subsamples of domestic and 
international PE investors, and bivariate statistics comparing domestic and international firms. 
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2.4.2. Variables 
 
2.4.2.1. Dependent variable: Cross-border investment activity 
 
We acknowledge the multidimensional nature of cross-border investment activity. As the projects 
undertaken by professional service firms require client and context adapted solutions, they are more 
vulnerable to increasing complexity and excessive governance costs to manage the information 
asymmetries in having a larger number of projects (Contractor et al., 2003; O’Farrell, Wood & Zheng, 
1998). For this reason, we measure the effect of our variables on two different outcomes of 
internationalization. First, we model the likelihood of investing internationally. A dummy variable 
international PE investor takes the value of 1 if the PE investor made at least one investment outside the 
country where its headquarters are located and 0 if all investments were domestic. The sample comprises 
66 (60%) domestic and 44 (40%) international PE investments (see Table 2.1.). Second, we model the 
degree of international activity, conditional on having made at least one cross-border investment. 
Therefore, the number (No) of international investments made by PE investments with at least one 
international investment is recorded. International PE investors made on average 6.93 cross-border 
investments. As this variable is skewed, a log transformation is used in further analyses. Analyzing both 
the likelihood of investing cross-border and, conditional on investing cross-border, the extent of the 
international investment activity allows for a more fine-grained understanding of the impact of different 
sources of knowledge on international activities. 
 
2.4.2.2. Independent variables 
 
In line with the dependent variable, we incorporate the effect of experiential knowledge through previous 
international activities using two variables: a dummy variable of experiential knowledge indicating 
whether the PE investor was international in the previous period and a variable that measures experiential 
knowledge in terms of the number (No) of previous international deals. Both are obtained from the 
Zephyr database. An average PE investor made 2.17 cross-border investments in the period 2001-2002 (or 
2000-2001 for UK PE investors). This variable is skewed and therefore log transformed. 
Inherited knowledge is a self-reported variable. Respondents indicated the percentage of executives with 
international work experience prior to their current position. This variable quantifies the cultural and 
regulatory knowledge obtained together with the ability to build relevant expertise, organizational 
learning and a global mindset (Sambharya, 1996).2 On average, 45% (median 37%) of the executives 
have international work experience. 
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External knowledge is measured through foreign network range and foreign network intensity. These 
variables are derived using information from the Zephyr database, based upon investments during 2001-
2002 (for UK PE investors: 2000-2001). Foreign network range is defined as the number of foreign 
syndication partners with at least one co-investment with the focal PE investor, and is on average 7.99. As 
it is skewed, the log of this variable is used in the analyses. To avoid missing values for firms without 
international syndication partners, a constant (0.1) is added.  
Foreign network intensity quantifies PE investors’ tendency to work multiple times with the same foreign 
investor. We first counted the number of investments the focal PE investor made together with the same 
foreign investor. If the firm made at most one co-investment together with all foreign syndication 
partners, its network intensity is set to 0. If the firm had more than one co-investment with at least one 
foreign partner, the average number of co-investments per foreign partner was calculated. Foreign 
network intensity is equal to that average minus one. As such, we calculate the average number of 
subsequent investments with the same foreign partner. For example, if a PE investor with four foreign 
syndication partners made two investments with foreign syndication partners A and C and one investment 
with syndication partner B and D, it has an average network intensity of 0.50 =[(2+1+2+1)/4 – 1]. The 
average foreign network intensity in our sample is 0.07. 
 
2.4.2.3. Control variables  
 
In line with previous research, we control for investment stage focus, distinguishing between early stage 
and later stage investors (Hall & Tu, 2003). Fifty seven firms invest in later stage deals, with 46 investing 
in both early and later stage deals. We further include fund size and the number of investment executives 
in our analyses to capture the influence of size (Hall & Tu, 2003) and general human resources (Hitt et al., 
2006). The average PE investor has a fund size of €550 million and has 9.59 investment executives. The 
log of these two measures is included. We also take into account if the PE investor is government related 
or not (dummy variable: Public PE investor), because government related firms may have a more local 
investment strategy. Finally, we controlled for the origin of the PE investor by including a dummy 
variable (UK PE investor) taking the value of 1 if the PE investor is British, as the UK PE market 
developed earlier than in Continental Europe. As a consequence, British PE investors are on average 
larger and invest more internationally. This variable contributes towards capturing the UK PE market as 
the most mature and the Continental European countries being at similar stages of development. 
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2.4.2.4. Heterogeneity across different countries 
 
We tested for regional differences in the independent and dependent variables. While neither the 
likelihood nor the number of international investments significantly differ across regions, there are some 
regional differences in terms of experiential and inherited knowledge. More specifically, while the 
likelihood of having international experience does not differ between regions, Dutch and UK PE investors 
have marginally significantly higher levels of experiential knowledge in terms of the number of previous 
international activities (average of 4.17, median of 2.00 and average of 2.55, median of 0.00 respectively). 
Interestingly, Dutch and British PE investors have significantly lower levels of inherited knowledge 
(average and median of respectively 0.27 and 0.25 for the Netherlands and an average and median of 
respectively 0.37 and 0.25 for the UK). Swedish PE investors have the highest level of inherited 
knowledge in our sample with an average value of 0.75 and a median value of 0.80. Belgian and Dutch 
PE investors also have levels of inherited knowledge exceeding the sample average. Differences in terms 
of external knowledge were not significant across the countries in our sample.  
2.4.3. Comparison of international versus domestic PE investors 
 
Table 2.1. presents bivariate statistics distinguishing between domestic and international PE investors. All 
independent variables differ significantly between the subsample of domestic versus international firms. 
75% of the international PE investors have developed experiential knowledge through international 
experience in the previous time period, compared to only 15% for domestic PE investors. International 
investors made on average more international investments in the previous period (4.80 compared to 0.42). 
In addition, 56% of the executives of international PE investors have international work experience, 
compared to 39% for domestic PE investors. International PE investors have a higher foreign network 
range (16.89 compared to 2.06) and cooperate more with the same foreign network partner (0.08 versus 
0.06) than domestic PE investors. This implies that international PE investors make on average a second 
investment with 1 out of 12 foreign network partners compared to 1 out of 15 for domestic firms. In 
addition, international PE investors have a significantly larger fund size (€984 million compared to €232 
million) and employ significantly more investment managers (14.18 versus 6.53). They do not differ 
significantly in terms of investment stage, the proportion of public PE investors and the proportion of UK 
investors.  
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2.4.4. Method of analysis 
 
We eschewed employing a zero inflated negative binomial regression model as this method may cause 
substantial discrepancies in small to medium sized samples (Gujarati, 2003) and because test results 
showed that the log transformation of the dependent variable is not skewed. Instead, we adopted a 
Heckman two-stage model to analyze the cross-border investment activities of PE investors, estimating 
first the probability of investing cross-border in a selection equation and, conditional on investing cross-
border, estimating the number of cross-border investments (Estrin, Meyer, Wright & Foliano, 2008; 
Heckman, 1979). The latter is estimated through an OLS regression which includes the ‘inverse Mills 
ratio’, an estimate based on the selection regression that measures the existence of international 
investments (Li & Prabhala, 2007). To avoid multicollinearity issues, there should be at least one 
instrument that affects the probability of foreign investments, but not the number of foreign investments. 
We therefore include whether the PE investor is government-related or not in the selection equation, as 
most public PE investors have a purely domestic focus. Being a government related PE investor should 
therefore only impact the selection equation. Further, experiential knowledge is measured through a 
dummy variable in the first step and through a continuous variable (log number of cross-border 
investments in the previous time period) in the second step of the analyses.  
Table 2.2. provides an overview of the correlations between the variables. With respect to the control 
variables in our study, there is a high correlation between the number of investment executives and fund 
size. For this reason, two separate models are estimated: the first model includes fund size only, while the 
second model includes the number of investment executives only. Concerning the correlations between 
our independent variables, there is no correlation problem between the two measures of experiential 
knowledge as they are used in different regression steps. Table 2.2. furthermore shows that experiential 
knowledge is highly correlated with external knowledge in terms of the foreign network range. This is not 
surprising as firms that invest abroad are more likely to co-invest with a larger range of non-domestic 
partners. There is also a positive and significant correlation between experiential knowledge and the 
intensity of foreign network relationships but this is relatively low. Variance inflation factors were 
calculated and range between 1.16 and 4.07. The latter corroborate the limited threat of multicollinearity. 
 
Insert Table 2.2. around here 
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2.5. Results 
 
The results of the multivariate analyses are presented in Table 2.3. Model I includes fund size and Model 
II includes the number of investment executives as indicators of the size of the PE investor. The left hand 
columns in each model show the regressions that focus on the control variables only. In line with previous 
findings, PE investors with larger investment funds and more investment managers are more likely to 
invest across borders (e.g. Hall & Tu, 2003). We furthermore find that PE investors who invest solely in 
later stage deals are less inclined to operate internationally compared to PE investors with a pure early 
stage or a more generalist approach. These effects are however only significant in the control models. 
Moreover, the Mills ratio is not significant in most models. Consequently, we conclude that the results 
would not change substantially if the second step of the regression was estimated through an OLS 
regression, but that inclusion of the Mills ratio is necessary due to the potential of a bias (Estrin et al., 
2008).  
 
Insert Table 2.3. around here 
 
The right hand columns in each Model present the regressions including the independent variables. The 
multivariate analyses provide strong support for hypothesis 1, which predicts that PE investors with more 
experiential knowledge will be more international. Both the likelihood of investing internationally and the 
number of international investments are significantly (p<0.01) and positively associated with experiential 
knowledge developed in the previous period. The odds of investing internationally are around 7.5 times 
higher (7.45 in Model I and 7.83 in Model II) 3 for PE investors with cross-border investing experience in 
the previous period. In addition, a percentage increase in international investment experience is related to 
an increase in international investments of 0.42 percent (0.47 in Model II), conditional on being 
international. This implies that for an average international PE investor with two international investments 
in the previous period, having an additional international investment will increase the number of 
international investments in the subsequent period with 21%. The latter shows the high impact of 
experiential knowledge on the cross-border activities of PE investors, both in terms of the number and the 
likelihood of international investing.  
Hypothesis 2 suggests that PE investors with more inherited knowledge will be more international. Table 
2.3. shows a significantly (p<0.05) positive effect in the first step of the Heckman regression. More 
specifically, for an average firm with 10 investment managers of which 45% have international 
experience, adding one investment manager with international experience increases the odds of being 
international by on average 18.7 % (Model I) or 22.2 % (Model II). The influence of this variable on the 
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number of international investments is also supported (p<0.10). Adding one investment manager with 
international experience to an average international PE investor increases its number of international 
investments by 3.6% (Model I) or 3.9% (Model II). Although inherited knowledge matters for both 
aspects of cross-border investing in our study, it more strongly affects the likelihood of cross-border 
investing than the number of cross-border investments. Overall, our findings provide strong support for 
hypothesis 2. 
Hypothesis 3 suggests a positive relationship between external knowledge and the PE investor’s cross-
border investment behavior. The results however indicate that external knowledge measured as foreign 
network range does not have a significant impact on the likelihood of international investing if PE 
investor fund size is taken into account (Model I). When the number of executives is included in the 
regression model, the variable is positive and significant at a 10% level. Foreign network range is not 
significantly related to the number of international investments. Overall, these results do not confirm the 
expected positive association between external knowledge in terms of the foreign network range and PE 
investors’ cross-border investment activities. In addition, in contrast to hypothesis 3, PE investors with a 
more intense foreign network have a significantly (p<0.05) lower probability of investing internationally. 
The economic effect of this relationship is substantial. The average PE investor in our sample has a 
foreign network intensity of 0.07 which equals an average number of subsequent investment with one out 
of fourteen non-domestic network partners. If doubles its foreign network intensity, it would decrease the 
odds of being international by 30.30%. Further, foreign network intensity is not associated with the 
number of international investments, conditional on investing internationally. Hypothesis 3 is hence not 
supported. 
As the findings relating to foreign network intensity go against expectations, additional analyses were 
performed to further investigate its negative relationship with the likelihood of investing internationally. 
The foreign network intensity variable is therefore split in two: a first variable measures foreign network 
intensity for firms that were international in the previous period, while a second variable measures foreign 
network intensity for firms that were domestic. Table 2.4. provides the results. Firms with previous 
international experience significantly decrease their propensity to remain international if they have a 
larger foreign network intensity. The negative effect of foreign network intensity is far less important for 
firms with no international experience in the past years, however.  
 
Insert Table 2.4. around here 
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2.6. Discussion and implications 
 
The high information asymmetries of professional service firms’ activities pose major challenges for their 
internationalization. Through a focus on the PE industry, we highlight the effect of three different sources 
of knowledge accumulation that originate internally or externally to the firm. We thereby consider 
internationalization in terms of both the likelihood and the number of cross-border investments. These 
findings are of interest for several reasons. 
2.6.1. Theoretical implications 
 
First, this study responds to a call for more research on the international development of professional 
service firms (Hitt et al., 2006). Despite the issues related to cross-border activities, many law, 
accountancy or private equity investors have become international and even global players. Our findings 
have shown how different types of foreign knowledge accumulation differentially compensate for the 
problems arising from investing internationally. 
Second, our findings contribute to the international business literature. We highlight the 
complementarities between early internationalization theorists that largely focus on internal knowledge 
development (e.g. Johanson & Vahlne, 1977) and the findings from “new venture internationalization” 
studies that stress the impact of inherited knowledge (e.g. Oviatt & McDougall, 1994). Our findings show 
that, under conditions of severe information asymmetries, both sources of knowledge accumulation are 
important. More specifically, the large and positive effects of experiential knowledge indicate that dealing 
with the potential issues of different local institutional contexts is a learning process. Knowledge inherited 
through a PE investor’s investment managers also has an important and positive influence on its 
international activities. This relationship is strongest in terms of the likelihood of international investing. 
Professional service firms with international aspirations but with limited international experience can 
hence build upon inherited knowledge through hiring managers with international experience to reduce 
the information asymmetries of cross-border activities. 
Third, our findings advance network theory. Our results stress the multidimensionality of network 
relationships through the different effects of foreign network range and foreign network intensity. On the 
one hand, we fail to find a consistent effect of foreign network range on internationalization activities. 
Hence, while having a broad range of international partners may be beneficial for servicing local 
companies with international operations (Devigne et al., forthcoming), it does not necessarily induce the 
service firm to internationalize. On the other hand, our results suggest that foreign network intensity is 
negatively related to the likelihood of investing internationally, but not to the number of international 
investments. This adds to reservations concerning an overly positive view about the influence of intense 
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network relationships for international development (Ojala, 2009). While intense networks reduce the 
transaction costs of activities characterized by high levels of information asymmetry, they could insulate 
firms from other sources of external knowledge (Yli-Renko et al., 2002). As professional service firms 
with strong ties can easily turn to familiar partners, this could create a preference to search inside their 
established information channels which negatively affects knowledge-intensive firms’ international 
growth (Chetty & Agndal, 2007). In general, our results indicate that professional service firms should 
balance the costs and benefits of working with trusted partners with the benefits of developing a central 
position in a larger network (Meuleman et al., 2010). Firms that want to continue to invest internationally 
may be particularly hampered. This does not necessarily imply that international network partners 
decrease the propensity to be international. However, PE investors are less likely to be international if 
they have especially intense relationships with their existing international partners. 
Fourth, this paper contributes to the PE literature. In addition to earlier findings that indicated how 
internal and external sources of knowledge may influence the success rate of PE investor involvement 
(De Clercq & Dimov, 2008), we explain the effect of these resources on the investment strategy itself 
through a focus on international investment activities. We also add to the knowledge on international PE 
transactions. While previous research has mainly studied the outcomes of international investment 
behavior in terms of their involvement in value adding activities or the exit pattern of these investments 
(e.g. Chemmanur et al., 2010; Dai et al., forthcoming), this paper focuses on the determinants of the 
international investment strategy. 
 
2.6.2. Managerial implications 
 
Our results have important managerial implications for professional service firms in general, and 
for PE investors in particular. Our findings indicate that professional service firms with 
international aspirations should focus on several sources of foreign knowledge accumulation as 
each of these sources may influence international development.  
In addition, although academic research has stressed the need for a well-developed human resource 
function in multinational organizations (Reiche, 2008), only a small number of firms do focus on 
global talent sourcing and management (Collings, Scullion & Dowling, 2009). Given the 
importance of executives with cross-border working experience, professional service firms 
should pro-actively develop a human resource management that specializes in the search and 
retention of international management talent.  
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Furthermore, PE investors with international aspirations have to reflect on their cooperation with non-
domestic syndication partners. While they may provide a first contact with international markets, overly 
intensive contacts may constrain the continuity of their international development. Hence, this may prove 
a suboptimal strategy. Knowledge–intensive firms should, in contrast, actively build a broad social 
network fostering international development (Yli-Renko et al., 2002). 
 
2.6.3. Limitations and future research directions  
 
This research is not without limitations, which provides avenues for future research. We measured 
international exposure in terms of the existence and the number of international investments. While 
beyond the scope of our current study, future studies could consider additional outcomes such as the 
number of countries in which the firm has international investments or its mode of entry in international 
markets. In addition, despite the care taken to achieve rigor, the operationalization of the independent 
variables entails some limitations. Due to lack of data, we were only able to measure experiential and 
external knowledge over a limited time period as the Zephyr database only started in 1997 and its 
coverage is rather low in the first years. Our approach hence implies that the effects of experiential and 
external knowledge fade away over time. It would be interesting to understand the longevity of the effect 
of experiential and external knowledge, however. Finally, external knowledge might be gained through 
other network partners, for example domestic syndication partners that have relevant international 
investment experience, international shareholders or service providers such as lawyers or consultants. 
Future research could test to what extent these partners are substitutes for foreign syndication partners, or 
whether they complement them in different ways.  
2.7. Conclusion 
 
Through the focus on private equity investors, this paper studied the effects of foreign knowledge 
accumulation on the international development of professional service firms. Using a unique international 
dataset, we have shown that dealing with the increased complexities of international investing is a 
learning process where professional services build upon their experiential knowledge. In addition to 
internal sources of knowledge accumulation, inherited knowledge and external knowledge had also an 
influence on cross-border investments. In sum, this paper has advanced our understanding of how 
different types of knowledge enable or constrain dealing with severe information asymmetries and agency 
issues inherent in the international activities of intangible service providers. 
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2.8. Notes 
 
1. For each of the cases, we checked whether they had a very low number of national, international or 
total investments. If one of these figures was very low according to the database, we checked other 
sources (firms’ websites, newspaper articles, …) to ensure that the data provided by the database were 
reliable. For six PE investors, this was not the case. Hence, these cases were omitted. 
2. An alternative approach is to collect information on the foreign work experience of its executives 
from the website of the PE investor. This information is however often unavailable or incomplete 
(Patzelt et al., 2009), especially in the context of our study. We therefore rely on survey information.  
3. The calculation of the economic significance of the variables of the selection model is based on the 
corresponding logit model instead of a probit model. In a probit model, the evaluation of the 
economic effect depends on the chosen start value. In addition, the interpretation of an odds ratio is 
far less tedious than the interpretation of the coefficients of a probit model (Gujarati, 2003). 
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2.10. Tables 
 
TABLE 2.1.:INTERNATIONAL VERSUS DOMESTIC PE INVESTOR CHARACTERISTICS 
 Total sample International PE investors Domestic PE investors  
 N Mean Med. S.D. Min. Max. N Mean Med. S.D. Min. Max. N Mean Med. S.D. Min. Max.  
International (Dummy) 110      .40     0         .49    0       1              
No of international investments1 44    6.93     4.50       7.94    1     38              
Experiential knowledge through 
previous international 
110      .39     0        .49    0       1 44     .75  1    .44    0    1 66       .15   0    .36    0       1 ** 
Experiential knowledge through 
the number of previous 
1
110    2.17     0      5.35    0     31 44   4.80  1.50   7.50    0  31 66       .42   0  1.72    0     13 ** 
Inherited knowledge 110      .45       .37         .35    0       1 44     .56   .60    .37    0    1 66       .39    .33    .31    0      1 * 
External knowledge through 
foreign network range1 
110    7.99     1     19.48    0   121 44 16.89  5.00 28.06    0 121 66     2.06   0 5.11    0     28 ** 
External knowledge through 
foreign network intensity 
110      .07     0        .17    0       1 44     .08  0    .13    0    .50 66       .06   0    .19    0       1 ** 
Later stage deals included 
(Dummy) 
110      .52     1        .50    0       1 44     .50    .50     .51    0    1 66       .53   1    .50    0       1  
Both stages included (Dummy) 110      .42     0        .50    0       1 44     .41     0     .50    0    1 66       .42   0    .50    0       1  
No of investment executives1 110    9.59     6    10.82    1     70 44 14.18     9 15.06    2  70 66     6.53   5  4.73    1     26 ** 
Fund size1 104 550 139 1223    2 9200 44 984 355 1696  22 9200 60 232  69 520    2 3750 ** 
Public PE investor (Dummy) 110      .05     0        .23    0       1 44     .02     0     .15    0    1 66      .08   0    .27    0       1  
UK PE investor (Dummy) 110      .40     0        .49    0       1 44     .48     0     .50    0    1 66     .35   0    .48    0       1  
1
 The logarithm of this measure is included in the multivariate analyses. 
Significance levels indicate test results from differences between international and domestic PE investors (Chi-square tests or Mann-Whitney tests). 
Significant at (**) 1%, (*) 5% or (†)10% on a two-tailed test.
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TABLE 2.2.: CORRELATION MATRIX OF THE VARIABLES INCLUDED IN THE REGRESSIONS 
 1. 2. 3. 4. 5. 6. 7. 8. 9. 10. 
1. Experiential knowledge through previous 
international investments (Dummy) 
1.00          
2. Experienti knowledge thro gh the number 
of previous international investments 
.85 1.00         
3. Inherited knowledge  .12 .10 1.00        
4. External knowledge through foreign network 
range 
.72 .76  .15 1.00       
5. External knowledge through foreign network 
intensity 
.21 .30 -.03  .46 1.00      
6.Later s age deals included (Dummy)  .02  .06 -.35 -.09 -.11 1.00     
7.Both stages included (Dummy)  .07  .10 -.25 -.02 -.05  .82 1.00    
8.No of investment executives  .40  .49 -.11  .44  .10  .32  .22 1.00   
9.Fund size  .47  .54 -.11  .49  .19  .36  .22  .84 1.00  
10.Public PE investor (Dummy) -.19 -.16 -.12 -.07 -.02 -.09 -.04  .03 -.06 1.00 
11.UK PE investor (Dummy)  .14  .15 -.19  .06  .09  .42  .40  .34  .38 -.20 
All correlations with absolute values above 0.18 are significant (p<0.05). 
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TABLE 2.3.: RESULTS OF THE MULTIVARIATE REGRESSION ANALYSES (HECKMAN TWO-STEP ANALYSES) 
Step 1: Internationalization (Dummy)  Model I  Model II 
 
          
Experiential knowledge (Dummy)     1.16 (.44)**    1.20 (.41)** 
Inherited knowledge    1.04 (.52)*    1.20 (.51)* 
External knowledge: Foreign network range    .41 (.28)    .49 (.26) † 
External knowledge: Foreign network intensity    -3.22 (1.38)*    -2.91 (1.31)* 
Later stage deals included (Dummy)  -1.26 (.52)* -.64 (.65)  -.82 (.48) † -.20 (.61) 
Both stages included (Dummy)  .56 (.50) -.01 (.59)  .28 (.48) -.21 (.58) 
No of investment executives         1.82 (.46)** 1.04 (.62) † 
Fund size  1.16 (.24)** .74 (.31)*        
Public PE investor (Dummy)  -1.06 (.68) -.08 (.76)  -.89 (.63) .16 (.72) 
UK PE investor (Dummy)  -.14 (.33) .43 (.39)  .12 (.31) .61 (.38) 
Intercept  -2.21 (.49) -2.47 (.75)**  -1.48 (.37) -2.13 (.67)** 
Step 2: Number of international investments  Model I  Model II 
 
          
Experiential knowledge (No international deals)    .42 (.12)**    .47 (.13)** 
Inherited knowledge    .36 (.19) †    .39 (.21) † 
External knowledge: Foreign network range    -.01 (.12)    .06 (.13) 
External knowledge: Foreign network intensity    -.06 (.65)    -.06 (.68) 
Later stage deals included (Dummy)  -.65 (.40) † -.15 (.22)  -.33 (.37) † .11 (.22) 
Both stages included (Dummy)  .25 (.27) -.06 (.20)  .05 (.27) -.22 (.21) 
No of investment executives         1.24 (.61) .43 (.22)* 
Fund size  .87 (.32**) .41 (.13)**        
UK PE investor (Dummy)  -.25 (.16) -.07 (.14)  -.07 (.18)** .05 (.15) 
Intercept  -1.61 (1.00) -.75 (.43) †  -.86 (.95) -.36 (.40) 
Mills ratio  .50 (.44) .37 (.24)  .52 (.52) .41 (.25) † 
Wald test  33.97 ** 50.57  **  22.91 ** 41.82  ** 
N  104   104    110   110   
Regression coefficients are displayed in the table, standard errors in parentheses.  
Significant at (**) 1%, (*) 5% or (†)10% on a two-tailed test. 
 49 
 
TABLE 2.4.: SENSITIVITY ANALYSIS: DETAILED ANALYSES OF FOREIGN NETWORK INTENSITY (PROBIT ANALYSES)  
Step 1: Internationalization (Dummy)  Model I  Model II 
 
          
Experiential knowledge (Dummy)     1.24 (.48)*    1.25 (.46)** 
Inherited knowledge    1.08 (.53)*    1.22 (.52)* 
External knowledge: Foreign network range    .38 (.29)    .47 (.27)† 
External knowledge: Foreign network intensity for PE 
investors that were international in the previous period  
   -3.39 (1.44)*    -3.01 (1.37)* 
External knowledge: Foreign  network intensity for PE 
investors that were domestic in the previous period 
   -2.22 (2.61)    -2.39 (2.43) 
Later stage deals included (Dummy)  -1.26 (.52)* -.62 (.65)  -.82 (.48) † -.18 (.62) 
Both stages included (Dummy)  .56 (.50) -.01 (.59)  .28 (.48) -.21 (.58) 
No of investment executives       1.82 (.46)** 1.03 (.62)† 
Fund size  1.16 (.24)** .74 (.32)*      
Public PE investor (Dummy)  -1.06 (.68) -.12 (.77)  -.89 (.63) .14 (.73) 
UK PE investor (Dummy)  -.14 (.33) .42 (.39)  .12 (.31) .61 (.38) 
Intercept  -2.21 (.49) -2.54 (.78)**  -1.48 (.37) -2.15 (.68)** 
LR Chi²  32.74  60.17 **  22.10  59.82 ** 
Log likelihood  -54.48  -40.77   -62.98  -44.12   
N  104   104    110   110   
Regression coefficients are displayed in the table, standard errors in parentheses. 
Significant at (**) 1%, (*) 5% or (†)10% on a two-tailed test. 
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3.1. Abstract 
 
This paper studies the exits of cross-border buyouts. We focus on the differences between financial and 
strategic acquisition exits in addition to the information problems of these acquirers. Using a unique 
dataset of Continental European buyouts divested by cross-border private equity investors, buyout growth 
increases the likelihood of a strategic compared to a financial acquisition. Efficiency increases the 
likelihood of a financial compared to a strategic acquisition. In addition, the reputation of the selling 
cross-border PE investor decreases the information problems of potential acquirers substantially. Both 
overall as well as specific measures of reputation, such as country-specific and industry-specific 
reputation are important herein. Country-specific reputation has the largest impact of all reputation 
measures. In sum, this paper advances our understanding how private equity investors divest their cross-
border buyouts through acquisition.  
3.2. Introduction 
 
Continental Europe has become an attractive investment region for cross-border private equity (PE) 
investors, despite the lack of a flourishing stock market that enables these cross-border investors to opt for 
an IPO exit (Meuleman & Wright, 2009). In order to understand their preference for Continental Europe, 
it is crucial to increase our knowledge on acquisition exits of cross-border buyouts. Cross-border buyout 
exits are however confronted with substantial information problems. As these firms are internationally 
owned and privately held prior to exit, potential acquirers are confronted with substantial uncertainties. 
The governance quality of the selling PE investor is expected to be lower for cross-border compared to 
domestic buyouts and the reliability of information on the acquisition target is more difficult to guarantee. 
Moreover, up till now, there is a limited understanding on the functioning of acquisitions as a successful 
exit mechanism, both for cross-border buyout exits as well as for buyout exits in general. 
This paper aims to address these two knowledge gaps. It differentiates between strategic acquisitions (also 
called trade sales) and financial acquisitions (also called secondary buyouts). In a first step, we explain 
the relationship between the value creating mechanisms of the buyout and the type of acquisition exit. 
More specifically, we study the effect of growth and efficiency during the buyout as value creating 
mechanisms. We thereby examine whether the distinctive corporate governance mechanisms of strategic 
versus financial acquirers play a role herein. In a second step, we focus on the reduction of information 
problems inherent in the sale of cross-border buyouts. We examine whether the reputation of the cross-
border PE investor can alleviate these information problems. We also differentiate between different types 
of reputation in this study. The effectiveness of overall as well as country-specific and industry-specific 
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reputation is examined. As such, we test whether the effect of reputation in the reduction of information 
costs is segmented across countries and industries.  
Our sample consists of 180 exits of cross-border buyouts in six Continental European countries: Belgium, 
France, the Netherlands, Italy, Spain and Sweden. The results indicate substantial distinctions between 
strategic compared to financial acquisitions. First, cross-border buyout growth increases the probability of 
a strategic compared to a financial acquisition. The opposite effect is found for efficiency, which 
decreases the probability of a strategic compared to a financial acquisition. Moreover, our findings stress 
the role of the selling PE investor’s reputation in the reduction of information problems. As a result, both 
overall as well as country-specific and industry-specific reputation strengthen the relationship between 
efficiency and the type of acquisition exit of cross-border buyouts. Country-specific reputation also 
increases the effect of growth on the acquisition type. Finally, our findings indicate that country-specific 
reputation has the strongest impact of the three reputation measures in our study. 
This study contributes to several strands of literature. First, our research advances the entrepreneurial 
finance literature. It addresses the knowledge gap on acquisition exits of cross-border buyouts. This study 
also responds to a call for more research on acquisition exits in general (Nikoskelainen & Wright, 2007). 
Our focus on the distinctions between strategic and financial acquisitions contributes to a better 
understanding on acquisition exits and to a better knowledge of the increasing importance of financial 
acquisition exits. Second, we extend existing insights in the role of reputation in the reduction of 
information problems. While the effect of reputation is mainly examined in IPOs (e.g. Lee & Wahal, 
2004), we study how the reputation of the selling firm is important for acquisitions. Third, this study 
advances international business theory. This literature stream mainly focuses on international expansion 
while there is little interest in the exit of international activities. However, within an evolutionary 
perspective of internationalization, exits of cross-border equity stakes are an essential part of the 
international business strategy (Birkinshaw & Hood, 1998). Fourth, this paper contributes to the 
divestment literature. Divestments are often associated with poor performance although a substantial part 
is done for strategic reasons rather than failure (Shimizu & Hitt, 2005; Brauer, 2006). As divesting is 
essential in the strategy of cross-border PE investors, this setting will increase our understanding of this 
phenomenon. More specifically, our study will detail the potential acquisition channels.  
The paper proceeds as follows. The next section develops hypotheses on the relationship between the 
value creating strategy of the divesting firm and the type of acquisition in addition to the effect of the 
divesting firm’s reputation to reduce information problems acquisitions. Thereafter, we describe our 
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research method followed by the empirical results of our analyses. We end with our discussion and 
conclusion. 
3.3. Hypotheses development 
 
3.3.1. Differentiating between financial and strategic acquisitions: A corporate governance perspective  
 
Financial acquisition exits differ substantially from strategic acquisition exits. This does not solely apply 
to cross-border buyout exits, it generally accounts for all buyout exits. Particularly the governance 
structure post-acquisition varies substantially between both acquisition types. On the one hand, a financial 
acquisition is a subsequent, secondary buyout transaction by a novel private equity investor (Sudarsanam 
& Nwagodoh, 2005). The acquired firm will continue to operate as a stand-alone entity and the novel 
private equity investor can build upon the corporate governance mechanisms that were installed by the 
previous PE investor (Bonini, 2010, Sousa, 2010). This implies a strong alignment of incentives between 
owners and managers through substantial managerial equity stakes, active monitoring and a reduction of 
agency costs through a high leverage (Achleitner & Figge, 2011; Jensen, 1986). As a result of these 
governance mechanisms, private equity investors are expert in the reduction of value destructing over-
investment issues (Jensen, 1986). In addition, the novel PE investor provides access to a wide network of 
business partnerships and managers that stimulate value creation in a secondary buyout (Wright, 
Hoskisson, Busenitz & Dial, 2000). As high debt levels are an essential part of the private equity 
investor’s governance mechanisms, the access to financial resources post-acquisition will however be 
rather limited (Bonini, 2010). 
On the other hand, strategic acquirers intend to integrate the target into the acquiring company which 
initiates a radical change in the post-buyout governance structure. Through the integration into a larger 
group, the target can build upon the resources and capabilities that have been developed within the 
acquirer (Camerlynck, Ooghe & De Langhe, 2005). Financial resources are also more widely available 
through the access towards the internal capital market of the strategic acquirer (Deloof, 1998).  
In this section, we will argue that differences between the governance structures of financial compared to 
strategic acquirers determine the type of acquisition. We thereby examine the strategic fit between the 
value creating mechanisms of the buyout prior to acquisition and the post-acquisition governance 
structure.  
We focus on the pre-acquisition levels of growth and efficiency which are the two main value creating 
mechanisms during a buyout (Mäkela & Maula, 2005; Wright et al., 2000). First, prior to acquisition exit, 
   
55 
 
the private equity investor has provided the buyout access to a wide range of network contacts and human 
capital (Mäkelä & Maula, 2005). This may have stimulated growth opportunities (Wright et al., 2000; 
Devigne, Vanacker, Manigart & Paeleman, 2011). Second, the use of a high leverage combined with 
managerial equity stakes by the private equity investor creates a managerial focus on efficiency (Jensen, 
1986). Although growth and efficiency are not mutually exclusive and go often hand in hand, there exists 
some heterogeneity between buyouts prior to acquisition (Meuleman, Amess, Wright & Scholes, 2009). 
We will explain how this heterogeneity explains the type of acquisition in the following paragraphs. We 
will first argue that growth achieved in the buyout will increase the probability of a strategic compared to 
a financial acquisition. Second, we explain the effect of efficiency on the acquisition type. The arguments 
that will be explained hereunder with respect to the main effect of growth and efficiency on the type of 
acquisition exit are not solely relevant for acquisition exits of cross-border buyouts. In contrast, they are 
more generally applicable to all buyout exits.  
3.3.1.1. Growth and the acquisition type  
For strategic acquirers, acquisitions are often considered as a tool to solve the mismatch between the 
availability of value creating growth projects and the financial resources that finance these projects. 
Hence, firms with a lot of financial resources and limited internal growth projects will look for external 
growth through acquisition (Camerlynck, Ooghe & De Langhe, 2005). Cash rich strategic acquirers are 
therefore interested in firms with a high growth potential. They are expected to target firms with a high 
current growth as a driver of future growth (Heyman, Deloof & Ooghe, 2008).  
The acquisition of buyouts with a high growth will help strategic acquirers to achieve their growth 
objectives. Particularly the combination of past resource access by the preceding PE owner and future 
resource access by the strategic acquirers may ensure further growth (Lavie & Miller, 2008). Moreover, 
while growth opportunities in the preceding buyout had to be achieved with restricted financial resources, 
the access to the acquirer’s internal capital market may stimulate growth mechanisms that were 
previously unavailable by lack of funds.  
Financial acquirers of buyouts also provide novel resource access, which stimulates value creating growth 
(Wright et al., 2000). However, in contrast to strategic acquirers, financial acquirers build upon the same 
tools and governance mechanisms to stimulate growth (Sousa, 2010). As a result, the PE investor may 
have already extracted the most value creating growth opportunities that can be achieved under a buyout 
structure (Bonini, 2010). It is hence questionable whether the buyout firm can sustain value creating 
growth under restricted availability of financial resources (Achleitner & Figge, 2011).  
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Due to the difficulties to sustain growth levels after a financial acquisition of a buyout, we expect that 
financial acquirers will have a lower focus on growth as an acquisition motive than strategic acquirers of 
cross-border buyouts. This leads to the following hypothesis:  
H1a: Cross-border buyout growth will increase the likelihood of a strategic compared to a financial 
acquisition.  
3.3.1.2. Efficiency and the acquisition type 
Prior to acquisition, the introduction of corporate governance mechanisms that stimulate efficiency in a 
buyout is a lengthy process. The focus on efficiency is likely to sustain post-acquisition if the acquirer 
uses the same governance mechanisms. As a result, it is beneficial for financial acquirers to build upon 
the efforts of the selling private equity investor. For this reason, financial acquirers are expected to focus 
on buyouts that have proven to work efficiently under the preceding buyout structure. In that way, the 
financial acquirer can benefit from the lower risk profile of the acquisition target which enables them to 
introduce even higher debt levels as a corporate governance mechanism (Achleitner & Figge, 2011). This 
will continue the focus on efficiencies within the firm and lead to substantial tax shield benefits (Sousa, 
2010; Bonini, 2010).  
Although the acquisition of efficient companies is also beneficial for strategic acquirers, we expect their 
interest to be somewhat lower. In order to maintain a managerial focus on efficiencies, it is important to 
establish strong corporate governance that discourages managers from value destructing growth projects 
post-acquisition (Muscarella & Vetsuypens, 1990). Strategic acquires are however less expert in the use 
of corporate governance mechanisms that prevent over-investments compared to financial acquirers 
whose business model is centered around a strong corporate governance (Jensen, 1986; Wright, Amess, 
Weir & Girma, 2009). We therefore expect that the pre-acquisition level of efficiency is less important for 
strategic compared to financial acquirers of buyouts. This leads to the following hypothesis:  
H1b: Cross-border buyout efficiency will decrease the likelihood of a strategic compared to a 
financial acquisition.  
3.3.2. The reputation of the selling private equity investor and the type of acquisition 
 
Acquisitions of cross-border buyouts suffer however from severe information problems. As these buyouts 
are internationally owned prior to acquisition, there is a high uncertainty whether the selling firm had 
been able to ensure the quality monitoring and the quality of financial information across borders (Kang 
& Kim, 2010; Morsfield & Tan, 2006). This creates important information problems between targets and 
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potential acquirers, even after a thorough due diligence of the target. Moreover, as buyouts are privately 
owned pre-acquisition, they face even more information problems because the reliability of their financial 
information is lower for private than for listed companies (Burgstahler, Hail & Leuz, 2006).  
Information problems can create substantial inefficiency issues in the acquisition process of cross-border 
buyouts. They reduce the interest of potential acquirers substantially thereby creating a rather limited pool 
of financial and strategic acquirers. Substantial interest in the acquisition target by both financial and 
strategic acquirers is however a necessary condition for the efficient flow of cross-border buyouts towards 
novel owners (Fidrmuc, Roosenboom, Paap & Teunissen, 2012).  
Hereunder, we will describe how the reputation of the selling cross-border private equity investor can 
alleviate these information problems. We will argue that reputation certifies the financial information of 
cross-border buyouts, thereby reducing the uncertainty of potential acquirers. This will increase the 
interest of potential acquirers substantially and guarantees an efficient functioning of acquisition markets. 
As such, reputation ensures that growth will increase the probability of a strategic acquisition and that 
efficiency increases the probability of a financial acquisition. In contrast, under high information 
problems, the limited availability of potential acquirers creates market inefficiencies which forces cross-
border investors to sell the firm to whoever that is available. 
We focus on the effect of overall reputation as well as on the fragmentation of reputation towards 
countries and industries. As a result, our hypotheses discuss the effect of overall reputation, country- and 
industry-specific reputation.  
3.3.2.1. Overall reputation of the selling private equity investor 
The overall reputation of the selling PE investor can decrease the information problems in an acquisition. 
Reputable cross-border PE investors guarantee a high quality of governance during the buyout. They are 
also expected to use reliable financial information as a monitoring tool (Beuselinck, Deloof & Manigart, 
2009; Demiroglu & James, 2010). This will certify the information on the value creating mechanisms of 
cross-border buyouts (Fang, 2005; Felix, Tan & Morsfield, 2005).  
As overall reputation reduces the information problems of potential acquirers, it is an important tool to 
attract a larger pool of potential acquirers which advances market efficiency. This implies that overall 
reputation increases the positive (negative) effect of growth (efficiency) on the likelihood of a strategic 
compared to a financial acquisition of cross-border buyouts. This leads to the following hypothesis: 
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H2a: The positive effect of growth on the likelihood of a strategic compared to a financial 
acquisition is higher for acquisition exits of cross-border PE investors with a high overall 
reputation.  
H2b: The negative effect of efficiency on the likelihood of a strategic compared to a financial 
acquisition is higher for acquisition exits of cross-border PE investors with a high overall 
reputation.  
3.3.2.2. Country-specific reputation of the selling private equity investor 
Although the overall reputation of the cross-border private equity investor ensures an overall ability to 
reduce information problems, it does not signal whether the seller has been able to alleviate the issues in 
cross-border ownership prior to acquisition. Cross-border private equity investors have to incorporate 
national idiosyncrasies with respect to taxation, regulations, financial market development and the local 
business style (Bruton, Fried & Manigart, 2005). They are also less familiar with the local market (Kang 
& Kim, 2010). Even with all communication advances, cross-border investing is expected to complicate a 
PE investor’s governance and monitoring during the buyout (Dai, Jo & Kassicieh, 2011; Sorenson & 
Stuart, 2001). As a result, the effect of reputation on the decrease of information problems is expected to 
be reduced in foreign regions (Kang & Stulz, 1997; Lee, Pollock & Jin, 2011).  
We argue that cross-border buyouts will benefit from the association with a selling PE investor that has a 
high country-specific reputation (i.e. a high reputation in the country of the acquisition target). These PE 
investors are expected to bear the increasing costs of monitoring and specialized guidance across borders 
(Fang, 2005; Kang & Kim, 2010; Makelä & Maula, 2006; Pruthi, Wright & Lockett, 2003). This will 
alleviate the credibility issues in the quality of financial information towards potential acquirers (Mäkelä 
& Maula, 2006). The reduced information problems of firms sold by cross-border PE investors with a 
high country-specific reputation will strengthen the positive (negative) association between growth 
(efficiency) and the likelihood of a strategic (financial) acquisition. We hence propose:  
H3a: The positive effect of growth on the likelihood of a strategic compared to a financial 
acquisition is higher for acquisition exits of cross-border PE investors with a high country-specific 
reputation.  
H3b: The negative effect of efficiency on the likelihood of a strategic compared to a financial 
acquisition is higher for acquisition exits of cross-border PE investors with a high country-specific 
reputation.  
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3.3.2.3. Industry-specific reputation of the selling private equity investor  
We also expect industry-specific reputation (i.e. the reputation in the industry of the acquisition target) of 
the selling cross-border PE investor to be important for the reduction of information problems. This effect 
is grounded in the specialized knowledge of products, markets and competition in that industry (Hsu, 
2004) which decreases the issues of cross-border private equity investing (Mäkelä & Maula, 2006; 
Sorenson & Stuart, 2001). As a result, cross-border buyouts are associated with skilled monitoring of 
their cross-border private equity investors and more reliable financial information (Beuselinck et al., 
2009; Cotter & Peck, 2001; Cressy, Munari & Malipiero, 2007). This will decrease the information 
problems of potential acquirers. We therefore expect that buyouts sold by cross-border PE investors with 
a high industry-specific reputation will be more able to attract acquirer types that are in line with their 
own characteristics. We hence propose:  
H4a: The positive effect of growth on the likelihood of a strategic compared to a financial 
acquisition is higher for acquisition exits of cross-border PE investors with a high industry-specific 
reputation.  
H4b: The negative effect of efficiency on the likelihood of a strategic compared to a financial 
acquisition is higher for acquisition exits of cross-border PE investors with a high industry-specific 
reputation.  
Figure 3.1.presents a graphical summary of our hypotheses 
Insert Figure 3.1. around here 
 
3.4. Research method 
 
3.4.1. Data and sample  
 
We focus on acquisition exits of cross-border buyouts located in Continental Europe. As a result of its 
bank oriented financial system, acquisitions are the dominant exit mechanism for buyouts in this region. 
They correspond to more than 90% of all successful exits by PE investors (Black & Gilson, 1998; 
CMBOR, 2008).  
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The acquisitions in our sample are identified through the database of the Centre for Management Buyout 
Research (CMBOR). This is a hand-collected database that retrieves its information through a 
combination of semi-annual surveys to private equity investors in addition to business press info. These 
surveys obtain a maximum response rate as respondents receive a free copy of a quarterly review of 
aggregate market trends. It is therefore regarded as a comprehensive source of information on acquisition 
exits in Europe. Our dataset covers exits located in six countries: Belgium, France, Italy, the Netherlands, 
Spain and Sweden. Acquisition targets in these countries provide detailed annual account information, 
necessary for our research.  
As we focus on acquisitions of cross-border buyouts, we only include buyouts sold by cross-border PE 
investors. Therefore, we incorporate exits of cross-border PE investors that act either as the single PE 
investor or as the lead PE investor. Information on the lead investor is also retrieved through the CMBOR 
database. For the limited number of deals where more than one lead investor is involved, we assume that 
the most reputable investor acts as the actual lead in the deal. The database covers the sale of investments 
that were made between 1997 and 2004. In order to be included in our sample, an acquisition needs to 
occur before the end of 2008. The latter makes sure that we were able to collect sufficient information on 
the cross-border buyout at time of acquisition exit. Our sample initially consists of 396 acquisitions: 208 
financial and 188 strategic acquisitions. Information on the characteristics of these firms was found for 
180 of these acquisition exits. This hence reduces the sample size to 45% of its initial size with 97 
financial and 83 strategic acquisitions.  
In order to assess potential sample selection bias, we compared the characteristics of the initial sample of 
396 acquisitions with the final sample of 180 acquisitions for which accounting information could be 
obtained. The proportion of financial compared to strategic acquisitions (46% versus 54%) is highly in 
line with the initial sample (47% versus 53%). Average and median company values (measured at time of 
investment) are furthermore highly similar (average and median of respectively €142 mio and €50 mio for 
the initial sample versus average and median of €126 mio and €50 mio for the final sample). Finally, no 
significant differences were found in terms of the proportional distribution of the different countries or the 
average value of the private equity reputation measures in our sample. This suggests that the final sample 
is not prone to selection biases. 
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3.4.2. Variables  
 
3.4.2.1. Dependent variable  
 
The dependent variable in our analyses is binary and indicates whether the cross-border buyout is sold to 
a strategic or a financial acquirer. A value of 1 is attributed if the buyout is sold to a strategic acquirer and 
0 if the buyout is sold to a financial acquirer.  
 
3.4.2.2.Independent variables  
 
We have two different sets of independent variables which are on the one hand the growth and efficiency 
of the divested buyout and the reputation of the selling PE investor on the other hand.  
On the one hand, we focus on growth and efficiency. Our data are obtained through the Amadeus database 
(Bureau Van Dijk) and are based on the financial statements of the target in the pre-acquisition year. Our 
measures are controlled for inflation, with 1994 as the baseline price level. We winsorized the inflation 
corrected measures at 5 and 95% percentiles. Growth is operationalized as the growth in sales. Sales 
growth is the preferred growth measure in entrepreneurially oriented companies such as buyouts (Delmar, 
Davidsson & Gartner; 2003). Moreover, sales growth is also more relevant than asset or employee growth 
in inter-industry studies. As the pattern of employee and total asset growth depends on a firm’s labor- and 
capital intensity, firms from different industries may be very heterogeneous in terms of their total asset 
and employee growth (Weinzimmer, Nystrom & Freeman, 1998). We measure growth as the relative 
annual growth in sales over the three years preceding the acquisition. When data on sales growth over the 
final three years were missing, we calculated the growth figures over the final two years. Efficiency is 
measured as EBITDA (Opler & Titman, 1993) and normalized by the book value of total assets (Lang, 
Stulz & Walking, 1991). Our efficiency measure hence incorporates the amounts of assets needed to 
generate operating cash flow. This measure is consistent with previously-used variables in buyout studies 
(e.g. Cressy et al., 2007; Sudarsanam & Nwagodoh, 2005).  
Reputation measures of the selling PE investor are based on the complete CMBOR database of buyout 
investments, not solely those that were examined within this particular sample. In line with recent studies 
on reputational effects in the buyout market (Demiroglu & James, 2010), overall reputation is 
operationalized as the market share (in percentage) of the selling private equity investor over the past 
three years prior to the year of exit, calculated as the number of investments of the private equity investor 
as a proportion of all buyout investments. A three-year window is preferred as a shorter window is 
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vulnerable for business cycle effects and a longer window measures experience instead of reputation. To 
test the effect of country-specific reputation, we measured the market share (in percentage) of the selling 
private equity investor as a proportion of all buyout investments in the country of the acquisition target. 
We finally measure industry-specific reputation. We therefore focus on the investments in the industry of 
the acquisition target. We categorize the investments of PE investors within 14 different industries. This 
categorization derives from the European Venture Capital & Private Equity Association (EVCA, 2009). 
3.4.2.3.Control variables 
 
Several control variables are included in the multivariate analyses. We control for syndication as non-lead 
PE investors could influence the acquisition exit (Jääskelaïnen & Maula, 2008). We include whether the 
selling private equity investor syndicated with other cross-border investors or with at least one domestic 
PE investor. We incorporate the size of the cross-border buyout, measured by the log of total assets at the 
1994 price level. This measure is winsorized at the 5 and 95% percentile. The source of the buyout is 
incorporated as well with three categories: divestments, private & family firms and the reference group 
contains secondary buyouts, public-to-private transactions and privatizations. We also take into account 
whether the cross-border buyout operates in a high tech industry. Both the source of the buyout and the 
industry determine the susceptibility towards growth and efficiency which may influence the type of 
acquisition exit (Jensen, 1986; Meuleman et al., 2009). We furthermore control for business cycle effects 
as financial and strategic acquisitions are highly dependent on macro-economic conditions. Therefore, the 
loan spread and the total deal value of acquisitions in the host country (as a % of the GDP) are taken into 
account. The loan spread is operationalized through the average loan spread between 3 and 6 months prior 
to exit, calculated as the difference between the interest rates on government bonds and BBB rated large 
non-financial corporations in the European Monetary Union for loans with a 5-7 years duration (Sousa, 
2010). The total value of acquisitions is obtained through the Zephyr database (Bureau Van Dijk) and 
divided by the GDP (obtained from the World Bank). Moreover, we insert a quadratic time variable for 
testing the effect of the holding period as the acquisitions in our sample suggest a quadratic hazard rate. 
We also control for the location of the acquisition target with France as the reference category, a control 
variable that incorporates exits located in Spain and Italy, and a second control variable with exits located 
in Belgium, the Netherlands and Sweden. These three groups represent differences in the maturity and 
attractiveness of the local private equity markets. More specifically, according to the venture capital and 
private equity attractiveness index, Belgium, the Netherlands and Sweden are considered as the three 
most attractive private equity markets, followed by France and finally Italy and Spain are considered as 
countries with a relatively low attractiveness within Continental Europe (Groh, von Liechtenstein & 
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Lieser, 2010). We finally incorporate the direct effect of the three different reputation measures of the 
selling private equity investor in our regressions. 
3.4.3. Sample description 
 
Table 3.1. provides a description of our sample. We present descriptive statistics for the total sample of 
acquisitions and for the subsamples of financial and strategic acquisitions. We also present bivariate 
statistics on the differences between the two subgroups. This shows that 24 percent of our acquisitions 
concern the exits of cross-border PE investments that were syndicated with a domestic private equity 
investor. Furthermore, 13 percent of the acquisition exits are sold by cross-border PE investors who were 
syndicated with other cross-border PE investors.  
In addition, strategic acquisitions have a median total asset value of €37 mio which is lower than financial 
acquisitions (€80 mio). This difference is significant on a 1% level. Most acquisition exits originate from 
a divestment (40 percent), 34 percent were private companies (including family firms) prior to the cross-
border buyout. The cross-border buyouts that originate from secondary buyouts, delistings or 
privatisations account for 24 percent of our sample. Cross-border buyouts of family firms are significantly 
more likely be sold to strategic acquirers (p<0.10). The opposite is found for the cross-border buyouts that 
originate from a secondary buyout, delisting or privatization; they are more sold to financial acquirers 
(p<0.05). 19 percent of our acquisition targets are active in a high-tech industry. This is, in line with the 
EVCA definitions, defined as ICT and biotech firms. High tech firms exit more through strategic 
acquisitions (p<0.05). We also provide information on the loan spread in Continental Europe at time of 
acquisition. The average value of the spread was 0.87 percent and this was relatively equal between 
financial and strategic acquisitions. The total deal value of acquisitions in the host country is on average 
5% of the GDP. Moreover, the holding period indicates that a cross-border buyout in our sample takes 
about 4 years to divest. The holding period is 4.03 years for financial acquisitions which is comparable to 
strategic acquisitions with 4.16 years. 51 percent of the acquisition exits originate from France. Italy and 
Spain account each for 13 percent, the Netherlands for 8 percent, and Sweden and Belgium for 7 percent. 
Cross-border buyouts located in Spain are more often sold to strategic acquisitions (p<0.10).  
Insert Table 3.1. around here 
Table 3.1. also indicates the descriptive statistics of our main variables. The average growth equals 17 % 
(median 3%) and the level of efficiency is on average 11% (median 11%). While the difference in 
efficiency between financial and strategic acquisitions is significant on a 1% level in bivariate statistics, 
growth does not significantly differ between those categories. With respect to the reputation measures in 
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our study, a selling private equity investor has an average overall market share of 1.82 percent (median 
0.95%). The country-specific reputation is on average 2.52 % (median 1.43%) while the average industry-
specific reputation equals 2.14% (median 1.01%). Cross-border PE investors selling to strategic acquirers 
have a significantly higher country-specific reputation (p<0.05). Other reputation measures are not 
statistically different between financial and strategic acquisitions. 
3.4.4. Hypothesis testing procedure 
 
Logistic regressions are used to model the probability of a strategic versus a financial acquisition, 
clustering on the selling PE investor (Froot, 1989). First, we test the main effect of growth and efficiency 
on the type of acquisition. Second, we analyze the moderating effect of overall, country-specific and 
industry-specific reputation through the seemingly unrelated estimation procedure (Weesie, 1999). In 
order to do so, we first perform a median split of the sample, separating cross-border buyouts sold by 
reputable PE investors from those sold by less reputable ones. As we have three different measures of 
reputation, a median split procedure is repeated for each reputation measure, resulting in three paired 
subsamples. This estimation procedure jointly estimates the effect in both subsamples. It combines the 
estimation results of the logit regressions of the subsamples into a single covariance matrix controlling for 
clustered standard errors per cross-border PE investor. Thereafter, using a Wald test, equality of 
coefficients is statistically tested between the subsamples (Weesie, 1999). 
This estimation method is preferred to the inclusion of interaction terms in logit analyses. Unlike OLS, 
estimating interaction terms in a logit regression does not result in a constant coefficient across all 
observations. In contrast, the magnitude and the sign of an interaction term are a function of not only the 
coefficient for the interaction, also the coefficients for each interacted variable and the values of all the 
variables play a role (Hoetker, 2007). 
A correlation matrix for the dependent, independent and continuous control measures is presented in 
Table 3.2. This matrix indicates the low correlations between the variables included in our analyses with 
the exception of our reputation measures. In our regression models that combine all reputation measures, 
we therefore insert orthogonalized variables using the Gram-Schmidt procedure (Saville & Wood, 1991). 
This technique “partials out” the common variance, creating transformed variables that are uncorrelated 
with one another. 
Insert Table 3.2. around here 
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3.5. Empirical results 
 
3.5.1. Main analyses 
 
Table 3.3. presents the results of our multivariate statistics on the probability of being sold to a strategic 
compared to a financial acquirer. Our first model presents the results from the main effects of growth and 
efficiency. Models 2 to 7 show the results of the seemingly unrelated estimations. Model 2 and 3 estimate 
the likelihood of a strategic compared to a financial acquisition in the subsample of exits sold by cross-
border private equity investors with respectively a high and a low overall reputation. Model 4 and 5 
present the results of the logit analyses, based on a median split of country-specific reputation and finally 
model 6 and 7 are based on a median split of the industry-specific reputation of the selling private equity 
investor. For models 2 to 7, Table 3.3. also indicates the results of the Wald test for equality of 
coefficients within different subsamples. This Wald test enables us to compare the effect of growth and 
efficiency between exits of PE investors with a high versus a low reputation. As such, we test hypotheses 
2, 3 and 4. One-tailed tests are reported for hypothesized effects. 
Insert Table 3.3. around here 
With respect to the control variables, the results highlight that small cross-border buyouts, buyouts that 
originate from a corporate divestment and buyouts that operate in a high tech industry are more likely to 
be sold to a strategic rather than to a financial acquirer. Cross-border buyouts that are sold during M&A 
waves are also more likely to end up as a strategic acquisition. In addition, there is a quadratic effect of 
holding time on the type of acquisition. Other variables, including the main effect of the PE investor 
reputation (overall, country-specific as well as industry-specific reputation) are not significantly related to 
the type of acquisition.  
The performance measures indicate a positive effect of growth (p<0.10) and a negative effect of 
efficiency (p<0.05) on the likelihood of a strategic acquisition, providing marginal support for hypothesis 
1a and strong support or hypothesis 1b. Models 2 and 3 compare the likelihood of a strategic acquisition 
in the subsamples of buyouts supported by private equity investors with a high compared to a low overall 
reputation. Model 2 indicates that efficiency (p<0.01) is again highly related to the likelihood of a 
strategic acquisition. Growth is no longer significant in this smaller sample. For firms sold by cross-
border PE investors with a low overall reputation, there is only a marginally significant relationship 
between the growth of the firm (p<0.10) and the type of acquisition. If we compare the values of the 
coefficients for our target firm characteristics, the Wald test indicates that efficiency is indeed more 
strongly related to the type of acquisition (p<0.01). Growth does not differ between the two subsamples. 
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This provides strong support for hypothesis 2b, hypothesis 2a is not supported. Models 4 and 5 present 
the relationship between target firm characteristics and the type of acquisition, based on a median split of 
country-specific reputation. The results of these models indicate that both growth (p<0.01) as well as 
efficiency (p<0.01) are strongly significant in the high country-specific reputation subsample, while this 
is not the case if the buyouts was sold by a cross-border private equity investor with a low country-
specific reputation. Based on the Wald test, there are strong differences between both subsamples with 
respect to the effect of efficiency (p<0.01) and growth (p<0.05) on the type of acquisition Hence, this 
provides strong support for hypothesis 3a and 3b. Finally, model 6 and 7 present the findings of the 
median split of industry-specific reputation. In the subsample of buyouts sold by cross-border private 
equity investors with a high industry-specific reputation, efficiency (p<0.01) strongly decreases the 
probability of a strategic compared to a financial acquisition. Growth was not found to matter. In contrast, 
in the low industry-specific reputation subsample neither growth nor efficiency influence the type of 
acquisition. The Wald test indicates that efficiency is significantly more related to the type of acquisition 
in the subsample of buyouts supported by investors with a high industry-specific reputation (p<0.01), 
providing strong support for hypothesis 4b. The moderating effect of industry-specific reputation on the 
relationship between growth and the type of acquisition (hypothesis 4a) was not supported.  
3.5.2. Post-hoc analysis 
 
As a post-hoc analysis, we compare the relative importance of three different reputation measures as a 
moderating variable in Table 3.4. We therefore analyze whether the moderating effect of overall 
reputation, country-specific reputation and industry-specific reputation are equally strong or not. We test 
this through seemingly unrelated regressions, comparing different subsamples of acquisitions sold by 
cross-border PE investors with respectively a high overall, a high country-specific and a high industry-
specific reputation. More specifically, model 1 and 2 estimate the likelihood of a strategic compared to a 
financial acquisition in the subsamples of acquisitions sold by respectively PE investors with a high 
overall reputation and a high country-specific reputation. Model 3 and 4 estimate the likelihood of a 
strategic acquisition in the subsamples of acquisitions sold by PE investors with a high overall compared 
to a high industry-specific reputation. Finally, model 5 and 6 estimate the likelihood of a strategic 
acquisition in the subsamples of acquisitions sold by cross-border PE investors with a high industry-
specific versus a high country-specific reputation. We also report the Wald test that compares the 
coefficients of growth and efficiency between the subsamples. Based on model 1 and 2, we find that the 
effect of growth on the type of acquisition is more important in the subsample of acquisitions sold by a 
cross-border PE investor with a high country-specific compared to a high overall reputation. The value of 
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the Wald test is significant on a 1% level. The effect of efficiency on the type of acquisition did not differ 
between the two subsamples. With respect to the difference between overall and industry-specific 
reputation of the selling PE investor (Model 3 and 4), our findings do not indicate significant differences 
between the effect of growth or efficiency between the two subsamples. Both subsamples suggest a 
negative effect of efficiency on the type of acquisition while growth is not significant. Moreover, the 
Wald test does not indicate any significant difference between both subsamples. Finally, model 5 and 6 
report the effect of growth and efficiency in the subsamples of acquisitions sold by cross-border PE 
investor with a high industry-specific versus a high country-specific reputation. While growth is 
important in the subsample of acquisitions sold by a cross-border PE investor with a high country-specific 
reputation, growth is not significant in the subsample of acquisitions sold by PE investors with a high 
industry-specific reputation. The Wald test furthermore indicates that the effect of growth is significantly 
different between both subsamples (p<0.10). The negative effect of efficiency on the type of acquisition 
was supported in both subsamples. Based on the Wald test, no differences between the subsamples were 
found.  
Based on the different models in Table 3.4., country-specific reputation has a stronger impact on the 
relationship between growth and the type of acquisition than the two other types of reputation. The 
moderating effect of efficiency is not significantly different between the three different types of 
reputation. This suggests that country-specific reputation is more important as a moderating variable than 
overall and industry-specific reputation.  
Insert Table 3.4. around here 
In sum, our findings indicate a marginally significant positive effect of growth and a significantly 
negative effect of efficiency on the likelihood of a strategic compared to a financial acquisition. 
Moreover, the negative effect of efficiency on the type of acquisition is stronger for buyouts sold by a 
reputable cross-border investor. Both overall as well as country-specific and industry-specific reputation 
strengthen the effect of efficiency. In addition, the positive influence of growth is also stronger if the 
selling cross-border PE investor has a high country-specific reputation. The moderating effect of overall 
and industry-specific reputation is not significant. This indicates that country-specific reputation has a 
more extensive moderating influence on the relationship between the value creating mechanisms and the 
type of acquisition exit of cross-border buyouts. The latter is confirmed in our post-hoc analysis, 
indicating that country-specific reputation is more important than overall and industry-specific reputation 
as a moderating variable on the effect of growth on the type of acquisition.  
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Figure 3.2. serves to clarify the interaction effects of our three reputation measures on the influence of 
growth and efficiency on the acquisition type. As shown in panel A, the probability of a financial 
acquisition increases more by higher levels of efficiency of the selling cross-border PE investor has a high 
overall reputation. Panel B and C furthermore indicate the larger impact of respectively growth and 
efficiency for high levels of country-specific reputation. Finally, the higher influence of efficiency across 
high levels of industry-specific reputation is shown in Panel D.  
Insert Figure 3.2. around here 
The economic significance of our effects is substantial. This interpretation is based on a difference in 
odds ratios between the values of the 75th compared to the 25th percentile of growth and efficiency. First 
of all, the coefficient of model 1 indicates that cross-border buyouts with a large growth increase their 
odds of a strategic acquisition with 12%; the odds of firms with a high efficiency decrease with 89%. The 
latter indicates that efficiency is both statistically as well as economically more important than growth. 
Second, the moderating effect of overall, country-specific and industry-specific reputation on the 
relationship between efficiency and the type of acquisition exits is considerable. While more efficient 
buyouts decrease their odds of a strategic compared to a financial acquisition with 250% if they are 
supported by a private equity investor with a high overall reputation, those supported by less reputable 
private equity investors show even an increase with 3%. Likewise, the odds ratio for efficient buyouts 
sold by PE investors with a high country-specific reputation decrease 258% in the high country-specific 
reputation subsample in contrast to efficient buyouts that increase their odds of a financial acquisition 
with 22% in the low country-specific reputation subsample. In a similar vein, the odds of a strategic 
acquisition for efficient firms drop with 208% in the high industry-specific reputation subsample whereas 
they only drop with 17% in the low industry-specific reputation subsample. Third, our results indicate that 
the likelihood of a strategic acquisition rises with 82% for cross-border buyouts with a higher growth in 
the subsample of acquisitions supported by investors with a high country-specific reputation. This 
contrasts to an increase with only 1% within the low country-specific reputation subsample. 
3.5.3. Robustness checks 
 
We have performed several robustness checks to control for the sensitivity of our analyses. First, we 
controlled for a selection effect in our models. More specifically, we analyzed the effect of potential 
differences between buyouts sold by reputable versus less reputable private equity investors. Our major 
concern here was that this selection effect could influence the hypothesized relationships between growth 
and efficiency on the type of acquisition (Heckman, 1979). Our robustness checks indicated that buyouts 
   
69 
 
exited by more reputable investors do not differ in terms of growth and efficiency from buyouts sold by 
less reputable investors. In addition, we controlled for the selection effect as an additional variable in our 
models. This selection effect did not alter our findings, suggesting that our results are not driven by 
selection.  
Moreover, we analyzed whether our findings are driven by the country of exit. Frist, we tested potential 
differences in terms of target firm characteristics between domestic and cross-border acquirers. This 
suggests that domestic acquisition targets have a higher efficiency. Growth does not differ between 
domestic and cross-border acquisition exits. Second, we analyzed the moderating effect of the country of 
exit on the relationship between target firm characteristics and the type of acquisition exit. This suggests 
that the behavior of domestic acquirers is not significantly different from cross-border acquirers: the 
effect of growth and efficiency does not differ. Third, the inclusion of the country of exit as a control 
variable in our models did also not alter our findings. This indicates that the country of exit does not drive 
our results. 
In addition, an alternative explanation for the positive moderating effect of reputation is that less 
reputable investors face higher fund pressures (Lee & Wahal, 2004). They face more issues to attract 
additional funds and may therefore suffer to a larger extent from the need to improve their track record 
through acquisition exits on short term (Gompers, 1996). This might create the preference of less 
reputable investors to opt for an earlier and less value maximizing type of exit. In contrast, reputable 
investors can wait till there is substantial interest from different parties to exit the cross-border buyouts in 
their portfolio. In order to test for this alternative explanation, we checked for potential effects of 
reputation on the time-to-exit. Both bivariate and multivariate analyses indicate however that reputable 
investors exit their buyouts earlier. These findings do not provide evidence for the effect of fund pressures 
on acquisition exits.  
Finally, as financial acquisitions of buyouts have become increasingly popular over the years, we tested 
its potential effect on our findings. 71% of the acquisitions in our sample occur within the period 2005-
2008. The others occur in the period 1999-2004. Through bivariate and multivariate analyses, we checked 
for the potential effect of timing on our results. This did not indicate a significant main effect of timing on 
the likelihood of a financial compared to a strategic acquisition. Moreover, the year of acquisition does 
not moderate the relationship between target firm characteristics and the type of acquisition exit.  
There are two alternative estimation procedures to test our findings that are, for several reasons, not 
applied in this research setting. First, an alternative to test the moderating effect of reputation is to use a 
correction procedure in logit analyses with moderating variables. This computes the marginal effect of a 
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change in two interacted variables through the “inteff” postestimation command in STATA (Norton, 
Wang & Ai, 2004). This method makes it possible to test moderating effects of continuous variables 
without the loss of information on intragroup variation as in the split sample procedure. Unfortunately, 
the inteff command does not work in a model with multiple interactions terms that include the same 
independent variable (Seymour, 2011). In this research setting, this is hence not a suitable estimation 
procedure. A second alternative method of analysis would be to use competing risk models to test our 
hypotheses. These analyze the combined effects of our variables on the type and timing of the exit. They 
do not allow us to separate the effects on exit type and the exit timing. In contrast, the goal of this study 
lies solely on the type of acquisition exit, not on the timing. The timing of the exit is therefore only used 
as a control variable in our study. Hence, we report the results based on logistic regressions.  
 
3.6. Discussion and conclusion 
 
This paper studies the differences between strategic and financial acquisition exits of cross-border 
buyouts. Our findings support the argumentation that the differences between strategic and financial 
acquisitions result from varying value creating mechanisms during the cross-border buyout. More 
specifically, cross-border buyout growth increases the likelihood of strategic compared to a financial 
acquisition while efficiency has the opposite effect. The latter increases the probability of a financial 
acquisition. The effect of efficiency on the type of acquisition exit is higher if the divesting cross-border 
PE investor has a high reputation. Both the overall, the industry-specific and particularly the country-
specific reputation play a role herein. Moreover, country-specific reputation also strengthens the 
relationship between efficiency and the type of acquisition. In sum, this paper advances our understanding 
how private equity investors divest their cross-border buyouts through acquisition. These findings are 
interesting for a number of reasons.  
First, we contribute to the entrepreneurship literature. Although PE investors dominantly opt for 
acquisitions to exit their cross-border buyout investments, there is a limited understanding in the 
differences between strategic and financial acquisitions of cross-border buyouts and of buyouts in general 
(Sudarsanam & Nwagodoh, 2005). Based on insights from the acquisition and the international 
entrepreneurship literature, we indicate that the value creating mechanisms during the buyout explain 
these differences. Strategic acquirers opt for buyouts with a higher growth while financial acquirers are 
more interested in efficiencies. In addition, the reputation of the selling PE investor is in important tool to 
reduce information costs in acquisition exits of cross-border buyouts. Particularly country-specific 
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reputation was found to matter. Moreover, our findings contribute to a better knowledge on the increasing 
attractiveness of financial acquisition exits of buyout firms, i.e. the secondary buyouts (Bonini, 2010, 
Achleitner & Figge, 2011). These are not the exits of last resort, although this is often mentioned in the 
popular media (Sousa, 2010). Instead, they offer buyouts that operate efficiently under the governance 
mechanisms of a private equity investor the opportunity to continue within a buyout governance structure 
while they provide the selling private equity investor a mechanism to end his current engagement.  
Second, our findings contribute to the literature on information costs in acquisitions. As previous studies 
have mainly focused on acquisition contracts or methods of payment as mechanisms to alleviate 
information problems in acquisitions, the effect of reputation on information problems in acquisitions is 
an underdeveloped research topic (Ragozzino & Reuer, 2011). In contrast, the effect of reputation on 
information problems is mainly examined in alternative financial transactions such as IPOs. Through a 
focus on acquisitions of internally owned firms, which are associated with high information costs, our 
study details how the reputation of the selling firm decreases the information problems in acquisitions. 
First, the reputation of the selling cross-border investor reduces information costs through a higher 
credibility of financial information. Second, our international setting enables us to increase our 
understanding on the fragmentation of reputation. Recent findings indicate that reputation is segmented 
towards different areas of expertise (e.g. Jensen & Roy, 2008; Rhee & Valdez, 2009). As a result, the 
effect of reputation is often considered to be industry-specific (Hsu, 2004). Reputation is also segmented 
across countries. More specifically, country-specific reputation signals the ability of expertise, credibility 
and specialized guidance of the foreign owner within a particular region. As such, acquisitions sold by 
cross-border investors with a high country-specific reputation are associated with a decrease in 
information costs.  
Third, we contribute to international business theory by exploring the exit of cross-border operations. This 
is an essential part of the internationalization strategy (Birkinshaw & Hood, 1998; Santangelo & Meyer, 
2011). Our findings stress the role of the selling firm within this process as his value creating strategy 
prior to exit determines the type of acquisition. Moreover, we extend existing knowledge on the benefits 
of local specialization. While the process based theory of internationalization highlights that local 
specialization leads to an increased commitment towards a particular country (Johanson & Vahlne, 1977), 
our findings suggest that it is also important for the divestment of cross-border activities. More 
specifically, a higher level of country-specific reputation as a result of local specialization reduces the 
information problems in the sale of cross-border operations. 
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3.8. Tables and figures 
 
TABLE 3.1.: DESCRIPTIVE STATISTICS FOR THE SAMPLE AND FOR THE TWO SUBGROUPS OF 
STRATEGIC AND FINANCIAL ACQUISITIONS 
Variable  
Sample 
Strategic 
acquisition 
Financial 
acquisition   
Av. Med. Av. Med. Av. Med.   
Sample description        
Syndication with domestic investora 0.24  0.20  0.27   
Syndication with other international investorsa 0.13  0.11  0.15   
Size (in € 000) 129709 52527 95502 37269 158979 80189 ** 
Source: divestmenta 0.40  0.42  0.38   
Source: family or private firma 0.34  0.41  0.28  † 
Source: secondary buyout, privatization or 
listed firma 
0.24  0.16  0.32  * 
High tech industrya 0.19  0.27  0.13  * 
Loan spread 0.87 0.77 0.90 0.79 0.84 0.75  
M&A activity 0.05 0.04 0.05 0.04 0.05 0.05  
Holding time in years 4.09 3.63 4.16 3.50 4.03 3.67  
Location: Belgiuma 0.07  0.06  0.08   
Location: Francea 0.51  0.47  0.55   
Location: Italya 0.13  0.16  0.10   
Location: Netherlandsa 0.08  0.07  0.09   
Location: Spaina 0.13  0.18  0.09  † 
Location: Swedena 0.07  0.06  0.08   
        
Dependent variables         
Growth 0.17 0.03 0.23 0.06 0.12 0.02  
Efficiency (in %) 11.27 11.47 9.12 6.49 13.11 12.53 ** 
Reputation of the divesting PE owner        
Overall reputation 1.82 0.95 1.90 0.95 1.75 0.95  
Country-specific reputation  2.51 1.43 2.87 2.22 2.20 1.33 * 
Industry-specific reputation  2.14 1.01 2.37 1.01 1.94 1.00  
N 180  83  97   
This table provides a description of our sample of buyouts in addition to the subgroups of buyouts that exit through a 
financial or a strategic acquisition. For each variable, we present average (Av.) and median (Med.) values except for 
the dummy variables. For these variables, we report the relative proportion. We also present the results of the 
bivarate test statistics between these two subgroups.  
** indicates p<0.01, * indicates  p<0.05, † indicates p<0.1 (One-tailed tests for hypothesized effects) 
aThis is a dummy variable.  
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TABLE 3.2.: CORRELATIONS FOR THE DEPENDENT, INDEPENDENT AND CONTINUOUS CONTROL VARIABLES 
    1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 
1 Secondary buyout 1.00                
2 Size (in € 000) 0.20 1.00         
3 Loan spread -0.07 -0.05 1.00  
  
 
   
4 M&A activity -0.00 0.16 -0.15 1.00 
  
 
   
5 Holding time in years -0.04 -0.16 0.04 0.15 1.00 
 
 
   
6 Growth -0.09 0.04 0.01 -0.17 -0.16 1.00     
7 Efficiency 0.20 -0.15 -0.04 -0.16 0.08 -0.02 1.00    
8 Overall reputation -0.03 -0.32 0.15 -0.24 -0.04 0.04 0.07 1.00   
9 Country-specific reputation  -0.09 -0.33 0.22 -0.22 -0.11 0.04 0.04 0.77 1.00  
10 Industry-specific reputation -0.07 -0.28 0.11 -0.24 -0.09 0.12 -0.01 0.88 0.67 1.00 
All correlations with absolute values above 0.14 are significant (p<0.05)
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TABLE 3.3.: LOGIT REGRESSIONS FOR THE DIFFERENCES BETWEEN STRATEGIC AND FINANCIAL ACQUISITIONS 
Dependent variable: Strategic versus 
financial acquisition 
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) 
Full sample 
High overall 
reputation 
Low overall 
reputation 
High country-
specific reputation 
Low country-
specific reputation 
High industry-
specific reputation 
Low industry-
specific reputation 
Coef.   S.D. Coef.   S.D. Coef.   S.D. Coef.   S.D. Coef.   S.D. Coef.   S.D. Coef.   S.D. 
Independent variables                 
Growth 0.392 † (0.259) -0.164  (0.526) 0.641 † (0.487) 1.467 ** (0.627) 0.026  (0.373) 0.265  (0.530) 0.415 (0.388) 
Efficiency -0.058 * (0.032) -0.173 ** (0.029) 0.002  (0.027) -0.160 ** (0.033) 0.015  (0.030) -0.142 ** (0.038) -0.011 (0.026) 
Control variables                     
Syndication with domestic investor -0.373  (0.385) 0.780 † (0.424) -0.982  (0.811) 0.520  (0.689) -1.082 † (0.648) 0.450  (0.664) -0.890 (0.593) 
Syndication with other international 
investors 
-0.350  (0.575) 1.595  (1.141) -0.027  (0.702) -3.367 ** (0.97) 0.173  (0.639) 0.042  (0.731) -0.164 (0.680) 
Size -0.337 * (0.137) -0.870 * (0.389) -0.373  (0.244) -0.323  (0.231) -0.396 † (0.221) -0.519 † (0.301) -0.309 (0.205) 
Source: Divestment 0.741 † (0.414) -0.232  (0.798) 1.347 * (0.654) 0.457  (0.788) 0.829  (0.633) 0.612  (0.627) 0.845 (0.598) 
Source: Family or private firm 0.667  (0.500) 0.955  (0.783) 0.094  (0.945) 0.695  (0.621) 0.117  (0.983) 1.448 * (0.573) 0.139 (0.773) 
High tech industry 0.939 * (0.396) 2.311 ** (0.460) 0.412  (0.541) 2.320 ** (0.686) 0.793  (0.727) 2.475 ** (0.917) 0.510 (0.458) 
Loan spread 0.488  (0.421) 1.141  (0.761) 0.237  (0.717) 0.089  (0.498) 1.284 † (0.760) 0.191  (0.748) 0.612 (0.553) 
M&A activity 12.140 † (7.226) 25.640 † (14.560) 12.540  (11.47) 18.710  (13.510) 14.230  (13.35) 21.840  (13.78) 10.430 (8.860) 
Holding time in years 0.029  (0.086) -0.122  (0.144) 0.033  (0.125) 0.056  (0.179) 0.001  (0.108) 0.105  (0.098) 0.018  (0.121) 
Holding time in years squared 0.103 ** (0.040) 0.183 † (0.094) 0.115 † (0.065) 0.103  (0.064) 0.132 * (0.055) 0.153 † (0.078) 0.131 * (0.066) 
Location: Belgium, Netherlands, -0.634  (0.463) -0.868  (0.598) -1.718 * (0.828) -0.915  (0.702) -0.796  (0.696) -1.039  (1.050) -0.654 (0.670) 
Location: Spain, Italy 0.389  (0.466) 0.834  (0.635) 0.037  (0.681) 0.211  (0.458) 0.116  (0.726) 0.797  (0.720) 0.178 (0.724) 
Overall reputation a -0.015  (0.124)     0.384 * (0.190) -0.635  (1.067) 0.281 † (0.158) -0.387 (0.922) 
Country-specific reputation a 0.111  (0.139) -0.013  (0.105) 1.846 ** (0.656)     0.164  (0.202) 0.255 (0.685) 
Industry-specific reputation a -0.033  (0.127) 0.417 † (0.227) -1.038 † (0.542) 0.447 * (0.215) -0.499  (0.345)      
Constant 2.161  (1.575) 6.977 * (3.240) 2.564  (3.232) 3.160  (2.696) 0.951  (3.257) 3.612  (3.157) 1.454 (2.577) 
Observations 180   91 89   88 92   88 92   
chi-square test 43.44 **  48.06 **  30.19 *  44.42 **  25.37 †  39.11 **  18.10   
Wald tests for equality of coefficients                 
Growth     1.27   3.95 * 0.06  
Efficiency     19.03  ** 13.40 ** 12.13 ** 
Estimated coefficients for the logit regressions which compare the characteristics of buyout exits through strategic versus financial acquisitions. (Dependent variable equals 1 in the 
case of a strategic acquisition). We model the final year before exit. Standard errors are clustered per private equity investor. 
a
 This variable is orthogonalized 
** p<0.01, * p<0.05, † p<0.1 (One-tailed tests for hypothesized effects)  
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TABLE 3.4.: LOGIT REGRESSIONS FOR THE DIFFERENCES BETWEEN STRATEGIC AND FINANCIAL ACQUISITIONS: COMPARISON BETWEEN 
DIFFERENT TYPES OF REPUTATION 
 
 (1)   (2)   (3)   (4)   (5)   (6)  
Dependent variable: Strategic versus financial 
acquisition 
High overall 
reputation 
High country-
specific reputation 
High overall 
reputation 
High industry-
specifc reputation 
High industry-
specific reputation 
High country-
specific reputation 
 
Coef.   S.D. Coef.   S.D. Coef.   S.D. Coef.   S.D. Coef.   S.D. Coef.   S.D. 
Independent variables                
Growth -0.164 (0.532) 1.467 * (0.636) -0.164 (0.533) 0.265  (0.538) 0.265 (0.534) 1.467 ** (0.633) 
Efficiency -0.173 ** (0.029) -0.160 ** (0.034) -0.173 ** (0.029) -0.142 ** (0.039) -0.142 ** (0.038) -0.160 ** (0.034) 
Control variables                   
Syndication with domestic investor 0.780 † (0.430) 0.520  (0.698) 0.780 † (0.431) 0.450  (0.674) 0.450  (0.670) 0.520  (0.695) 
Syndication with other international investors 1.595  (1.156) -3.367 ** (0.983) 1.595  (1.158) 0.042  (0.742) 0.042  (0.738) -3.367 ** (0.978) 
Size -0.870 * (0.394) -0.323  (0.234) -0.870 * (0.395) -0.519 † (0.306) -0.519 † (0.304) -0.323  (0.233) 
Source: Divestment -0.232  (0.809) 0.457  (0.798) -0.232  (0.810) 0.612  (0.637) 0.612  (0.633) 0.457  (0.795) 
Source: Family or private firm 0.955  (0.793) 0.695  (0.629) 0.955  (0.794) 1.448 * (0.581) 1.448 * (0.578) 0.695  (0.626) 
High tech industry 2.311 ** (0.466) 2.320 ** (0.695) 2.311 ** (0.467) 2.475 ** (0.930) 2.475 ** (0.924) 2.320 ** (0.692) 
Loan spread 1.141  (0.771) 0.089  (0.504) 1.141  (0.772) 0.191  (0.759) 0.191  (0.754) 0.089  (0.502) 
M&A activity 25.640 † (14.750) 18.710  (13.680) 25.640 † (14.770) 21.840  (13.980) 21.840  (13.890) 18.710  (13.620) 
Holding time in years -0.122  (0.146) 0.056  (0.181) -0.122  (0.146) 0.105  (0.100) 0.105  (0.099) 0.056  (0.180) 
Holding time in years squared 0.183 † (0.095) 0.103  (0.064) 0.183 † (0.095) 0.153 † (0.079) 0.153 † (0.079) 0.103  (0.064) 
Location: Belgium, Netherlands, Sweden -0.868  (0.606) -0.915  (0.711) -0.868  (0.607) -1.039  (1.066) -1.039  (1.059) -0.915  (0.708) 
Location: Spain, Italy 0.834  (0.643) 0.211  (0.464) 0.834  (0.645) 0.797  (0.731) 0.797  (0.726) 0.211  (0.462) 
Overall reputation a -0.013  (0.106)    -0.013  (0.107) 0.164  (0.205) 0.164  (0.204)    
Country-specific reputation a 0.417 † (0.230) 0.447 ** (0.218) 0.417 † (0.231)       0.447 * (0.217) 
Industry-specific reputation a    0.384 ** (0.193)    0.281 † (0.161) 0.281 † (0.160) 0.384 * (0.192) 
Constant 6.977 * (3.282) 3.160  (2.731) 6.977 * (3.288) 3.612  (3.203) 3.612  (3.183) 3.160  (2.718) 
Observations 91 88   91 88   88 88   
Wald tests for equality of coefficients              
Growth 5.70  ** 0.47   2.40 †  
Efficiency 0.15   1.19   0.38   
Estimated coefficients for the logit regressions which compare the characteristics of buyout exits through strategic versus financial acquisitions. (Dependent variable equals 1 in the 
case of a strategic acquisition). We model the final year before exit. Standard errors are clustered per private equity investor 
a
 This variable is orthogonalized 
** p<0.01, * p<0.05, † p<0.1 (One-tailed tests for hypothesized effects)
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FIGURE 3.1.: THEORETICAL MODEL 
 
Growth 
Efficiency 
Strategic versus 
financial acquisition 
Overall reputation 
Country-specific reputation 
Industry-specific reputation 
 H1 
H2 
H3 
H4 
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FIGURE 3.2: THE PROBABILITY OF A STRATEGIC ACQUISITION AS A FUNCTION OF 
GROWTH AND EFFICIENCY ACROSS DIFFERENT LEVELS OF REPUTATION 
Panel A: The probability of a strategic acquisition as a function of efficiency across different levels of 
overall reputation
 
Panel B: The probability of a strategic acquisition as a function of growth across different levels of 
country-specific reputation
 
.
2
.
4
.
6
.
8
1
Pr
e
di
ct
e
d 
pr
ob
ab
ilit
y 
of
 
a
 
st
ra
te
gi
c 
ac
qu
is
iti
on
-1 0 1 2 3
Growth
Contribution of covariates at the mean
High country-specific reputation
.
2
.
4
.
6
.
8
1
Pr
e
di
ct
e
d 
pr
ob
ab
ilit
y 
of
 
a
 
st
ra
te
gi
c 
ac
qu
is
iti
on
-1 0 1 2 3
Growth
Contribution of covariates at the mean
Low country-specific reputation
0 
.
.
.
.
1 
Pr
e
di
ct
e
d 
pr
o
ba
bi
lit
y 
o
f a
 
st
ra
te
gi
c 
a
cq
u
isi
tio
n
 
0 10 20 30 40
Efficiency (in%)
Contribution of covariates at the mean
High overall reputation
0 
.
.
.
.
1 
Pr
e
di
ct
ed
 
pr
o
ba
bi
lit
y 
o
f a
 
st
ra
te
gi
c 
a
cq
u
isi
tio
n
 
0 10 20 30 40 
Efficiency (in%) 
Contribution of covariates at the mean
Low overall reputation 
   
83 
 
Panel C: The probability of a strategic acquisition as a function of efficiency across different levels of 
country-specific reputation
 
Panel D: The probability of a strategic acquisition as a function of efficiency across different levels of 
industry-specific reputation
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4.1. Abstract 
 
This paper studies the effect of host country experience of cross-border financial intermediaries on the 
probability of a domestic versus an international acquisition. Using a unique dataset of 296 Continental 
European acquisitions guided by cross-border private equity investors, this paper shows how host country 
experience enhances local information transfer through local embeddedness. This reduces the information 
costs of domestic acquirers which increases the probability of a domestic acquisition. The positive effect 
of cross-border private equity investors’ host country experience on the probability of a domestic 
acquisition is higher for financial than for strategic acquisitions. This is the result of increasing network 
connections between private equity investors and financial acquirers compared to strategic acquirers. 
Finally, host country experience is less positively associated with a domestic acquisition under higher 
levels of host country financial market development. The increased accessibility of local information 
within more developed financial markets substitutes for benefits of local information transfer by cross-
border intermediaries with higher levels of host country experience.  
4.2. Introduction 
 
Financial intermediaries, such as private equity investors, help to spread information thereby substantially 
reducing the information costs of acquirers (Chemmanur & Fulghieri, 1994). In the currently globalized 
economy, a substantial number of financial intermediaries originate from cross-border regions. Their 
geographically dispersed network increases the spread of information towards foreign acquirers thereby 
facilitating cross-border acquisitions (Jääskelaïnen & Maula, 2008; Ragozzino & Reuer, 2009). In 
contrast, domestic acquirers favor domestic intermediaries which are more embedded in the host country 
information networks (Granovetter, 1985; Zaheer & Mosakowski, 1997). This creates an important 
liability of foreignness for cross-border financial intermediaries whose access to domestic networks and 
domestic acquirers is more limited. In order to understand the effectiveness of cross-border financial 
intermediaries for domestic acquirers, it is crucial to analyze how cross-border financial intermediaries 
overcome their liability of foreignness.  
In this study, we focus on the transfer of information between cross-border financial intermediaries and 
domestic acquirers. We examine how cross-border financial intermediaries can alleviate their liability of 
foreignness towards domestic acquirers through higher levels of host country experience. This is defined 
as the experience acquired by the financial intermediary through prior business deals in the country of the 
target company (Chetty, Eriksson & Lindbergh, 2006). First, we investigate whether host country 
experience increases the likelihood of a domestic over an international acquisition through a reduction of 
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domestic acquirers’ information costs. Second, we concentrate on domestic acquirers’ connections 
towards different sources of local information. We examine whether this moderates the positive influence 
of local information transfer by cross-border financial intermediaries with more host country experience. 
On the one hand, we examine the moderating effect of business connections between the domestic 
acquirer and the cross-border financial intermediary. We therefore investigate whether the influence of 
host country experience differs between financial acquirers - that operate within the same business 
network as financial intermediaries - and strategic buyers – with less established network connections to 
financial intermediaries. On the other hand, we concentrate on financial market development which 
increases the connections of domestic acquirers with alternative, domestic financial intermediaries. We 
examine whether the increased access of information on local acquisition targets under higher levels of 
financial market development substitutes for the effectiveness of host country experience on the reduction 
of domestic acquirers’ information costs.  
The hypotheses are tested on a unique and hand-collected sample of 296 acquisitions that are supported by 
cross-border financial intermediaries. More specifically, we examine acquisition exits of cross-border 
buyouts sold by cross-border private equity investors. Given the substantial equity stake of these private 
equity investors, they are highly involved in the acquisition process. Acquirers therefore attach a 
particularly high importance to the information spread by these intermediaries (Fitza & Dean, 2009). We 
concentrate on the Continental Europe, as this region is increasingly internationally oriented with a high 
number of both domestic and international acquisitions, a large and diverse set of cross-border private 
equity investors in addition to a substantial variation of financial market development (Meuleman & 
Wright, 2011).  
Our findings highlight the positive effect of host country experience of cross-border financial 
intermediaries on the likelihood of a domestic acquisition. It reduces the financial intermediaries’ liability 
of foreignness through increased local information transfer towards domestic acquirers (Coval & 
Moskowitz, 1999; Zaheer & Mosakowski, 1997). Moreover, the positive effect of financial 
intermediaries’ host country experience is larger for financial than for strategic acquisitions. Finally, the 
positive effect of host country experience on the probability of a domestic acquisition is lower under 
higher levels of financial market development.  
This study has important contributions for the liability of foreignness literature. The high levels of 
internationalization within the financial service industry have challenged existing insights on the liability 
of foreignness. More specifically, recent findings have shown that in many industries, such as the financial 
intermediation industry, foreign entrants are numerous and perform often better than purely domestic 
firms. This calls for additional research whether there are indeed benefits of increased host country 
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experience in highly internationally oriented industries (Nachum, 2010). Our study addresses the need for 
a better insight in this phenomenon. Second, our study enlarges the liability of foreignness literature 
through the introduction of a contingency perspective. As embeddedness within local information 
channels explains the benefits of host country experience (Zaheer & Mosakowski, 1997), this raises the 
question whether domestic acquirers’ connectivity towards these local information channels affects the 
benefits of host country experience. Third, we contribute to network theory. The focus of this paper is to 
examine whether the benefits of a network for information transfer depend on the relative importance of 
different information networks. This contrasts to most studies that only examine the effect of information 
transfer within a sole information network (Burt, 1992). Finally, our study extends the home bias literature 
in acquisitions. While most studies highlight the relationship between cross-border financial 
intermediation and the information costs of international acquirers (e.g. Jääskeläinen & Maula, 2008), the 
impact of cross-border financial intermediation on the information costs of cross-border acquirers is yet 
not fully understood. 
The remainder of this paper proceeds as follows. We first develop our theoretical framework including 
hypotheses. Thereafter, we describe our research method and present our results. The paper ends with a 
discussion and conclusion.  
4.3. Theory development and hypotheses 
 
The role of financial intermediaries in acquisitions is to spread information on the acquisition targets. 
However, as information is bounded across geographical locations, domestic intermediaries are better able 
than cross-border intermediaries to spread information towards domestic acquirers (Granovetter, 1985; 
Zaheer & Mosakowski, 1997). We study how a cross-border financial intermediary can alleviate its 
liability of foreignness.  
We argue that cross-border financial intermediaries can ease local information transfer to domestic 
acquirers through increasing levels of host country experience. This will increase the likelihood of a 
domestic compared to a cross-border acquisition. Moreover, we expect that the effect of host country 
experience on local information transfer depends on the connectivity of domestic acquirers towards local 
sources of information. In other words, we study whether local information transfer by cross-border 
intermediaries is more valuable for domestic acquirers that are well-connected to the financial 
intermediary and that are less connected to alternative information channels (Burt, 1992). We thereby 
focus on social as well as institutional aspects of connectivity. First, we examine the impact of local 
network connections between the cross-border financial intermediary and the domestic acquirer. Second, 
we concentrate on the institutional aspect of connectivity. More specifically, we study whether higher 
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levels of financial market development create a better access of information towards local acquirers 
through alternative information channels. We examine whether this alternative information transfer 
substitutes for local information transfer of cross-border financial intermediaries with increasing levels of 
host-country experience. We will expand hereafter on the expected relationships.  
4.3.1. Host country experience of the financial intermediary 
 
Cross-border financial intermediaries with increased investment experience in the host country gradually 
develop a wide range of connections with domestic actors such as legal or strategic advisors, investment 
banks, operating companies and domestic private equity investors (Cumming, Fleming & Schwienbacher, 
2009; Nachum, 2003). In addition, host country experience enhances familiarity with the local culture and 
business style (Zaheer, 1995). The combination of local connections and familiarity within the region 
increase the local embeddedness of the cross-border financial intermediary (Slangen & Hennart, 2008). 
This is highly important for the transfer of information on the acquisition target towards domestic 
acquirers. Through local embeddedness, financial intermediaries can effectively contact domestic 
acquirers through direct or indirect information channels and reduce their information costs. We therefore 
expect that the likelihood of an acquisition by a local acquirer increases with higher levels of financial 
intermediaries’ host country experience.  
H1: Host country experience of cross-border financial intermediaries increases the likelihood of a 
domestic acquisition. 
4.3.2. The impact of connectivity towards local information channels 
 
In this section, we examine whether the benefits of increased information transfer by financial 
intermediaries through host country experience depend on the connections of domestic acquirers towards 
local information channels. We incorporate two aspects of connectivity. First, we stress the social aspect 
of connectivity. We thereby focus on the networks that connect domestic acquirers with the cross-border 
financial intermediary (Davidsson & Honig, 2003). Second, we examine the institutional aspect of 
connectivity and more specifically the impact of financial market development. We thereby stress the 
increased access to alternative information sources on local acquisition targets under higher levels of host 
country financial market development (Johnson, 2004). Both the moderating influence of business 
networks as well as financial market development is explained hereafter. 
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4.3.2.1. Host country experience and business networks 
 
Financial intermediaries with higher levels of host country experience are more strongly integrated in 
local business networks. These network meetings offer close contacts that are an important mechanism for 
local information transfer towards potential acquirers (Uzzi, 1999; Zaheer & Mosakowski, 1997).  
Different types of acquirers operate however in different business networks (Chuang & Lee, 2011). We 
therefore expect the effect of financial intermediaries’ host country experience to vary between financial 
acquirers (i.e. private equity investors) and strategic acquirers (i.e. corporate firms). There is ample 
evidence of strong connections between financial acquirers and financial intermediaries operating in the 
same country or region (Guler & Guillén, 2010; Sorenson & Stuart, 2001). Financial intermediaries with 
higher levels of host country experience are therefore expected to effectively reduce the information costs 
of domestic financial acquirers (Sorenson & Stuart, 2001).  
Financial intermediaries have less direct connections with strategic acquirers. In the absence of close 
connections between strategic acquirers and financial intermediaries, the value of host country experience 
of financial intermediaries for local information transfer is expected to be lower (Uzzi, 1997). Further, the 
targets of strategic acquirers often operate within their own business network, as these targets are often 
customers or suppliers (in vertical acquisitions) or competitors (in horizontal acquisitions). Hence, 
domestic strategic acquirers have more network meetings and hence relevant firsthand information with 
their acquisition targets (Bruneel, Yli-Renko & Clarysse, 2010). This is less the case for financial 
acquirers. Strategic acquirers therefore rely less on info from financial intermediaries to localize and 
evaluate acquisition targets. As a result, the benefits of host country experience of the financial 
intermediary on the likelihood of a domestic acquisition are expected to be higher for financial than for 
strategic acquisitions. This leads to the following hypothesis:  
H2: The positive effect of host country experience of the financial intermediary on the likelihood of 
a domestic acquisition is higher for financial than for strategic acquisitions. 
4.3.2.2. Host country experience and financial market development  
 
Financial market development creates a more information-friendly environment (Hazarika, Nahata & 
Tandon, 2009). This environment is the result of a higher number and a better expertise of domestic 
financial intermediaries, such as local investment bankers and consultants, operating in developed 
financial markets (Hyun & Kim, 2010). These local intermediaries are primarily embedded within 
domestic information networks. Through these information networks, domestic financial intermediaries 
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generate substantial information about local acquisition targets. These information networks also enable 
domestic financial intermediaries to transfer relevant information towards potential, domestic acquirers. 
As a result, these domestic intermediaries create an alternative source of information for domestic 
acquirers (Johnson, 2004; Meuleman & Wright, 2011). 
We argue that this alternative information channel decreases the information costs of domestic acquirers 
substantially. This channel substitutes for the information transfer by cross-border intermediaries with 
increasing levels of host country experience. Hence, we expect the effect of host country experience on 
the probability of a domestic acquisition to be lower at increasing levels of financial market development 
(Filatotchev & Wright, 2012; Johnson, 2004).  
In contrast, under lower levels of financial market development, domestic acquirers are more dependent 
upon information transfer from cross-border financial intermediaries. Under these conditions, increasing 
levels of host country experience are more highly valued. We therefore expect that host country 
experience has a larger effect on the likelihood of a domestic acquisition within host countries with a 
lower level of financial market development. We therefore hypothesize:  
H3: The positive effect of host country experience of the financial intermediary on the likelihood of 
a domestic acquisition decreases at higher levels of financial market development. 
Figure 4.1. summarizes the hypothesized relationships. 
Insert Figure 4.1. around here 
 
4.4. Research method 
 
4.4.1. Empirical setting and sample 
 
Our hypotheses are empirically tested within a sample of acquisitions supported by cross-border private 
equity investors as non-domestic financial intermediaries. Cross-border private equity investors are an 
important information source for acquirers given their substantial equity stake and their strong 
involvement in the management of the acquisition target. We study acquisitions within Continental 
Europe as it has highly internationally oriented takeover and private equity markets (Meuleman & Wright, 
2011; Wright, Pruthi & Lockett, 2005). 
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The acquisitions in our sample are identified through the database of the Centre for Management Buyout 
Research (CMBOR). This hand-collected database retrieves its information through semi-annual surveys 
in addition to business press info. These surveys obtain a high response rate as private equity investors 
receive a free copy of a quarterly review of aggregate market trends. This database is therefore regarded as 
a comprehensive source of information on European private equity transactions in general and on 
acquisitions supported by cross-border private equity investors in particular.  
A private equity investor is considered cross-border if its head offices are located in a different country 
from the head offices of his investment. In addition, we only included acquisitions where the cross-border 
private equity investor was the leading private equity investor, not the syndicate partner. This exclusion is 
the result of the lower involvement of non-domestic syndication partners in the management and sale of 
the acquisition target compared to leading foreign private equity investors. If there is more than one lead 
private equity investor involved, we assume that most reputable investor acts as the lead investor.  
Our dataset covers acquisitions of target firms located in six countries: Belgium, France, Italy, the 
Netherlands, Spain and Sweden. These six countries are selected to have a large and diverse spread on 
domestic and cross-border acquisitions and on cross-border private equity involvement (EVCA, 2010; 
Groh, von Liechtenstein & Lieser, 2010). The database furthermore covers acquisitions where the cross-
border private equity investor initiated its involvement during the period 1997 - 2004.  
Our sample initially consists of 401 acquisitions backed by cross-border financial intermediaries. Detailed 
information on the origin of the acquirers was found for 379 acquisitions (95%). 42% of these are 
domestic acquisitions. This proportion is somewhat larger for financial (46%) compared to strategic 
acquisitions (38%). Information on the complete set of variables was found for 296 of these acquisitions, 
reducing our sample with 22%. The proportion of domestic compared to cross-border acquisitions remains 
unchanged in the final sample (42%) as well as the proportion of domestically syndicated deals, or the 
proportion of Anglo-Saxon PE investors. Moreover, the average levels of host country experience, deal 
value and duration also do not significantly differ between the initial and the final sample. There are some 
significant differences between the characteristics of the initial and the final sample, although these 
variations remain small. More specifically, the acquisitions that were not included in the final sample 
differ slightly with the acquisitions in the final sample in terms of the age of the financial intermediary (an 
average of 11 compared to 12 years), the proportion of domestic ownership prior to financial intermediary 
involvement (93% compared to 79%) and the proportion of strategic acquisitions (36% compared to 54%). 
This indicates the limited risk of sample selection bias. 
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4.4.2. Variables 
 
An overview of the variable definitions is provided in Table 4.1. These variables are explained in detail 
hereunder. Table 4.2. presents the descriptive statistics of the variables used in the multivariate analyses, 
including comparisons between domestic and cross-border acquisitions.  
 
Insert Table 4.1. around here 
Insert Table 4.2. around here 
 
4.4.2.1. Dependent variable: Domestic acquisition 
 
The dependent variable is binary and indicates whether the firm is bought by a domestic or a foreign 
acquirer. An acquirer is considered domestic if its headquarter is located in the same country as the 
headquarter of the acquisition target. A value of 1 is attributed for a domestic acquisition and 0 for a cross-
border acquisition. 42% of our acquisitions are domestic.  
 
4.4.2.2. Independent variables 
 
Host country experience is operationalized as the total number of private equity transactions in the country 
of the acquisition target, either as a lead or as a non-lead investor, until the pre-acquisition year. On 
average, a private equity investor has invested in 20 firms in the host country until the year prior to the 
acquisition. The logarithm of this variable is taken as the marginal effect of host country experience is 
expected to decrease (De Clercq & Dimov, 2008). 
Financial versus strategic acquisition is a dummy variable indicating whether the acquirer is a strategic 
(i.e. a corporate firm) or a financial acquirer (i.e. another private equity investor). A value of 1 is attributed 
if it is a financial acquirer and 0 if it is a strategic acquirer. 54% of the firms are sold to a financial 
acquirer; 46% to a strategic acquirer. 
Financial market development is measured as the market capitalization of listed firms (in % of GDP). This 
is an important indicator of the development of the financial markets within in a country (Black & Gilson, 
1998). Within our sample, the mean market capitalization of listed companies equals 83% of the GDP.  
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4.4.2.3. Control variables  
 
Several control variables that reflect the differences between domestic versus cross-border acquisitions are 
included in the multivariate statistics. One set of variables accounts for the heterogeneity among the 
acquisitions in our sample. These variables are: deal value, the duration of private equity involvement, the 
source of the deal, domestic ownership prior to private equity involvement and syndication with other 
private equity investors. First, we include the natural log of target firm value as larger deals are less likely 
acquired domestically (Balsvic & Haller, 2010). This is measured at the start of the cross-border private 
equity investor’s involvement. The measure is adjusted for inflation rates with the 1994 price levels as 
base level. The deal value is on average €145 mio for the acquisitions in our sample. Second, we take the 
natural log of the duration of private equity involvement prior to acquisition into account (measured in 
number of months), which is on average 47 months. This variable incorporates potential differences in the 
time to contract domestic versus international acquirers (Boeh, 2011). Third, the source of the deal that 
initiates private equity involvement is incorporated, distinguishing between family or private deals (30% 
of the firms in our sample) and other sources such as divestments, secondary buyouts, delistings and 
privatizations. Family or private deals may have different strategic orientations and governance issues 
than other deals which influences the attractiveness towards domestic or international acquirers (Devigne, 
Vanacker, Manigart & Paeleman, 2011; Scholes, Wright, Westhead & Bruining, 2010). Fourth, we take 
into account whether the acquisition target was domestically (79%) or internationally (21%) owned prior 
to cross-border private equity involvement. Fifth, we incorporate whether the foreign private equity 
investor syndicated with local private equity investors in the focal deal. 22% of the acquisitions were 
supported by a combination both domestic and cross-border investors. 
Next to the private equity investor’s host country experience, the analyses control for its overall 
experience (measured during the year prior to the domestic or foreign acquisition of the target firm) since 
experienced private equity investors are expected to be more internationally oriented (Hall & Tu, 2003). 
Hence, they may search more actively for cross-border acquirers. This is operationalized as the log of the 
age of the private equity investor. The age is on average 12 years. In order to control for the stronger 
development of US and UK private equity markets, two dummies are created, taking the value of 1 when 
the private equity investor originates from the UK (67%) and the US (14%) respectively. These variables 
indicate the dominance of Anglo-Saxon intermediaries in the Continental European cross-border private 
equity market.  
Finally, we control for the potential effect of the business environment. We incorporate business cycle 
effects, the importance of local acquisitions, the development of the local private equity market and the 
smarket openness. Business cycle effects are measured through the return of the Europe’s Morgan Stanley 
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Capital International index (MSCI index) 3 to 6 months prior to acquisition (Cumming, 2008; Groh et al., 
2010). The mean value of this variable is 1%. With respect to the importance of local acquisitions, we 
include the number of domestic acquisitions as a proportion of the total number of acquisitions within the 
host country in the year prior to acquisition. The average of this value is 70%. On the other hand, we 
control for the development of the local private equity market through the cumulative number of private 
equity investments within the host country until the year prior to acquisition (Gompers, Kovner, Lerner & 
Scharfstein, 2008). This measure incorporates the development of the local private equity market in 
addition to the mechanic increase in host country experience of a cross-border private equity investor over 
time. This is on average 1179 investments. Finally, market openness is operationalized as the amount of 
foreign direct investments in the host country as a proportion of GDP. This averages 4.11% of the GDP. 
Table 4.2. shows the results of the bivariate statistics comparing domestic and cross-border acquisition 
targets. The host country experience of the foreign private equity investor is significantly larger in the case 
of a domestic acquisition. Moreover, host country financial market development is also positively 
associated with the likelihood of a domestic acquisition. This effect is marginally significant. 
Interestingly, domestic acquisitions are more often domestically owned prior to the private equity 
investment and are more often syndicated by a combination of domestic and cross-border private equity 
investors. The proportion of domestic acquisitions, the cumulative number of private equity investments in 
the host country and the openness of the economy are also positively related to the likelihood of a 
domestic acquisition. 
4.4.3. Method of analyses 
 
Logistic regressions are used to model the probability of a domestic versus an international acquisition, 
clustering on private equity investors (Froot, 1989). The final sample consists of 296 acquisitions 
supported by 79 private equity investors. First, we test the main effect of host country experience on the 
likelihood of a domestic acquisition. Second, we analyze the moderating effect of the type of acquirer 
(hypothesis 2) and the host country financial market development (hypothesis 3) through the seemingly 
unrelated estimation procedure (Weesie, 1999). More specifically, we divide the sample into two 
subsamples of on the one hand financial versus strategic acquisitions (hypothesis 2) and on the other hand 
a median split of the sample based on the levels of financial market development (hypothesis 3). As a 
result, we separate between levels of host country financial market development above and below 82% of 
the GDP (i.e. the median value). Thereafter, this estimation procedure jointly analyzes the effect of host 
country experience on the likelihood of a domestic acquisition within both subsamples. It combines the 
estimation results of the subsamples into a single covariance matrix controlling for clustered standard 
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errors per financial intermediary. The difference of coefficients between both subsamples is statistically 
tested through a Wald test.  
The seemingly unrelated estimation procedure is preferred to the inclusion of interaction terms in logit 
analyses. Unlike OLS, estimating interaction terms in a logit regression does not result in a constant 
coefficient across all observations. In contrast, the magnitude and the sign of an interaction term are a 
function of not only the coefficient for the interaction, but also of the coefficients for each interacted 
variable and the values of all the variables (Hoetker, 2007). 
A correlation matrix for the dependent, independent and continuous control measures is presented in Table 
4.3. It indicates that correlations between the variables included in the analyses are low and do not exceed 
0.50 except from the correlation between the levels of overall and host country experience. All models 
were rerun, excluding the effect of overall experience. This does not alter the results that will be presented 
hereafter. The variance inflating factor score for the full model indicates that multicollinearity is not an 
issue. The mean VIF score for this model equals 1.35 and the maximum individual VIF score is 1.73.   
Insert Table 4.3. around here 
4.5. Results 
 
Table 4.4. presents the results of the multivariate statistics. Model 1 is the baseline model that estimates 
the influence of the control variables on the probability of a domestic acquisition. Model 2 adds the main 
effect of host country experience. Model 3 till 6 estimate the likelihood of a domestic acquisition within a 
particular subsample, based on the seemingly unrelated estimation procedure. Model 3 estimates the 
likelihood of a domestic acquisition in the subsample of financial acquisitions whereas model 4 shows the 
results of the subsample of strategic acquisitions. Model 5 and 6 analyze the probability of a domestic 
acquisition within the subsamples of a low versus a high financial market development. A split sample 
procedure is used to divide the sample in two parts. Table 4.4. also indicates the results of the Wald test to 
examine the equality of coefficients of host country experience between financial and strategic 
acquisitions on the one hand and between low versus high financial market development on the other 
hand. One-tailed tests are used to analyze hypothesized effects.  
With respect to our control variables, the multivariate analyses indicate that acquisition targets, supported 
by highly experienced private equity investors are more likely to be acquired by cross-border firms. This 
is in line with earlier research that associates experienced cross-border financial intermediaries with an 
increased probability of a cross-border acquisition (Jääskelaïnen & Maula, 2008). Our findings suggest 
that it is particularly their high overall experience which plays a role in the spread of information towards 
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cross-border acquirers. UK private equity investors are also more likely to sell across borders. Moreover, 
the cumulative number of investments in a particular region over time and the openness of the market also 
influence the acquirer country. Finally, deal source and domestic ownership prior to private equity 
involvement are significantly positively associated to the likelihood of a domestic acquisition under low 
levels of host country financial market development. 
The main effect of host country experience is analyzed in model 2. The model indicates that host country 
experience significantly increases the probability of a domestic acquisition (p <0.01). This provides strong 
support for hypothesis 1. Models 3 and 4 compare the likelihood of a domestic acquisition in the 
subsamples of respectively financial and strategic acquisitions. While host country experience 
significantly increases the probability of a domestic acquisition in the subsample of financial acquisitions 
(p<0.01), it is not significant in the subsample of strategic acquisitions. The Wald test indicates that the 
coefficients of host country experience are significantly different (p<0.05) between both subsamples, 
thereby supporting hypothesis 2. Finally, model 5 and 6 analyze the likelihood of a domestic acquisition in 
the subsamples of high versus low financial market development. In accordance with hypothesis 3, host 
country experience is more positively associated with the likelihood of a domestic acquisition under lower 
levels of institutional development (p<0.01 versus p<0.10). This is also confirmed by the results of the 
Wald test for equality of coefficients (p<0.01). Hypothesis 3 is hence supported. 
Insert Table 4.4. around here 
Figure 4.2. serves to clarify the interaction effects of the acquisition type and the level of financial market 
development. As shown in panel A, host country experience has a larger influence on the probability of a 
domestic acquisition in the subsample of financial compared to strategic acquisitions. Panel B furthermore 
indicates the larger impact of host country experience under lower levels of financial market development.  
Insert Figure 4.2. around here 
The economic significance of our effects is substantial. This interpretation is based on a comparison of the 
odds of a domestic acquisition between 75th and the 25th percentile of host country experience. This 
corresponds to a comparison of acquisition targets supported by cross-border financial intermediaries with 
21 versus two prior investments within the host country. More specifically, the coefficient of host country 
experience in model 2 corresponds to an odds ratio of 1.67. This implies that the odds of a domestic 
acquisition for targets supported by a financial intermediary with 21 prior host country investments are 
154% higher than the odds of targets supported by cross-border financial intermediaries with only two 
prior host country investments. Moreover, within the subsample of financial acquisitions, the odds of a 
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domestic acquisition at higher levels of host country experience increase with 236%, while this is only 
76% in the subsample of strategic acquisitions. Similarly, the odds of a domestic acquisition are 418% 
higher for targets supported by cross-border financial intermediaries with 21 prior host country 
investments compared to those supported by cross-border financial intermediaries with only two prior 
investments within the host country. This contrasts to an odds increase with 95% in the subsample of a 
high financial market development.  
In order to test the robustness of our findings, we perform several sensitivity tests. First, we control for 
sample selection effects. Therefore, we incorporate a selection step to test whether potential inherent 
differences between the firms supported by private equity investors with a high compared to a low host 
country experience could alter our findings. Our selection model combines the effect of target firm 
characteristics (deal value, the duration of private equity involvement, the source of the deal, domestic 
ownership prior to financial intermediary involvement, syndication with other private equity investors) in 
addition to the origin and overall experience of the private equity investor and the type of acquisition. 
Moreover, the selection step incorporates business cycle effects, the characteristics of the local acquisition 
and private equity market, the market openness and financial market development indirectly through a 
combination of country and year dummies. If we add the selection step in our main analyses, our results 
are similar. Hence, selection does not drive our findings.  
Second, there is an alternative mechanism to test the moderating effect of acquisition type on the one hand 
and the level of financial market development on the other hand. This mechanism uses a logit analysis 
with interaction terms in addition to a correction procedure that computes the interaction effect through 
the “inteff” postestimation command in STATA (Norton, Wang & Ai, 2004). This correction procedure 
calculates a corrected interaction effect for each observation, which depends on the estimated coefficients 
of the main effects and the estimated probability for this observation. In appendix 4.1., we report the 
average interaction effects in addition to their level of significance and the percentage of observations for 
which this interaction effect is significant (Belderbos & Zou, 2009). These findings are generally in line 
with our main analyses presented in Table 4.4. First, the findings indicate a significantly higher effect of 
host country experience in the case of a financial acquisition (p<0.05) and under lower levels of financial 
market development (p<0.05). Moreover, the moderating effect of acquisition type is significant in 69% of 
our observations. The moderating effect of financial market development is significant in 74% of the 
observations. These findings provide again support for hypotheses 2 and 3.  
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4.6. Discussion and conclusion 
 
This paper studies the impact of cross-border financial intermediaries on the information costs of domestic 
acquirers. We build on the liability of foreignness literature and examine the effect of host country 
experience on the likelihood of a domestic acquisition through increased local information transfer. We 
also investigate whether the impact of host country experience is contingent on the connectivity of 
domestic acquirers towards local information channels. We study the influence of connectivity through 
network relationships as well as the impact of connectivity across different levels of financial market 
development.  
Multivariate logistic regressions on the acquisition exits of internationally financed buyouts support our 
central argument that cross-border financial intermediaries with more experience in the host country 
increase the probability of a domestic acquisition. These intermediaries become more locally embedded 
and are better connected towards local information channels. Moreover, the effect of financial 
intermediaries’ host country experience is larger for financial than for strategic acquisitions. This derives 
from the increased transfer of information between domestic financial acquirers and cross-border financial 
intermediaries with higher levels of host country experience. This transfer occurs through business 
network connections. In contrast, network connectivity and information transfer between cross-border 
financial intermediaries and strategic acquirers is lower. Finally, in more developed financial markets, 
domestic acquirers are highly connected towards alternative sources of information on the local 
acquisition target. These sources substitute for the role of cross-border financial intermediaries in the 
reduction of information costs. Therefore, domestic acquirers depend less upon the cross-border financial 
intermediary as a source of information. The positive effect of host country experience on the probability 
of a domestic acquisition is therefore lower under higher levels of financial market development.  
Our findings contribute to a better understanding of the liability of foreignness. The increasing 
international orientation of firms has challenged our existing knowledge on the liability of foreignness. In 
many industries, foreign entrants perform even better than purely domestic firms (Nachum, 2003, 2010). 
Our findings suggest that even in highly internationally oriented industries such as the financial services 
industry, liability of foreignness is still important. More specifically, certain activities, such as domestic 
information transfer depend highly upon local embeddedness. This explains the benefits of host country 
experience. In addition, we introduce a contingency perspective within the liability of foreignness 
literature. We indicate that the benefits of increased local information transfer through higher levels of 
host country experience depend upon the environment in which the cross-border firm operates. The 
business networks and the institutional context within the host country are important in this respect. 
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Moreover, our findings contribute to network theory. Earlier studies stress the ability to spread 
information as a result of the network position (Burt, 1992, 2007). More specifically, actors are better 
positioned if they are able to spread information towards many actors within a particular network and if 
they possess information that is less available by other actors within the network. However, as economic 
actors operate in many networks, the benefits of local information transfer do not solely depend on the 
position within a particular information network, these benefits also depend on the relative importance of 
the information network itself compared to alternative information networks. This is often ignored in the 
literature. In addition, in order to examine the relative importance of an information network, we have to 
incorporate also institutional factors. In institutional contexts that hamper the access to local sources of 
information, local information transfer through network relationships becomes more important (Johnson, 
2004).  
There are a number of limitations in our study that suggest avenues for further research. First, our findings 
are obtained from a sample of private equity investors as financial intermediaries. There are many reasons 
to believe that the mechanisms through which financial intermediaries spread information towards 
domestic acquirers are more generally applicable. Additional research could however further explore the 
generalizability of our findings. Second, foreign investors may reduce their liability of foreignness by 
syndicating with domestic partners. Although we expect domestic syndication partners to reduce the 
information costs of domestic acquirers, this effect is mostly not significant in our multivariate analyses. 
Several reasons could explain why we do not find an effect of domestic syndication on the country of exit. 
One the one hand, this points at the dominance of the lead investor over its syndication partners in the 
search for an acquisition exit. On the other hand, the effect of domestic syndication could also vary upon 
the motives for syndication. More specifically, syndication could be a tool for domestic private equity 
investors to get foreign market access in subsequent syndicated deals. As such, these domestic investors 
might have a lower focus on the domestic market while other syndication partners play a more effective 
role in the reduction of information costs. Further research could examine this in more detail. Third, there 
are limitations as a result of data availability. For example, we measure the size of the acquired firm in 
terms of the original deal value at the initiation of the financial intermediary’s involvement. This 
corresponds largely to the acquisition price which is only limitedly available. Moreover, our measure of 
overall experience of the financial intermediary is based upon the initial investment made in Europe (both 
Continental and Anglo-Saxon European countries). We however did not obtain information on deals 
outside Europe. Especially for private equity investors that originate from countries outside Europe, we 
may underestimate their overall experience.  
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For practitioners, our findings highlight the importance of local market specialization for cross-border 
financial intermediaries. In contrast to earlier studies who mainly consider cross-border financial 
intermediaries as a tool to reduce the information costs of foreign acquirers, cross-border intermediaries 
can also reduce the information costs of domestic acquirers. As domestic firms account for a substantial 
proportion of the acquirer companies, it is crucial not to limit their attention towards international 
acquirers when aiming for a successful acquisition. In addition, our results stress the long term effects of 
cross-border private equity involvement. While cross-border private equity investors are often approached 
in order to enhance growth and strategic development (Mäkelä & Maula, 2005; Devigne et al., 2011), our 
findings demonstrate the long term effects of cross-border private equity ownership. More specifically, 
private equity investors have an important role to play in the sale of their investments and they influence 
which firms will remain internationally owned or become domestic.  
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4.8. Tables and figures 
 
TABLE 4.1.: VARIABLE DEFINITION 
Variable Definition 
Host country experience 
financial intermediary 
Logarithm of the cumulative number of deals a financial intermediary was involved in 
the country of the portfolio firm- Source: CMBOR  
Financial acquisition Dummy variable indicating if the buyout was sold to a financial (i.e. private equity) 
investor versus a strategic buyer - Source: CMBOR 
Financial market 
development 
Market capitalization of listed firms in the year prior to acquisition (in % of GDP)- 
Source: World Bank 
Control measures  
Deal value Logarithm of the firm value, measured at the start of the involvement of the financial 
intermediary in € (1994 price level) - Source: CMBOR 
Duration (months) Logarithm of the time range (in months) between start and end of the cross-border 
financial intermediary’s involvement - Source: CMBOR 
Source: family or private 
deal 
A distinction is made between buyouts that originate from a private or family firm and 
other buyout sources (divestments, secondary buyouts, public-to-private deals, 
receiverships, privatizations) - Source: CMBOR 
Domestic ownership 
prior to buyout 
Dummy variable indicating whether the portfolio firm was owned by domestic versus 
international shareholders prior to the cross-border buyout - Source: CMBOR 
Syndication with 
domestic investor 
Dummy variable that highlights if the cross-border private equity investor syndicated 
with at least one domestic investor in the deal - Source: CMBOR 
Overall experience 
financial intermediary 
Logarithm age of the financial intermediary - Source: CMBOR 
UK Dummy variable indicating if the financial intermediary originates from the UK - 
Source: CMBOR 
US Dummy variable indicating if the financial intermediary originates from the US - Source: 
CMBOR 
MSCI return index 
(Europe) 
The return of the Europe Morgan Stanley Capital International index 3 till 6 months prior 
to acquisition- Source: Datastream 
Proportion domestic 
acquisitions 
Relative proportion of the number of domestic compared to the number of total 
acquisitions within the host country during the year prior to acquisition – Source: Zephyr 
(Bureau van Dijk) 
Cumulative number of 
investments in local PE 
industry 
Logarithm cumulative number of investments in the private equity industry of the host 
country prior to the year of acquisition - Source: CMBOR 
 
Market openness Foreign direct investments, net inflows in the year prior to acquisition (in % of GDP)- 
Source: World Bank 
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TABLE 4.2.: SAMPLE DESCRIPTION 
 Total sample Domestic acquisitions Cross-border acquisitions  
 N Mean Med. S.D. N Mean Med. S.D. N Mean Med. S.D.  
Domestic acquisition 296        0.42       0            0.49          
Host country experience financial intermediary1 296      19.56       7     27.74 124      26.87      13.50     33.15 172     14.28    5    21.67 ** 
Financial acquisition 296        0.54       0       0.50 124        0.59        1       0.49 172       0.51    1      0.50  
Legal development 296        1.31       1.39       0.38 124        1.28        1.40       0.37 172       1.33    1.36      0.38  
Financial market development 296      82.87     82.32     22.66 124      79.87      75.84     22.71 172     85.03  82.32    22.45 † 
Deal value (in € mio)1 296     144.55     54.27   234.20 124    130.88      47.00   238.79 172   154.40  70.73  231.04  
Duration (months) 1 296      46.81     42    22.84 124      47.55      45.50     21.87 172     46.28  41.5    23.56  
Source: family or private deal 296        0.30      0      0.46 124        0.35        0       0.48 172       0.27    0      0.44  
Domestic ownership prior to buyout 296        0.79      1      0.41 124        0.84        1       0.37 172       0.76    1      0.43 † 
Syndication with domestic investor 296        0.22      0      0.41 124        0.27        0       0.45 172       0.17    0      0.38 * 
Overall experience financial intermediary1 296      12.45     14      4.84 124      12.47      14       5.11 172     12.43  13      4.65  
UK 296        0.67       1      0.47 124        0.62        1       0.49 172       0.70    1      0.46  
US 296        0.14       0      0.34 124        0.14        0       0.35 172       0.13    0      0.34  
MSCI return index (Europe) 296        0.01       0.04      0.09 124        0.02        0.04       0.08 172       0.01    0.04      0.10  
Proportion domestic acquisitions 296        0.70       0.70      0.07 124        0.71        0.71       0.06 172       0.69    0.70      0.07 † 
Cumulative number of investments in local PE industry1 296  1179.21   765.00   842.27 124  1386.35 1623   860.73 172 1029 653  798.38 ** 
Market openness 296        4.11       3.17       6.03 124       2.74        2.40       1.99 172       5.10    3.20      7.58 ** 
1
 The log of this measure is included in the multivariate analyses. 
 Significance levels indicate test results from differences between domestic and international acquisitions (Chi-square tests or Mann-Whitney tests). 
Significant at (**) 1%, (*) 5% or (†) 10% (one-tailed tests for hypothesized effects) 
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TABLE 4.3.: PAIRWISE CORRELATION COEFFICIENTS OF THE DEPENDENT, INDEPENDENT AND CONTINUOUS 
CONTROL VARIABLES 
 1. 2. 3. 4. 5. 6. 7. 8. 9. 10. 
1. Domestic acquisition 1.00          
2. Host country experience 0.21 1.00         
3. Financial acquisition 0.08 0.02 1.00        
4. Financial market development -0.11 0.01 0.03 1.00       
5. Deal value -0.09 -0.26 0.17 0.06 1.00      
6. Duration (months) 0.04 0.19 0.17 0.08 0.03 1.00     
7. Overall experience financial intermediary -0.03 0.55 0.13 0.06 0.08 0.29 1.00    
8. MSCI return index Europe 0.08 -0.03 0.05 0.00 0.06 0.04 0.00 1.00   
9. Proportion domestic acquisitions 0.12 0.15 0.11 0.01 0.14 0.39 0.21 0.09 1.00  
10. Cumulative number of investments in local PE industry 0.22 0.39 0.17 0.09 0.03 0.20 0.17 0.06 0.37 1.00 
11. Market openness -0.19 -0.21 -0.03 0.13 -0.01 -0.09 -0.01 -0.18 -0.41 -0.43 
All correlations with absolute values above 0.11 are significant (p<0.05) 
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TABLE 4.4.: MULTIVARIATE LOGISTIC REGRESSIONS THAT MODEL THE LIKELIHOOD OF A DOMESTIC EXIT 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
 Full sample Full sample Financial 
acquisition 
Strategic 
acquisition 
Low financial 
market 
development 
High financial 
market 
development 
 Coef.  S.D. Coef.  S.D. Coef.  S.D. Coef.  S.D. Coef.  S.D. Coef.  S.D. 
Host country experience 
   0.512 ** (0.142) 0.705 ** (0.217) 0.284  (0.179) 1.034 ** (0.267) 0.344 + (0.202) 
Financial acquisition 0.324  (0.320) 0.404  (0.333)       0.096  (0.426) 0.664  (0.529) 
Financial market development -0.005  (0.007) -0.005  (0.008) 0.007  (0.009) -0.010  (0.014)       
Deal value -0.112  (0.113) 0.025  (0.092) -0.053  (0.142) 0.167  (0.138) 0.095  (0.141) 0.110  (0.157) 
Duration (months) 0.007  (0.214) -0.036  (0.212) -0.409  (0.378) 0.147  (0.308) -0.126  (0.350) 0.085  (0.292) 
Source: Family or private deal 0.313  (0.325) 0.291  (0.324) 0.319  (0.418) 0.799  (0.625) 1.040 ** (0.368) -0.253  (0.445) 
Domestic ownership prior to buyout 0.384  (0.285) 0.411  (0.300) 0.528  (0.386) -0.430  (0.649) 0.967 * (0.389) -0.012  (0.521) 
Syndication with domestic investor 0.342  (0.232) 0.344  (0.224) 0.629  (0.405) -0.396  (0.413) 0.607  (0.375) 0.227  (0.384) 
Overall experience of the financial 
intermediary 
-0.156  (0.296) -0.748 * (0.306) -0.539  (0.642) -0.745 * (0.369) -1.177 ** (0.410) -0.649  (0.528) 
UK -0.675 + (0.371) -1.132 ** (0.390) -0.924 + (0.480) -1.475 * (0.619) -1.511 * (0.677) -1.067 + (0.545) 
US -0.504  (0.501) -0.555  (0.494) 0.143  (0.740) -1.447 * (0.658) -0.545  (0.817) -0.889  (0.746) 
MSCI return index (Europe) 0.795  (1.293) 1.195  (1.380) 1.252  (1.877) 2.834  (2.198) 2.338  (1.828) 1.479  (1.880) 
Proportion domestic acquisitions 0.460  (2.009) 1.016  (2.296) 1.469  (4.519) 0.796  (2.672) 0.420  (3.614) 4.545  (4.446) 
Cumulative number of investments 
in local PE industry 
0.464 * (0.185) 0.260  (0.176) 0.259  (0.217) 0.384  (0.302) 0.139  (0.293) 0.365 + (0.208) 
Market opennes  -0.122 + (0.068) -0.112  (0.075) -0.027  (0.057) -0.266 * (0.126) -0.268 + (0.145) -0.028  (0.098) 
Constant -2.323  (1.467) -1.175  (1.795) -1.862  (3.888) -0.796  (2.377) -0.261  (2.223) -5.585  (3.916) 
Observations 296   296   160   136   138   158   
chi-square test 28.36 *  53.26 **  37.16 **  34.56 **  55.75 **  21.04   
Wald test for equality of coefficients 
of host country experience between 
seemingly unrelated regressions 
      4.10 6.15 
p-value Wald test (one tailed)   0.021 0.007 
Estimated coeffcients for the logit regressions which compare the characteristics of domestic versus cross-border acquisitions. (Dependent variable equals 1 in the 
case of a domestic acquisition.) Standard errors are clustered per financial intermediary  
** p<0.01, * p<0.05, † p<0.1 (one-tailed tests for hypothesized effects)                
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FIGURE 4.1.: CONCEPTUAL MODEL 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Financial versus strategic acquisition 
H2 
Host country experience of the financial 
intermediary  
Domestic versus cross-border acquisition 
H1 
Host country financial market development 
H3 
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FIGURE 4.2.: THE PROBABILITY OF A DOMESTIC ACQUISITION AS A FUNCTION OF 
HOST COUNTRY EXPERIENCE 
Panel A: The probability of a domestic acquisition for financial versus strategic acquisitions 
 
Panel B: The probability of a domestic acquisition for low versus high levels of financial market 
development  
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4.9. Appendix 1 
 
OVERVIEW INTERACTION EFFECTS USING THE “INTEFF” CORRECTION PROCEDURE 
(Norton et al., 2004) 
 Mean interaction effect % of observations with a significant interaction term1
Host country experience* Financial 
acquisition 
0.072* 69%
Host country experience * Financial 
market development 
-0.002* 74%
1Significance based on a 5% level (one-tailed test) 
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Chapter 5: Conclusion 
The goal of this dissertation is to provide an insight in international private equity (PE) transactions. Due 
to the difficulties to guarantee the quality of investment selection and managerial involvement across 
borders, cross-border investments were traditionally only a small fraction of the total private equity 
investment activity. This has changed dramatically over the last 20 years. As a result, non-domestic 
investments account for more than 70% of the total transaction volume between 2000 and 2010 (Thomson 
One, 2012). 
The importance of cross-border investing raises the question whether resources enable the private equity 
investor to manage the difficulties of cross-border investing. In each study, the focus lies primarily on the 
effect of context-specific resources. These are resources that are adapted to the specific, international 
context. This final chapter summarizes the main findings and the academic contributions of these 
dissertation studies. Furthermore, the limitations and avenues for further research will be discussed. This 
conclusion ends with managerial implications. 
5.1. Main findings 
 
The goal of this dissertation is to examine whether context-specific resources influence the international 
activities of private equity investors. The first study concentrates on the international investment strategy 
of the private equity investor. The second and third study explore the performance of international 
activities, with a focus on acquisition exits of cross-border buyouts. We concentrate on different types of 
context-specific resources across these studies. The first study is centered on context-specific knowledge, 
the second study examines the impact of context-specific reputation and finally, the third study focuses on 
context-specific experience. A summary of the man findings is presented in Table 1 and discussed 
hereunder.  
Insert Table 5.1. around here 
The first study concentrates on the role of context-specific knowledge in the international investment 
strategy. More specifically, we examine the role of knowledge that is adjusted to the foreign, international 
context (i.e. foreign knowledge accumulation). We contribute to the debate on the effectiveness of this 
resource. Currently, there is no consensus within the international business literature whether effective 
sources of foreign knowledge accumulation reside internally or externally to the firm. Our hypotheses are 
tested on a sample of 110 European PE investors. Heckman two-staged regressions are used to examine 
the influence of different sources of context-specific, foreign knowledge accumulation on the likelihood 
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and on the number of international investments. Our results show that both internal as well as external 
sources of foreign knowledge are important for cross-border activities: internal knowledge, also called 
experiential knowledge as well as external, inherited knowledge stimulate both the likelihood as well as 
the number of cross-border investments. Internally developed, experiential knowledge has however a 
larger positive impact on internationalization than inherited knowledge. In addition, contrary to our 
hypothesis, external foreign knowledge access through the network partners of the private equity investor 
does not have the expected positive influence on cross-border investments. The range of foreign network 
is not related to international activities while the intensity of the relationship negatively affects the 
likelihood of cross-border investing. Especially international private equity investors that want to continue 
their cross-border activities are hampered by the intensity of their foreign network. As a result, private 
equity investors should balance the benefits of working with familiar non-domestic partners with the 
importance of building a central position in a larger network (Meuleman, Manigart, Lockett & Wright, 
2010). 
In the second and third study, we explore the outcomes of international activities, with a focus on 
acquisition exits of cross-border investments. The central question was how context-specific resources 
alleviate the information problems of acquirers that buy internationally owned portfolio firms. In the 
second study, we compare the role of overall with context-specific resources as a tool to reduce the 
information asymmetries inherent in the sale of cross-border buyouts. With respect to context-specific 
reputation, we examine the effectiveness of reputation build through active presence in the investment 
country (i.e. country-specific reputation) as well as the effectiveness of reputation that is built within the 
particular industry of investment (i.e. industry-specific reputation). In order to do so, we integrate the 
literature on information problems with insights from the resource-based view and international business 
theory. Our findings are based on 180 acquisition exits of internationally financed buyouts located in 
Continental Europe. They stress the benefits of both overall as well as context-specific sources of 
reputation for the reduction of information asymmetries in the sale of cross-border buyouts. Whereas 
overall reputation certifies the general expertise of private equity investors, county-specific and industry-
specific reputation signal the ability to adequately monitor investments in a particular country and 
industry. As such, both overall as well as specific types of reputation matter. Country-specific reputation 
has even a larger impact than alternative types of reputation. Hence, our second study shows the value of 
reputation that is adjusted to the particular, foreign context on the reduction of information asymmetries. 
The third study explores the experience a cross-border private equity investor in the country of 
investment, also defined as host country experience. We build on the liability of foreignness literature and 
argue that host country experience enables firms to spread more information about the acquisition target 
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towards local, domestic acquirers. As such, host county (i.e. investment country) experience is expected to 
increase the probability of a domestic compared to an international acquisition. In addition, following a 
contingency theory logic, we explore whether the impact of host country experience is depends on the 
connectivity of domestic acquirers towards local information channels. We study the influence of 
connectivity through network relationships as well as the impact of connectivity across different levels of 
financial market development. Logit analyses based on a sample of 296 acquisition exits of cross-border 
buyouts results in the following findings. First, this study shows the positive effect of host country 
experience: it can overcome the liability of foreignness of the selling private equity investor. This 
stimulates the transfer of local information towards domestic acquirers and results in a higher probability 
of a domestic acquisition exits. Second, we show that the effect of financial intermediaries’ host country 
experience is contingent upon the connectivity of domestic acquirers towards local information channels. 
Both network connections between domestic financial acquirers and cross-border private equity investors 
as well as connections between alternative financial intermediaries and domestic acquirers under different 
levels of financial market development play a role herein.  
5.2. Academic contributions  
 
This dissertation contributes to academic literature in various ways. In the following paragraphs, we 
indicate the main implications for the resource-based view, international business theory, the financial 
intermediation literature and the entrepreneurial finance literature.  
5.2.1. Implications for the resource-based view 
 
Above all, the three studies contribute to the resource-based view, and more specifically to the contingent 
resource-based view, an upcoming research stream in management literature. The resource-based view 
argues that a competitive advantage derives from resources that are valuable, rare and non-substitutable 
and it is traditionally a context-free theory (Barney, 1991). However, the context-specific resource-based 
view emphasizes the need for a more integrated approach. It states that business scholars have to 
incorporate the characteristics of the general business environment as a driver of the relationship between 
the firm’s resources and its performance. An environmental condition that requires particular attention is 
information asymmetry. This makes it more difficult for companies to anticipate success or to estimate the 
effectiveness of their resource base (Brush & Artz, 1999). Given the substantial information asymmetries 
in internationalization and in private equity investing, our research setting is highly relevant to examine 
the effectiveness of resources under substantial information asymmetries.  
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The central research question in this dissertation is whether context-specific resources enable firms to 
operate under large information asymmetries. There are currently contradicting argumentations on the 
benefits of context-specific resources under high information asymmetries. On the one hand, managers 
depend primarily on context-specific resources as they have proven their value under severe information 
asymmetries. As they are relatively easy to apply and easy to exploit, these resources help the firm to 
increase and sustain their competitive advantage (Carpenter & Frederickson, 2001, Aragón-Correa & 
Sharma, 2003). On the other hand, context-specific resources may create a pitfall for firms once they 
neglect the potential benefit of resources obtained within other contexts (Chetty, Eriksson & Lindberg, 
2006; Miller & Shamsie, 1996).  
Based on a setting of international private equity investing, the studies in this dissertation generally 
support the argumentation that context-specific resources are valuable under severe information 
asymmetries. These context-specific resources create the perception of expertise in international 
operations, both by the firm itself as well as by its third parties. More specifically, in the first study of this 
dissertation, we show that firms rely heavily on context-specific knowledge once they are confronted with 
severe information asymmetries (Carpenter & Frederickson, 2001, Aragón-Correa & Sharma, 2003). It 
stimulates firms to internationalize as they consider themselves better able to succeed. This knowledge is 
gained through previous international experience by the firm or by the managers of the firm. In addition, 
the results of the second and third study suggest that context-specific resources improve the outcomes of 
international activities. While our second indicates that context-specific reputation is found to be more 
important than overall reputation to certify the expertise in international operations towards third parties, 
the third study shows that context-specific experience enhances the access towards local sources of 
information. Hence, these resources contribute substantially to the success of international operations 
under severe information asymmetries. In sum, our findings show that context-specific resources provide 
the firm certain benefits that are difficult to obtain through general resources. 
Furthermore, we show that a contingency perspective needs to be incorporated within different levels. 
This was particularly stressed in the third study of our dissertation: while context-specific experience may 
help the firm to deal with certain aspects of the business environment, the importance of its effect depends 
on other environmental conditions. As a result, context-specific, host country experience becomes more 
important for local information transfer if the institutional business context itself limits the access to 
relevant information.  
Another aspect that has been addressed in this dissertation is the influence of internally versus externally 
developed context-specific resources. Based on our findings which are obtained within a cross-border 
context, we stress the importance of internal development to overcome substantial information 
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asymmetries. First, the internally developed, context-specific resources that were examined in the three 
studies of this dissertation- which are context-specific knowledge, reputation and experience- were all 
found to be important for cross-border private equity investing. Second, the findings of our first study 
highlight that internally developed resources are more important than externally developed ones when it 
comes to the decision to internationalize. Our findings therefore imply that, under severe information 
asymmetries, managers depend primarily under resources that have been integrated within the firm and 
that are easier to apply. External resources are less important.  
However, our findings do not suggest that firms with more context-specific resources are unconditionally 
better in their international activities. As highlighted by earlier theorists embedded in the contingent 
resource-based view, the value of resources depends on environmental conditions as well as on firms’ 
value creating strategies (Brush & Artz, 1999). In this respect, we indicate in our third study that firms 
with different levels of context-specific resources have different value creating strategies. More 
specifically, while firms with a larger level of context-specific experience create value from their 
international activities through the use of their local information network, firms with lower levels of 
context-specific experience rely more on international business contacts. Hence, we can conclude that 
context-specific resources can be an important source of competitive advantage under large information 
asymmetries. However, the effect of context-specific resources under severe information asymmetries 
depends on the business context as well as the value creating strategies of the firm.  
5.2.2. Implications for the international business literature 
 
This dissertation also advances the international business literature by providing a richer understanding 
on the liability of foreignness. This posits that firms face additional difficulties when operating in a foreign 
market. These difficulties originate from two different reasons: a lack of knowledge how to conduct 
business in foreign regions and the lack of information by third parties (such as customers or suppliers) in 
the expertise of a firm across borders. These issues decrease by higher levels of context-specific 
experience (Nachum, 2003).  
We increase our understanding on the role of context-specific experience to influence both the lack of 
knowledge and the lack of information by third parties about the expertise in cross-border operations. 
First, the findings of our first study nuance the dominant role of experience for developing knowledge on 
foreign market operations. Managerial knowledge that was developed outside the firm (also called 
inherited knowledge) is also beneficial as it increases familiarity with the market and helps to develop 
schemata for dealing with the issues of cross-border investing (Takeuchi, Tesluk & Yun, 2005).  
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Second, this dissertation has disentangled the mechanisms how increase the information towards third 
parties about the expertise in foreign operations. This depends from the integration within local 
information channels as well as from the ability to signal quality in a particular region. Both mechanisms 
are studied independently in this dissertation. With respect to the integration within local information 
channels, the third study of this dissertation suggests that the benefits of local market embeddedness 
through context-specific experience are moderated by environmental conditions such as the institutional 
context or network characteristics. This extends earlier findings that focus on the main effect of 
institutions or network relationships on the liability of foreignness. The moderating impact was, to our 
knowledge, not yet examined. With respect to the certification of quality in a particular region, the second 
study stresses the impact of context-specific reputation rather than the impact of context-specific 
experience. Whereas the certification effect of reputation is generally acknowledged in management and 
finance literature, this has not yet been explored as a mechanism to reduce the liability of foreignness.  
5.2.3. Implications for the financial intermediation literature 
 
In addition, we advance the literature on the global development of financial intermediation. Earlier 
research has demonstrated the crucial role of stock market liquidity for financial intermediary 
development in general and for private equity investing in particular (Black & Gilson, 1998). Private 
equity has however become an important financing tool for entrepreneurial firms in regions that lack a 
flourishing stock market such as in Continental Europe. Our findings shed light on this phenomenon. We 
show how acquisition exits are an important alternative exit mechanism for later stage investments that 
enable a successful outcome of private equity investing in bank oriented financial systems. Interestingly, 
these regions even attract increasing interest from non-domestic financial intermediaries. Our sample 
shows that particularly private equity investors that origin from liquid stock market regions such as UK 
and US are highly interested in these regions.  
Our findings furthermore focus on the behavior of non-domestic financial intermediaries. First, we show 
that foreign private equity investors adapt to local institutional conditions: the exit mechanisms that are 
used by these investors correspond largely to local market conditions. IPO exits were highly uncommon, 
in contrast to the exits within the country of origin of these cross-border financial intermediaries. Second, 
local integration through host country experience is important for the success of acquisition exits that 
differ substantially from IPOs (Jääskeläinen & Maula, 2008). As the success of acquisition exits depends 
on close contacts between acquirers and financial intermediaries, host country experience is important to 
decrease information costs, particularly for financial acquisitions.  
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Finally, our findings enhance our understanding on cross-border financial intermediation as an initiator 
of sustained international ownership or not. While we do show that a substantial proportion of the cross-
border buyouts in our sample remain internationally owned, this is not necessarily the case for all buyout 
investments. Given the differences between domestic and international owners for the strategic 
development of the acquisition targets, future research should take this heterogeneity into account.  
5.2.4. Implications for the entrepreneurial finance literature 
 
Furthermore, this dissertation contributes to the entrepreneurial finance literature in two ways. First, we 
expand existing knowledge on the paradox of the increasing internationalization in the private equity 
market: the importance of cross-border investing contrasts to the benefits of proximity for the quality of 
selection and for managerial involvement (Mason, 2007). Our findings show that dealing with the 
challenges of international investing calls for a context-specific resource base, even in highly 
internationally oriented financial markets such as Continental Europe (Alhorr, Moore & Payne, 2008). 
We indicate that both the international investment strategy as well as the outcomes of international 
investing therefore benefit substantially from resources adjusted to the international environment.  
Second, we address the knowledge gap on acquisition exits of buyouts. We highlight the distinctions 
between financial and strategic acquisitions in terms of growth and efficiency. Financial acquirers have a 
higher interest than strategic acquirers in efficiency while they are less interested in growth. This also 
contributes to a better knowledge on the increasing attractiveness of financial acquisition exits of buyout 
firms, i.e. secondary buyouts. Given the higher efficiency of financial acquisition exits compared to 
strategic acquisitions, we contrast the supposition that financial acquisitions are ‘the exit of last resort’.  
This dissertation also challenges existing suppositions about the temporariness of buyouts and the buyout 
cycle (e.g. Bruton, Keels & Scifres, 2002). For an increasing number of firms, a buyout is the preferred 
organizational structure. Especially firms that are vulnerable to free cash flow issues benefit from long 
term private equity ownership. They are hence not likely to give up the benefits of private equity 
ownership and exit preferably through a financial instead of a strategic acquisition. 
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5.3. Limitations and avenues for further research 
 
This section sets out to discuss some theoretical and methodological issues that suggest some avenues for 
further research. I will thereby reflect on both theoretical as well as methodological limitations.  
 
5.3.1. Theoretical limitations in the resource-based view and international business literature 
 
5.3.1.1. Towards a contingent resource-based view? An agenda for the future. 
 
For a while the resource-based view (RBV) is one of the dominant theoretical frameworks in management 
literature (Hoskisson, Hitt, Wan & Yiu, 1999): it has been used as an umbrella for examining the 
relationship between resources, strategies and performance. While this offered a wide range of insights, it 
has led to some critics on the value of this theory as well. One of these critics is that the RBV studies 
resulted in a large variety of findings but that it fails to integrate this variety into a more integrated 
framework on the effectiveness of resources across various contexts. It is therefore sometimes perceived 
as an ad hoc paradigm (Lado, Boyd, Wright & Kroll, 2006). In order to address this criticism, managerial 
scholars should pay more attention to contingency factors. Both the existence of environmental conditions 
as well as different value creating strategies may influence the relationship between resources and 
performance (Aragon-Correa & Sharma, 2003, Brush & Artz, 1999). This criticism is addressed within the 
contingent resource-based view which hence creates a more overall picture of the effectiveness of 
resources. As an advanced theoretical paradigm of the resource-based view, the contingency resource-
based view would benefit however from additional research on a broad range of environmental conditions 
and value creating strategies other than the existence of large information asymmetries that have been the 
focus within our studies.  
An additional note relates to the degree of context-specificity needed for the adjustment to a particular 
context. In this dissertation, we have studied both the effects of resources developed through international 
activities as well as resources developed through activities within a particular country. They may have 
different effects however. International resources on the one hand create more general capabilities how to 
deal with diverse contexts and with the actors operating in foreign regions. Country-specific resources on 
the other hand create idiosyncratic capabilities how to cope with country-specific issues (Li & Mayer, 
2009). There is however limited knowledge on the differences between the effectiveness of both resource 
types (Chetty et al., 2006). Institutional factors are expected to influence the needs for higher levels of 
specificity, but future research could provide a more fine-grained view on e.g. the different roles of home 
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and host country institutions (Filatotchev & Wright, 2012). Other contextual factors are also yet to be 
examined.  
A better integration of the contingency factors would also increase our knowledge of the balance between 
the value creating versus value destroying effects of resources. In this dissertation, we found for example 
that intense cooperation with foreign network relations creates an important cost for private equity 
investors. It potentially leads to insulation and the lack of access towards other external network partners. 
However, the balance between the value creating and value destroying effects of resources differs across 
environmental conditions (Van Houtte, 2012). Investigating this balance under a wide range of 
contingencies substantially enlarge our understanding of the relationship between resources and 
performance.  
5.3.1.2. Novel perspectives on the effects of international ownership  
 
In this dissertation, we did not examine the relationship between target firm characteristics and the 
benefits of international compared to domestic ownership. The different governance styles of domestic 
compared to international owners may appeal to different types of firms however. Compared to domestic 
owners, international acquirers are on the one hand less equipped to monitor the firm closely: they are less 
committed to the region and place a lower emphasis on operational involvement (Boddewyn, 1983; Pruthi, 
Wright & Lockett, 2003). On the other hand, they operate within a broader network of potential business 
partners and managers, which increases flexibility and responsiveness to rapidly changing market trends 
(Devigne, Vanacker, Manigart & Paeleman, 2011). This topic leads to various avenues for further 
research. First, firms operating in volatile business environments for example might benefit more from 
international ownership in order to enhance the scope of their knowledge base and to accelerate innovation 
(Lavie & Miller, 2008). Second, there is a limited understanding on potential life cycle effects on the 
benefits of domestic versus international ownership. Earlier research highlighted that start-up businesses 
benefit more from the close monitoring whereas international investors are more beneficial at further 
stages of development (Devigne et al., 2011). There is limited knowledge however on the benefits of 
international compared to domestic ownership when firms evolve from a more developing towards a more 
mature state: a higher cash flow generation requires different strategic involvement and an adjusted 
governance style of the owners (Jensen, 1986). In a similar vein, buyouts operate under different stages of 
development. More specifically, there are substantial differences in terms of the appropriateness of 
different governance and financial structures between growth oriented, entrepreneurial buyouts compared 
to stable, efficiency driven buyouts (Wright, Robbie, Thomson & Starkey, 1994; Wright, Hoskisson, 
Busenitz & Dial, 2000). Further research could examine this more in-depth to create a better insight in the 
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benefits of cross-border compared to domestic ownership for different types of buyouts. Third, a final 
avenue relates to the conditions that make firms more susceptible for subsequent international compared 
to domestic ownership after the initial foreign owner has exited his involvement. Further research could 
for example compare the value creating mechanisms of initial versus subsequent international owners in 
addition to the returns that are gained from their value creating strategies. 
 
5.3.2. Methodological limitations: Sample, variables and method of analysis 
 
5.3.2.1. Sample: discussion of the internal validity, external validity and the time frame used in the studies 
 
A first potential limitation of the dissertation relates to the internal validity of our studies. This potentially 
suffers from the inclusion of multiple geographical locations and investment stages. One might argue that 
they both influence the information asymmetries in cross-border activities, a central theme in our research 
(Hall & Tu, 2003; Wright, Pruthi & Lokett, 2005). Hereunder, we examine its potential limitations for the 
internal validity of in each of our studies, starting with the effect of multiple geographical locations.  
In the first study, the internal validity may suffer from the various levels of development and competition 
in the private equity investor home region. This potentially affects their tendency to internationalize 
(Wright et al., 2005). These regions might also differ in terms of their foreign knowledge accumulation. In 
order to address this issue, we incorporated whether the private equity investor was British or not, as 
Anglo-Saxon investors origin from a more internationally oriented private equity market. We also 
compared the international orientation and levels of foreign knowledge accumulation within different 
countries. This did not result in substantial differences between the countries in our sample. This is hence 
not expected to alter our findings. With respect to the second study, the interest of financial compared to 
strategic acquirers may be higher in flourishing private equity markets. The development of local private 
equity markets varies however in our research setting. Bivariate statistics indicate that Spanish deals are 
indeed somewhat less likely to end up in a secondary buyout (p<0.10). Other countries are not 
significantly different. In order to guarantee the internal validity of our findings, we therefore incorporated 
the location of the buyout as a control variable. In the third study, the inclusion of different investee 
countries may affect the probability of a domestic compared to an international acquisition. This is 
however mainly related to the institutional development, such as the financial market development of a 
particular country. This is addressed within the theoretical and empirical framework of our study. As such, 
we believe that the internal validity of our third study is guaranteed. 
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A second threat to the internal validity of our sample is related to the incorporation of multiple investment 
stages which is the case in the first study. For early stage investments, the levels of information 
asymmetries are much higher which may increase the information asymmetries inherent in distant 
investing (Hall & Tu, 2003). We therefore incorporated its potential effect as a control variable in our 
study. Bivariate statistics show that in our sample, the likelihood of internationalization and the levels of 
foreign knowledge accumulation are not significantly different for investors with an exclusive focus on 
the early stage market. In addition, in multivariate statistics, the investment stage does not influence our 
findings.  
A second potential limitation is related to external validity. More specifically, the geographical and 
investment stage coverage of our studies may reduce the generalization of our findings. First, the effect of 
geographical coverage is explained, followed by the influence of investment stage coverage on external 
validity. 
There are several reasons to assume that the findings of our first study are generalizable towards investors 
outside Europe. Earlier studies show that the internationalization of the private equity investors follows a 
highly standard pattern. Both US, UK or Continental European firms internationalize first towards regions 
with a low geographical and institutional distance (Manigart et al., 2009). Moreover, within our sample, 
we show that UK investors act in accordance to the Continental European countries in our sample, despite 
their institutional differences. Concerning the second study, I acknowledge the potential limitations in the 
generalizability of the findings. This is due to the particularities of the Continental European market where 
IPOs are scarce. In Anglo-Saxon markets, IPOs are a third and very important exit mechanism that 
provide on average the highest returns (Nikoskelainen & Wright, 2007; Sudarsanam & Nwagodoh, 2005). 
As a result, there are some indications that in stock oriented financial markets, IPOs are a preferable exit 
for portfolio companies with a large size, a high growth or a high leverage (Sudarsanam & Nwagodoh, 
2005; Sousa, 2010). In the Continental European market, these firms have to search for other exit 
opportunities. However, the limited studies available that compare IPOs with other exit options in Anglo-
Saxon markets show that the differences in terms of efficiency and growth between financial and strategic 
acquisitions are consistent with our findings (Sudarsanam & Nwagodoh, 2005). Finally, a potential threat 
in the external validity of the third study originates from the limitations in the heterogeneity in the 
institutional context of our sample. Our findings with respect to the influence of financial market 
development on the country of exit are solely based on acquisitions in civil law countries that have a lower 
financial market development than common law countries. Despite this, our measures of financial market 
development do vary substantially in our sample as a result of the heterogeneity within Continental 
Europe. This warrants the external validity. 
   
124 
 
A second threat to the external validity relates to the investment stages covered in our studies. The second 
and third study focus on the later stage investment market. The later stage market is however highly 
specific in terms of the importance of financial acquisitions as an exit mechanisms. In the early stage 
investment market, a sellout of the existing private equity investor is more exceptional, particularly if that 
private equity investor has not yet invested in the portfolio company. However, the beneficial effects of 
reputation and experience to decrease information asymmetries and information costs in the exits of early 
stage firms have been acknowledged in earlier studies (e.g. Megginson & Weiss, 1991; Jääskeläinen & 
Maula, 2008). I therefore believe that the insights, on which our findings are based, are also applicable for 
early stage investments.  
Finally, I acknowledge the limitations inherent in the time frame of the first and second study. The first 
study only accounts for the influence of knowledge accumulation within a time period of three years. It 
also incorporates the effect of experiential and internal knowledge over a restricted time period due to lack 
of data. This approach hence implies that the effects of foreign knowledge accumulation fade away over 
time. Future research could verify the longevity of the effects of foreign knowledge development. A 
potential limitation to the time frame adopted in the second study relates to the increasing popularity of 
secondary buyouts. Through bivariate and multivariate analyses, we checked for the potential effect of 
timing on our results. Fortunately, this did not indicate an effect of effect of timing on the likelihood of a 
financial compare to a strategic acquisition exit.  
5.3.2.2. Variables  
 
There are some limitations related to the measurement of the variables used in our studies. First of all, we 
do not control for the impact of an office presence abroad. There is however an increasing awareness that 
this can alleviate the information asymmetries of private equity investors across borders (Meuleman & 
Wright, 2011). Future research could incorporate whether it increases the number of cross-border 
investments of international private equity investors in addition to the type and country of acquisition of 
private equity backed companies. Moreover, the first study only incorporates the effect of foreign 
knowledge accumulation through non-domestic network partners. Professional service firms could 
however also develop relevant knowledge through domestic network partners with foreign experience. It 
would be interesting to analyze whether these sources of external knowledge complement of substitute for 
the external knowledge accumulated through foreign network partners. Moreover, the second and third 
study of this dissertation measure respectively reputation and experience of the private equity investor 
through the CMBOR database that incorporates European investments, including UK, Continental Europe 
and Central European countries. For financial intermediaries that originate from countries outside Europe, 
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we may underestimate their overall and industry-specific reputation in addition to their overall experience. 
The private equity investors however only account for a limited proportion of all acquisition exits in our 
sample, respectively for 15% of all acquisitions in the second study and for 14% of all acquisitions in the 
third study. Most of these investors are US private equity investors. Excluding investments that involve 
non-European investors does not alter our main findings, indicating that the potential effect of this 
limitation is expected to be low.  
 
5.3.2.3. Method of analysis 
 
Since the dependent variables of our second and third study are binary, we employ logit analyses. In order 
to test the moderating effects in these studies, we relied on seemingly unrelated estimations rather than 
including interaction terms. As highlighted in these studies, estimating interaction terms in a logit 
regression does not result in a constant coefficient across all observations. In contrast, the magnitude and 
the sign of the moderating effect are a function of not only the coefficient for the interaction, but also the 
coefficients for each interacted variable and the values of all the variables. As a result, the inclusion of 
interaction terms in logit regressions may hence potentially lead towards erroneous results (Hoetker, 
2007).  
The seemingly unrelated estimation procedure is employed after a split sample procedure. Concerning the 
moderating effects of continuous variables, our sample is hence divided between groups with a high 
compared to a low reputation –for the second study- or between groups with a high or a low level of 
institutional development –for the third study. Within group variation in the different subsamples is hence 
not fully incorporated in our studies. A second mechanism to test moderating effect of a variable in logit 
analyses is to use a correction procedure that computes the marginal effect of a change in two interacted 
variables through the “inteff” postestimation command in STATA (Norton, Wang & Ai, 2004). This 
method makes it possible to analyze moderating effects of continuous variables without the loss of 
information on intragroup variation as in the split sample procedure. Unfortunately, the inteff command 
does not work in a model with multiple interactions terms that include the same independent variable. This 
issue is yet to be further addressed in statistical research (Seymour, 2011). 
5.4. Practical implications 
 
The findings presented in the three studies have several practical implications for private equity investors. 
First, our findings are of interest for private equity investors that consider cross-border investing. While 
we highlight that international investing is a learning process; private equity investors with international 
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aspirations should also proactively focus on global talent management. The integration of managers with 
foreign experiences helps to deal with the increasing complexity of selecting and monitoring cross-border 
investments. We also stress the benefits of local specialization. Gaining experience and a building 
reputation through active presence within the country of investment is highly valued. It increases the 
ability to monitor an investment and certifies your local expertise towards potential acquirers. It also 
connects the cross-border private equity investor towards domestic acquirers. Second, we highlight the 
benefits of reputation and experience for private equity investors that exit their buyouts. While earlier 
findings mainly stress their effects on IPO exits (Megginson & Weiss, 1991), we suggest that both 
experience and reputation are highly important for acquisition exits as well. Third, this dissertation 
explains the increasing popularity of secondary buyouts. Despite the presumption of the popular media 
that they are exits of last resort, this is an increasingly attractive mechanism to keep firms that operate 
efficiently under the governance of private equity investors and it offers the existing private equity 
investor an ability to exit his investment.  
Our findings have furthermore implications for entrepreneurs. They have to reckon the long term 
consequences of their private equity investor selection. More specifically, the private equity investor has 
an important role in the exit of a buyout as it affects the type and origin of the acquirer substantially. 
Given the impact of acquirer type and origin on the strategy, employment, productivity and wages of the 
acquired firm (Hege, Lovo, Slovin & Sushka, 2011, Balsvik & Haller, 2010), investor selection will 
indirectly influence the long term perspectives of the company’s management and employees. Moreover, 
entrepreneurial companies should not solely focus on the overall reputation and experience when 
selecting a particular private equity investor but also look at the specialization of these investors and their 
achievements within a particular region.  
For policy makers, these studies provide additional insights on the effect of the institutional context for 
private equity investing. We show that acquisition exits can develop as alternative exit mechanism for 
later stage investments in regions with illiquid stock markets. As such, we highlight the importance of a 
well-functioning acquisition climate in order to attract international private equity investors. Furthermore, 
our findings stress the need for financial market development to promote international private equity 
investing. Under higher levels of financial market development, it is much easier for cross-border private 
equity investors to operate in a novel country.  
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5.6. Tables 
 
TABLE 5.1.: OVERVIEW FINDINGS OF THE THREE DISSERTATION STUDIES 
Title study The influence of 
experiential, inherited and 
external knowledge on the 
internationalization of 
private equity investors 
Acquisition exits of cross-
border buyouts: 
Differentiating between 
financial and strategic 
acquisitions 
Cross-border financial 
intermediation and 
domestic acquisitions: The 
role of host country 
experience 
Dependent 
variable 
The internationalization of 
private equity investors (the 
likelihood and the extent of 
international activities) 
The difference between 
financial and strategic 
acquisition exits of 
internationally owned 
buyouts 
The difference between 
domestic and international 
acquisitions of 
internationally owned 
buyouts 
Independent 
variables 
Foreign knowledge 
accumulation through 
experiential, inherited and 
external knowledge 
Reputation: overall, 
country-specific and 
industry-specific reputation 
Host country experience 
Unit of 
analysis 
Acquirer: private equity 
investor 
Portfolio firm: acquisition 
target 
Portfolio firm: acquisition 
target 
Overview 
findings 
H1 supported: Experiential 
foreign knowledge increases 
the internationalization of 
private equity investors  
 
 
 
H2 supported: Inherited 
foreign knowledge increases 
the internationalization of 
private equity investors  
 
 
 
 
 
H3 not supported: External 
foreign knowledge does not 
increase the 
internationalization of 
private equity investors 
H1 supported: Overall 
reputation of the cross-
border PE investor reduces 
the information 
asymmetries in the 
acquisition exits of cross-
border buyouts 
 
H2 supported: Country-
specific reputation of the 
cross-border PE investor 
reduces the information 
asymmetries in the 
acquisition exits of cross-
border buyouts 
 
 
H3 supported: Industry-
specific reputation of the 
cross-border PE investor 
reduces the information 
asymmetries in the 
acquisition exits of cross-
border buyouts 
H1 supported: Host country 
experience of the cross-
border PE investor increases 
the likelihood of a domestic 
acquisition exit 
 
 
H2 supported: The positive 
effect of host country 
experience on the likelihood 
of a domestic acquisition is 
contingent on the 
connectivity of domestic 
acquirers towards local 
sources of information. 
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Nederlandstalige samenvatting (Summary in 
Dutch) 
Private equity investeerders of durfkapitalisten zijn investeringsmaatschappijen die zich specialiseren in 
de financiering of overname van niet-beursgenoteerde ondernemingen met het doel deze op middellange 
termijn door te verkopen, meestal na een periode van 5 tot 7 jaar. Hun investeringsaanpak wordt 
gekenmerkt door een strikte selectie en actieve begeleiding van hun participatie. Om een sterke 
betrokkenheid binnen de participatie optimaal te garanderen, richtten private equity ondernemingen zich 
traditioneel voornamelijk op lokale investeringsopportuniteiten. 
Ondanks de voordelen van een lokale investering, is er de laatste twee decennia een sterke toename van 
het aantal buitenlandse participaties binnen de private equity sector. Bijgevolg waren meer dan één op vijf 
transacties in de periode 2000-2010 internationale investeringen. Bovendien zijn internationale 
investeringen gemiddeld véél grotere transacties, waardoor de internationale private equity markt  tijdens 
dezelfde periode meer dan 70% van de globale transactiewaarde vertegenwoordigde. De drang tot 
diversificatie en de toenemende concurrentie op de lokale markt zijn hiervan enkele onderliggende 
oorzaken. Een internationale durfkapitalist dient echter om te gaan met de potentiële moeilijkheden van 
het investeren over lange afstand. Daarom bestudeert dit doctoraal proefschrift in welke mate de 
aanpassing van de durfkapitalist aan de internationale context het internationaal investeringsgedrag 
bepaalt. We focussen ons hierbij zowel op de oorzaken als op de gevolgen van internationalisering.  
Een eerste studie onderzoekt de relatie tussen het internationaal investeringsgedrag en de kennis over 
internationalisering. We onderzoeken zowel de kennis die men haalt uit eigen internationale ervaringen 
alsook uit de samenwerking met buitenlandse partners en de eerdere internationale werkervaring van het 
investeringsmanagement. Onze resultaten bevestigen het belang aan van een behoorlijke kennis over 
internationalisering. De kennis uit eigen internationale ervaring speelt de grootste rol, maar ook de 
ervaringen van het investeringsmanagement hebben een belangrijke invloed. Een opmerkelijke bevinding 
van het onderzoek is het effect van een internationaal netwerk op het investeringsgedrag: een zeer intense 
samenwerking met steeds dezelfde internationale partners reduceert de internationalisering van een 
durfkapitalist. Dit leidt namelijk tot een isolering waardoor men interessante investeringsopportuniteiten 
aan zich voorbij laat gaan. 
In de tweede en derde studie wordt de aandacht verschoven naar de gevolgen van het internationaal 
investeringsgedrag. We richten ons meerbepaald op de verkoop van een internationale participatie in een 
management buyout. In een management buyout wordt een onderneming beheerd door een combinatie 
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van managers en durfkapitalisten die tot doel hebben deze participatie op middellange termijn zelf door te 
verkopen. In de tweede en derde studie richten we ons dan ook specifiek op het verkoopproces van de 
management buyout door de internationale private equity investeerder. In een tweede studie ligt de 
klemtoon op de verschillende types van verkoop. We onderzoeken de verschillen tussen de verkoop van 
aan een nieuwe durfkapitalist (een secondary buyout) enerzijds en aan een niet-financiële, onderneming 
anderzijds. We tonen aan dat een secondary buyout vooral is weggelegd voor participaties in 
ondernemingen met een hoge efficiëntie in tegenstelling tot de verkoop aan een strategische speler. Hierbij 
speelt de groei van de buyout een grote rol. We stellen bovendien vast dat buitenlandse investeerders met 
een hoge reputatie er beter in slagen om een koper te vinden die aansluit bij het profiel van de investering. 
Naast de invloed van algemene reputatie blijkt ook de reputatie binnen de sector en voornamelijk de 
reputatie binnen het land van investering een positief effect te hebben op de verkoop van een 
internationale participatie. Dit laatste wijst op het belang van lokale verankering voor internationale 
durfkapitalisten. 
Een derde studie tenslotte onderzoekt de nationaliteit van de kopers van deze internationale participaties. 
In dit onderzoek focussen we specifiek op de rol van lokale ervaring voor een internationale durfkapitalist. 
Uit onze resultaten blijkt dat lokale ervaring de informatiekosten van een binnenlandse koper reduceert 
waardoor de kans op een verkoop aan een lokale speler toeneemt. Hierbij mogen we niet uit het oog 
verliezen dat het effect van lokale ervaring niet in alle omstandigheden even sterk is. De voordelen van 
lokale ervaring spelen voornamelijk een rol in de verkoop aan andere durfkapitalisten. De verkoop aan 
niet-financiële spelers is minder gedreven door de lokale ervaring van de verkoper aangezien niet-
financiële spelers in mindere mate beroep doen op durfkapitalisten als een bron van informatie. Daarnaast 
blijkt de invloed van lokale ervaring toe te nemen in een minder gunstige institutionele context. Aangezien 
een moeilijke institutionele context de nood aan informatie van lokale kopers verhoogt, hechten deze 
kopers een groter belang aan de informatie die door de internationale durfkapitalisten verspreid wordt.  
Deze drie studies geven een beter inzicht in de manier waarop een durfkapitalist zich kan aanpassen aan 
een internationale omgeving. Deze studies bevestigen onze hypothese dat de aanpassing van de 
investeerder aan de specifieke, internationale context een grote rol heeft op de oorzaken en gevolgen van 
het internationaal investeringsgedrag.  
 
 
